The calibration between national regulatory oversight and local policy autonomy is a prominent feature in the discussion regarding social assistance institutions in large countries. The complex principal-agent structure embedded within such institutions and the resultant information asymmetry make it difficult for the national principal to monitor the behaviour of subnational agents, resulting in prevalent mis-targeting of welfare benefits and petty corruption. Built on a principal-agent framework, this study seeks to explain the puzzling shrinkage of China’s Minimum Livelihood Guarantee Scheme (Dibao) in recent years. Accountability mechanisms are found to exert major impacts on the scale of welfare programs. Using a unique city-level panel dataset and difference-in-differences (DID) strategy, this quantitative study finds that discipline inspection by upper-level government leads to a significant decrease of Dibao coverage in a city, a link reinforced by the local intensity of China’s anti-corruption campaign. Blame avoidance and the defensive reaction of local agents triggered by draconian enforcement of accountability result in distorted welfare administration on the ground. Building informational capacity presents a useful approach in mitigating the vertical control–autonomy dilemma illustrated in this study.

This article applies the lessons from the prior theory of responsive regulation in criminology to EU competition law and extends these lessons to argue in favour of an enhanced form of responsive competition law. First, it finds that EU competition law enforcement is already responsive in the traditional sense as it takes the reactions of undertakings into account when deciding which instrument to apply, in accordance with the enforcement pyramid developed by Braithwaite. An enforcement pyramid for EU competition law is presented. The objectives of competition law are found to be broad, and its key norms are open, facilitating responsiveness. This also allows competition law to develop to meet new societal demands, such as the need to control market power in the digital realm and to combat climate change. Next, the article examines the role of responsive and accountable behaviour by undertakings in competition law. First, it is found that in line with new forms of regulation concerning non-financial reporting, greenwashing, data protection, digital markets and services, and artificial intelligence, the special responsibility of dominant undertakings in competition law increasingly demands a pro-active approach to compliance. This also involves considering the interests of third parties and framing private governance in accordance with fundamental rights and legal principles. An enhanced degree of responsiveness of dominant undertakings results. Second, additional space is being created within competition law to accommodate undertakings that behave in a socially responsible manner, notably regarding sustainability. This is examined in relation to the issue of a fair share for consumers, and private enforcement by means of compliance agreements. After discussing potential objections to responsiveness in terms of democratic legitimacy, legal certainty, and redistribution of wealth, the article concludes that the developments sketched above indeed point towards the reinforcement of the responsive nature of competition law.

Accountability—the expectation on the side of the decision maker that she may have to justify her decisions in front of somebody else—has been found by psychologists to strongly influence decision-making processes. The awareness of this issue remains however limited amongst economists, who tend to focus on the motivational effects of financial incentives. Accountability and incentives may provide different motivations for decision makers, and disentangling their effects is thus important for understanding real-world situations in which both are present. Separating accountability and incentives, I find different effects. Accountability is found to reduce preference reversals between frames, for which incentives have no effect. Incentives on the other hand are found to reduce risk seeking for losses, where accountability has no effect. In a choice task between simple and compound events, accountability increases the preference for the normatively superior simple event, while incentives have a weaker effect going in the opposite direction.

This special collection of papers reflects the work of contributing authors to the newly released book Legacies of Fukushima: 3.11 in Context (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021). The edited volume addresses the Fukushima nuclear crisis in Japan, taking a multi-dimensional, cross-disciplinary approach to understanding this epic disaster. The book is an intersectional collaboration that is unique in that it incorporates the work of Japan-area scholars, journalists, nuclear experts and Science, Technology and Society (STS) scholars from Japan and abroad, who discuss the trajectory of the Fukushima nuclear disaster in the first decade since its inception. There are 19 authors whose work is included in the book; this special edition of selected papers for The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus evokes that work, and while they do not entirely represent the scope of the material included in the edited volume, these papers delve into issues that any disaster studies scholar or student of the Fukushima nuclear disaster will find compelling.

Public sector worker absence has been cited as a reason for the poor performance of public services. This paper argues that the differential attention politicians pay to public services over their tenure cycle can explain levels of absenteeism. Using the case of teachers in India, teachers and politicians are embedded in a dynamic principal-agent relationship that allows for absenteeism when electoral incentives are not salient and results in increased accountability when they are. I constructed a panel of all schools across India between 2006 and 2018, employed an event study design, and found that teacher absenteeism decreases the year before an election and is higher the year after an election. I found inconsistent effects in the private sector, lending support for a channel of political control in the public sector. Political interference has an effect on bureaucratic performance, and relationships between public sector workers and politicians can ameliorate absenteeism.

Populists emerge when distrust of state institutions or dissatisfaction with democracy convince voters that claims about conspiring elites blocking the general will are valid. We propose that these dynamics change when populists are incumbents; once they command institutions, their sustained support becomes contingent upon trust in the new institutional order, and they are held accountable for making people think democracy is working well. Newly collected data on party populism and survey data from Latin America show that support for populist parties in the region is conditioned by satisfaction with democracy as well as the incumbency status of populists. Dissatisfied voters support populist opposition parties, but support for populist incumbents is higher among those satisfied with democracy and its institutions. While democratic deficits and poor governance provide openings for populists, populists are held accountable for institutional outcomes.

In response to our critics, we clarify and defend key ideas in the report Open and Inclusive: Fair Processes for Financing Universal Health Coverage. First, we argue that procedural fairness has greater value than Dan Hausman allows. Second, we argue that the Report aligns with John Kinuthia's view that a knowledgeable public and a capable civil society, alongside good facilitation, are important for effective public deliberation. Moreover, we agree with Kinuthia that the Report's framework for procedural fairness applies not merely within the health sector, but also to the wider budget process. Third, we argue that while Dheepa Rajan and Benjamin Rouffy-Ly are right that robust processes for equal participation are often central to a fair process, sometimes improvements in other aspects of procedural fairness, such as transparency, can take priority over strengthening participation. Fourth, while we welcome Sara Bennett and Maria Merritt's fascinating use of the Report's principles of procedural fairness to assess the US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, we argue that their application of the Report's principle of equality to development partners' decision-making requires further justification.

How can citizens in authoritarian regimes exercise oversight of the legal system? I examine police and court monitoring, bottom-up oversight activities popular in pre-war Russia (2012–2022). Monitoring pushes the state to honor commitments it has made in its own laws, taking advantage of the authoritarian state’s need for information and legitimacy. Yet monitoring activities are not just about improving the state’s performance. Using interviews, participant observation and document analysis of monitoring campaigns in pre-war Russia, I argue that monitoring can empower citizens in a profoundly disempowering environment, perhaps its most important legacy in a closing authoritarian space.

We summarise key messages from the World Bank Report Open and Inclusive: Fair Processes for Financing Universal Health Coverage. A central lesson of the Report is that in decision-making on the path to Universal Health Coverage (UHC), procedural fairness matters alongside substantive fairness. Decision systems should be assessed using a complete conception of procedural fairness that embodies core commitments to impartial and equal consideration of interests and perspectives. These commitments demand that comprehensive information is gathered and disclosed and that justifications for policies are publicly debated; that participation in decision-making is enabled; and that these characteristics of the decision system are institutionalised rather than up to the good will of decision-makers. Procedural fairness can improve equity in outcomes, raise legitimacy and trust, and can help make reforms last. While improving procedural fairness can be costly and there are barriers to achieving it, the range of instruments that countries at varying levels of income and institutional capacity have used with some success shows that, in many contexts, advances in procedural fairness in health financing are possible and worthwhile.