Chapter 6 focuses on the men who were caught in the act of trying to start the intended rebellion. They were all free people of African descent, yet some among them also invited enslaved people to join the rebellion. Thus, relations between enslaved and free people are at the center of this chapter. The ways in which these people talked about freedom and bondage with one another presents a picture in which it is impossible to say that the conspiracy was definitively anti- or pro-slavery. There were some men who took abolition of slavery quite seriously, and there were others who had no interest in the matter whatsoever. Those who fit the latter group were connected to a shadowy group of elite white men who had been planning their own rebellion. Evidence of these white men’s participation in a conspiracy showed up frequently during a significant number of different men’s interrogations. The High Court chose to ignore or dismiss all such claims, clearing the way for them to transform the collective insurgencies of 1798 into a so-called Pardo conspiracy, free from confusion, free from uneven relations, and unconnected to the aims of elite white men.

In light of police raids and de facto forms of censorship, Shelley Streeby has powerfully pointed to what she aptly terms “the limits of print as an archive of radical memory,” and, so too, the limits within American literary studies in so far recognizing the various and voluminous genres of nineteenth-century radical print culture – from fiery speeches and satirical strike songs to political pamphlets, worker song-poems, insurgent novels, and experimental biography – as literature. This chapter explores the ways American literature nevertheless archives radical movements and the ways nineteenth-century radicals engaged with and rethought the canon of American literature. It also considers how nineteenth-century US radicalism shaped American literature more broadly by turning to Henry James’s 1886 novel The Bostonians as an unexpectedly rich archive of radical abolition and its legacies.

One of the core principles essential to an anesthesiologist’s fund of knowledge is that of general pharmacology. The aim of this chapter is to provide a foundation of key pharmacology principles necessary for the clinical application of anesthesia. The understanding of pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics is fundamental to maintaining anesthesia in a safe manner. This chapter will present basic pharmacological principles that govern anesthetic drug behavior, such as absorption, volume of distribution, clearance, metabolism, context sensitive half-time, extrahepatic modes of metabolism, and the impact of liver and renal dysfunction on anesthetic pharmacology.

The chapter returns to what has been called the “central paradox of American history,” the ostensible contradiction between this nation’s declared liberal ideals (“all men” being promised the inalienable right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”) and its sanctioning of slavery, the supreme denial of liberty. It focuses on how antebellum debates (literary, political, and theological) over the moral and political legitimacy of slavery were ultimately debates over “personhood” in order to make clear that the conceptual category of the “person” (the center of liberal thought) needs to be understood as a historically contingent – rather than absolute – identity. Noting how deeply modern accounts of slavery remain indebted to the liberal presumption that slavery is wrong precisely to the extent that those enslaved possess a fixed, transhistorical personhood (a personhood that racism, ideology, or self-interest too often obscures), the chapter seeks to leave behind arguments over the conflict between slavery and liberalism and ultimately asks whether it is possible to imagine a liberatory politics that does not require the “person” to be at its center.

Many states have realized there is a shortage of lawyers in rural areas and have decided to improve legal access in rural communities. This chapter surveys the current approaches to increasing access to justice or access to lawyers in rural areas. South Dakota has the earliest and most robust program, and the origin of that program is shared in detail.

This chapter examines freedom of thought in Colombia. No Constitution of Colombia has stipulated the right to freedom of thought since the country’s independence. However, its existence is currently undisputed in the Colombian legal system due to the Constitutional Court jurisprudence. Since 1997, the Court has defined this freedom as a stand-alone forum internum right and has delineated its content and attributes. However, case-law references to this right have been mainly rhetorical for at least three reasons. First, scepticism about its practical utility given that thoughts have been considered impossible to access. Second, cases related to the right to freedom of thought usually involve interests that also fall under the protective remit of other rights, which are directly stipulated by the Constitution. Third, the Court’s characterization of the relation and differences between the right to freedom of thought and other rights (i.e., freedom of expression and freedom of conscience) is inconsistent, complex, as well as conceptually and practically unclear. We do think it is necessary for the Colombian legal system to make advancements on the conceptual and normative independence of freedom of thought to reinforce the protection of the forum internum.

Chapter 6 employs Welby’s Meaning Triad to investigate whether the boundary for the beginning of girlhood should be clearly identified in the international legal framework. It studies the definitions of child under international law and in the English language to assess whether they establish a beginning point for girlhood. It conducts two case studies concerning, respectively, the practice of prenatal sex selection and the right of young and adolescent girls to a safe abortion, to illustrate the significance for girl children of the current boundary for the beginning of girlhood under international law. It studies the sense, meaning and significance of provisions in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and refers to their respective travaux préparatoires.

In recent discussions on the right to freedom of thought (RFoT) it has been emphasised that for an adequate understanding, development, and application of the right, one should consider how the RFoT relates to or complements other rights, such as the right to mental privacy, mental integrity and the freedom of expression. In this chapter, we examine the interrelationship between the RFoT and the protection of mental privacy and mental integrity. Considering the case of employing emerging neurotechnology in criminal justice, we explore how the absolute protection offered by the RFoT relates to the qualified protection of mental privacy and mental integrity offered by the right to respect for private life. We argue that, depending on the interpretation of these rights, they have the potential to overlap, which raises the need to develop a legal mechanism to distinguish absolute from qualified protection of mental privacy and mental integrity. We suggest three general factors that could be relevant in this regard: (1) the mental effects of an interference and the method of inducing them, (2) the victim’s vulnerability, and (3) the context of a mental interference.

Chapter 2 is situated in the context of Portugal’s internal conflicts with its colonies. In 1787, a group of so-called Brahmin priests who attributed racism to their lack of clerical promotions planned a revolt against Portuguese authority in Goa. In the Kingdom of Kongo, a rebellion in 1788 by the smaller Kingdom of Musulu spread into Portuguese slave-trading territories in Angola, initiating a war between Portugal and Musulu. Finally, a conspiracy in 1789 to end Portuguese rule in Minas Gerais, Brazil included slaveholders with outstanding debts who were in jeopardy of losing their property, including the people they enslaved. Two things stand out from placing these events together. First, we see more acutely how slavery and the slave trade not only supported the entirety of the Portuguese empire but also constituted its very framework. Second, and relatedly, the 1798 conspiracy in Bahia may have been more explicitly about race and slavery than these other three episodes. But it is, in fact, race and slavery that tied them together, a claim which orients the reader towards thinking about the Tailors’ conspiracy as part of an empire-wide phenomenon in the remaining chapters.

This chapter concerns environmental relationships between Europe and the rest of the world. Europe and Europeans, and Europe’s flora and fauna, altered environments on other continents. The content of other continents’ biotas, and their soils, seas, and mineral veins, affected Europe too. These sorts of connections, involving animals, plants, microbes, minerals – and many other components of the natural world – had occasionally powerful impacts on European and indeed world history. They began many millennia ago. This chapter begins with an overview of Europe’s distinctive environmental features. It then turns to four broad and overlapping categories, all considered only as regards European connections to other world regions: Europe’s history of biological exchanges, beginning with the arrival from Southwest Asia of the Neolithic complex of domesticated plants and animals; its imperial environmental history, which began in the fifteenth century; its industrial environmental history, which began in late eighteenth century; and the intellectual environmental history of Europe’s interactions with the wider world, mainly between 1700 and 1950.