Good states want to increase the well-being of their citizens, and act to do this. Insofar as state efforts constrain action for the sake of well-being, however, there is a danger that these constraints will limit liberty in a way that actually undercuts the individual achievement of well-being. If we limit liberty in order to bring us to one desirable state (say, good health) that doesn’t necessarily increase well-being if the loss of liberty in itself diminishes well-being. However, when we consider the three major theories of well-being, hedonism, desire-satisfaction, and objective list theories, we see that there is nothing in the loss of liberty that necessarily diminishes well-being at all. It depends on what that loss brings about. Sometimes liberties make us better off, but it depends on the specific liberty and what it contributes. There is nothing about loss of liberty per se that does us any harm.

In law and scholarship, natural rights are associated more often with libertarian theories than theories of natural law. This chapter contrasts the two models of natural rights. Natural law-based natural rights rely on the interest theory of rights, not will theories. In natural law theories, autonomy is subordinate to rational flourishing and not a good on its own. Natural law theories make relevant the consequences on people of structuring rights in different ways. And in natural law theories political communities may accord broader rights to their members than to outsiders. The chapter illustrates the jus abutendi or right to destroy, the trespass case State v. Shack, doctrines about the acquisition of captured wild animals and whales, and the Native American property case Johnson v. M’Intosh.

The commonest view on the essential moral nature of manipulation is that manipulation is pro tanto wrong: it is wrong as such but, given countervailing considerations, can be all-things-considered morally justified. The argument in this chapter, in contrast, is that manipulation is not intrinsically morally bad. This claim has never been argued for systematically. Reviewing the most probable bad-making features associated with manipulation shows that none of them is necessarily exhibited by it. The chapter then lays out a broad phenomenological description of the many positive contributions manipulation makes to human life. This reveals manipulation as an indispensable “social lubricant” and an element of the good life for people. The main moral conclusions of this review are (a) that manipulation is (not only not necessarily bad, but) not even typically bad. And (b) that rational choosers “behind a veil of ignorance” would choose a society where certain kinds of (mutually enjoyable or prosocial) manipulation are part of the ordinary repertoire. This suggests, in turn, that manipulation does not necessarily disrespect the autonomy of persons – since they choose to be subjected to it. This constitutes a new argument against the charge that manipulation disrespects autonomy.

Karen Bauer offers a comprehensive review of the Islamic moral framework as outlined in the Qur’an, situating Islamic gender norms within this context. The chapter demonstrates how these norms support a hierarchical structure that also emphasizes fairness.

Private employers and their health insurers have come to occupy a central role in access to reproductive care for the majority of Americans through a complex legal infrastructure that effectuates employers’ choices in their employee benefit plans. While some aspects of state insurance law, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the Affordable Care Act (ACA), and anti-discrimination laws encourage employers to cover reproductive care, this web of laws is very porous and predominantly supports employers’ choices. Sometimes, this validation of employer choices expands access to reproductive care services, as in the case of Walmart extending its benefits to cover abortion-related travel expenses in the wake of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health. But employers who wish to restrict access to reproductive care also find their preferences validated by law, as illustrated in Hobby Lobby’s successful bid to refuse coverage for certain contraceptive drugs, despite the ACA’s mandate to cover them. The additional deregulation that employers’ “self-insured” plans enjoy under ERISA preemption, combined with the prevalence of these plans, amplifies these effects. In essence, the availability of funding for reproductive care for the majority of Americans of reproductive age is left to the promises enshrined in employers’ health benefit plans and the incentives that these entities pursue in designing their plans. This chapter untangles the legal web that gives private sector employers this gatekeeper role, and explores the implications of our reliance on employers for individuals’ reproductive freedom.

“Militant Neoclassicism” argues that W. E. B. Du Bois marshaled post-Kantian aesthetics against the anthropological categories posited by Enlightenment theorists. The chapter departs from the traditional interpretation of Du Bois as a champion of integration, which relies heavily on The Souls of Black Folk at the expense of Du Bois’s later Marxism. This interpretation downplays his controversial advocacy for the self-segregation of African-American communities, which sought to capitalize on intra-group solidarity in order to rectify class conflict. The chapter argues that these collectives, spheres of free action carved out from predominately white social structures, evince the aesthetic autonomy theorized by Friedrich Schiller, whom Du Bois admired and quotes in Souls. Attending to aesthetic autonomy also reveals new connections between Du Bois and cultural anthropology, especially the work of Ruth Benedict, who advanced aesthetic arguments about anthropological communities that distinguished themselves from a dominant social milieu.

This chapter covers the common ethical and legal issues that arise in psychiatry. It begins with an overview of the four ethical principles guiding medical practice: autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. A brief discussion of parens patriae and police power follow, highlighting their particular applications in psychiatry. The chapter then goes on to illustrate how the balancing of these principles guides everyday ethical and legal issues. Confidentiality and its exceptions in the interests of safety and prevention of abuse/neglect are covered in detail. Next, informed consent and decision-making are explored. The requirements for informed consent are reviewed, leading into a discussion of those instances when an individual lacks capacity for informed consent (surrogate decision-making, involuntary admission and treatment, and exceptions). Finally, the chapter closes with an examination of the prohibitions against dual relationships, including sexual relationships, with patients.

This chapter argues the freedom requires the capacity for self-government or autonomy as one of its components.

This chapter argues that it is ethical to buy sweatshop products. It explains why arguments to the contrary made in the business ethics literature fail, why sweatshops are not wrongfully exploitative, and why it is better to benefit workers a little bit rather than not at all. It also considers how background injustices impact the ethics of sweatshop employment, and finally reviews issues of worker autonomy and goals other than the welfare of sweatshop workers.

This chapter discusses social-cognitive domain theory (SCDT) as a theoretical lens for studying parental monitoring and adolescents’ information management. Theoretical concepts are presented, social cognitive domains are defined, and research applying SCDT to parenting and adolescent information management is reviewed. Research on various beliefs (parental authority legitimacy, parents’ right to know about adolescents’ behaviors, adolescents’ obligations to disclose to and obey parents) and adolescents’ reasons for disclosing and concealing information are discussed and related to adolescents’ disclosure and nondisclosure. Distinctions are drawn between issues that are legitimately regulated by parents (i.e. moral, conventional, prudential issues) and those viewed as personal prerogatives and essential to autonomy and identity development. Developmental changes, cultural variations, and parent-adolescent discrepancies in beliefs are discussed, and explanations are considered for observed discrepancies between youth’s beliefs about obligations to disclose their risky behaviors and involvement in those behaviors. The chapter concludes with directions for future research.

Although debate has long raged about how to understand the emergence of modern industrial society, it has generally been agreed until recently that Europe’s (and especially Britain’s) pioneering role was enabled by certain distinctive features of its history, economy, or society. Today, however, certain scholars deny this, arguing that other societies had reached a level of development from which a transition similar to Britain’s could have emerged, and that the special trajectory Britain followed was enabled only by accidental or incidental factors or circumstances. The two proposed candidates are China and India, and this chapter takes up and seeks to refute the claims made in regard to each, in the process developing comparisons that show the utility of the categories of autonomy and teleocracy employed throughout this book for the history of industry. The impressive achievements of both countries are acknowledged and described, but growth and sophistication are shown to be insufficient without the structural features that made British society the special case it was.