We report on sealed-bid second-price auctions that we conducted on the Internet using subjects with substantial prior experience: they were highly experienced participants in eBay auctions. Unlike the novice bidders in previous (laboratory) experiments, the experienced bidders exhibited no greater tendency to overbid than to underbid. However, even subjects with substantial prior experience tended not to bid their values, suggesting that the non-optimal bidding of novice subjects is robust to substantial experience in non-experimental auctions. We found that auction revenue was not significantly different from the expected revenue the auction would generate if bidders bid their values. Auction efficiency, as measured by the percentage of surplus captured, was substantially lower in our SPAs than in previous laboratory experiments.

We propose a simple adaptive learning model to study behavior in the call market. The laboratory environment features buyers and sellers who receive a new random value or cost in each period, so they must learn a strategy that maps these random draws into bids or asks. We focus on buyers’ adjustment of the “mark-down” ratio of bids relative to private value and sellers’ adjustment of the corresponding “mark-up” ratio of asks relative to private cost. The learning model involves partial adjustment of these ratios towards the ex post optimum each period. The model explains a substantial proportion of the variation in traders’ strategies. Parameter estimates indicate strong recency effects and negligible autonomous trend, but strongly asymmetric response to different kinds of ex post error. The asymmetry is only slightly attenuated in “observational learning” from other traders’ ex post errors. Simulations show that the model can account for the main systematic deviations from equilibrium predictions observed in this market institution and environment.

The presence of financial constraints changes traditional auction theory predictions. In the case of multiple items, such constraints may affect revenue equivalence and efficiency of different auction formats. We consider a simple complete information setting with three financially constrained bidders and two items that have different values common to all the bidders. Using a laboratory experiment, we find that, as predicted by theory, it is more beneficial for the seller to sell the higher value item first. We then show that the first-price sealed-bid auction yields higher revenue than the English auction, with significant differences in learning of equilibrium strategies.

Overbidding in sealed-bid second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which losses from high bids are more salient than in SPAs. Experience in FPAs causes substantial cross-game learning for cognitively less able participants but does not affect overbidding for the cognitively more able. Vice versa, experiencing SPAs before bidding in an FPA does not substantially affect bidding behavior by the cognitively less able but, somewhat surprisingly, reduces bid shading by cognitively more able participants, resulting in lower profits in FPAs. Thus, ‘cross-game learning’ may rather be understood as ‘cross-game transfer’, as it has the potential to benefit bidders with lower cognitive ability whereas it has little or even adverse effects for higher-ability bidders.

This paper considers the external validity of the growing corpus of literature that reports the use of laboratory auctions to reveal consumers’ willingness to pay for consumer goods, when the concerned goods are sold in retail stores through posted price procedures. The quality of the parallel between the field and the lab crucially depends on whether being informed of the actual field price influences a consumer's willingness to pay for a good or not. We show that the elasticity of the WTP revision according to the field price estimation error is significant, positive, and can be roughly approximate to one quarter of the error. We then discuss the normative implications of these results for future experiments aimed at eliciting private valuations through auctions.

Theoretical equivalence exists among various auction mechanisms, specifically the Second-Price-Auction (SPA), a competitive environment, and the BDM mechanism, a non-competitive environment. Yet, empirical studies suggest that behavior in these mechanisms may diverge. Our experimental study examines the WTP and the WTA of individuals by analyzing buying and selling bidding patterns both for a physical product (mugs) and for two types of lotteries (regular lotteries and extreme lotteries) in these two auctions mechanism: SPA and BDM. We found that the WTP in the SPA is higher than the WTP in the BDM for mugs and for regular lotteries, while the mechanisms do not differ significantly for extreme lotteries. In addition, the WTA in the SPA is lower than in the BDM for regular lotteries only. These results indicate that the WTP and WTA, as well as the WTA-WTP gap, tend to differ in the SPA and in the BDM as a result of the interaction between the competitiveness effect and other psychological effects on bidding patterns for riskless and risky assets. In addition, the current study suggests that the competitiveness effect depends not only on the type of mechanism (SPA), but also on the type of item (physical assets or lotteries) and the type of lottery. In addition, the influence of the competitiveness effect may vary between buying and selling positions.

Prior research has found mixed evidence for the long-theorized link between religiosity and pro-social behavior. To help overcome this divergence, I hypothesize that pro-social behavior is linked not to religiosity per se, but rather to the salience of religion and religious norms. I report a field experiment that examined when auction participants will respond to an appeal to continue bidding for secular charitable causes. Religious individuals are more likely than non-religious individuals to respond to an appeal “for charity” only on days that they visit their place of worship; on other days of the week, religiosity has no effect. Notably, the result persists after controlling for a host of factors that may influence bidding, but disappears when the appeal “for charity” is replaced by an appeal to bid for other (i.e., competitive) reasons. Implications for the link between religion and pro-social behavior are discussed.

The aim of this study was to assess the welfare of culled dairy cattle sent to an auction in the UK and identify associations between animal-based measurement and economic gain. The population of cull dairy cows sold at a Scottish livestock market were assessed on ten occasions for measures including body condition, mobility, hair loss and lesions, swelling, body cleanliness, claw conformation and total time in pre-sale pens. Details on breed, age, breeding status, farm, weight and price were gathered from market reports and cattle passports. Questionnaires sent to farms gathered information on reason for culling, retirement period (a finishing period to improve body condition), and number of lactations, among other variables. Measures such as bodyweight, breeding status, and breed type influenced price paid, with heifers and larger animals receiving higher prices. A negative effect over price paid was due to reduced mobility and hair loss scores, suggesting that some animal-based indicators of compromised welfare may be associated with a lower economic return from the cows sent to market. No influence of retirement length on price paid was noted. Reason for culling also did not influence price paid, but considering the association found between welfare and price paid, this suggests that the farmers’ reason for culling may not be necessarily revealed by the visual appearance of the cow. This study reveals reasons for culling and quantifies the welfare of dairy cows at market and demonstrates how measures of breeding status and body size, as well as measures of welfare, influence the buyers’ decisions and prices paid at auction.

Discussions about looted antiquities often focus on large, culturally and monetarily valuable items. Nevertheless, it is clear that mundane small finds, which sell for relatively small amounts, account for a large portion of the global market in antiquities. This article highlights two types of small artifacts—namely, cylinder seals and coins, presumed to come from Syria and Iraq and offered for sale by online vendors. We argue that the number of cylinder seals and coins sold on the Internet has increased steadily since 2011, reaching a peak in 2016–17. This shows that the trade in Iraqi and Syrian antiquities has shifted from big-ticket items sold in traditional brick-and-mortar shops to small items readily available on the Internet for modest prices. The continuing growth of the online market in antiquities is having a devastating effect on the archaeological sites in Iraq and Syria as increasing demand fuels further looting in the region.

This study proposes a new explanation for institutional differences of organizations in China. It focuses on how two organizational forms dominant in contemporary art markets – commercial galleries and auction houses – were first established in China in the 1990s. Based on archival and interview data, it argues that the organizational forms were introduced to China due to mimetic isomorphism, and that their divergences from the foreign models are the result of unintended consequences of institutional work. It highlights the role of individual agency, including the role of foreign nationals, in organization-building in China. The findings also have implications for institutional theory: the article shows how the political, cultural and institutional context in China shaped institutional work that needed to be conducted and led to unintended consequences of institutional work.

This paper examines the strong version of the law of one price (LOOP) on the auction market for fine wine. We draw on worldwide auction prices from eight auction houses,1 covering the time period from 2000 to 2012. Employing a hedonic approach, we find significant price premiums in particular in Hong Kong and between auction companies (independent of their locations). The price premiums by far exceed the expected transaction costs, casting doubt on the existence of the strong version of LOOP in the fine wine market. Our results suggest that heterogeneity in buyer preferences may crucially contribute to the observed price dispersion. In particular, although wines suspected of being counterfeits are sold at discounts in Western markets, they fetch price premiums in Hong Kong. (JEL Classifications: Q14, G11)

The authors present an analytical model of a first-price sealed-bid cattle auction in which a spot and coordinated markets are interconnected. The model reveals that the conventional wisdom that market coordination negatively affects the bid price in the spot market is an oversimplification. The relationships between key market variables impact bids and bid shading in complex ways. While captive supplies can lead to lower spot prices, the price reductions do not necessarily stem from an increase in market power due to contracting. The model emphasizes the importance of several variables for future empirical studies.

The direct sale of emission allowances by auction is an emerging characteristic of cap-and-trade programs. This study is motivated by the observation that all of the major implementations of cap-and-trade regulations for the control of air pollution have started with a generous allocation of allowances relative to recent emissions history, a situation we refer to as a “loose cap.” Typically more stringent reductions are achieved in subsequent years of a program. We use an experimental setting to investigate the effects of a loose cap environment on a variety of auction types. We find that all auction formats studied are efficient in allocating emission allowances, but auction revenues tend to be lower relative to competitive benchmarks when the cap is loose. Regardless of whether the cap is tight or loose, the different auction formats tend to yield comparable revenues toward the end of a series of auctions. However, aggressive bidding behavior in initial discriminatory auctions yields higher revenues than in the other auction formats, a difference that disappears as bidders learn to adjust their bids closer to the cut-off that separates winning and losing bids.

Environmental economists invest in measuring the value of the environment but put less effort toward integrating that value directly into the economy. Experimental economists evaluate the performance of mechanisms to fund public goods but in some cases offer limited insight into practical implications for developing markets. This discussion presents initial insights into applying mechanisms for private provision of public goods based on demand-side values rather than regulatory-based market incentives such as cap-and-trade policies. Consideration of mechanisms to generate revenue inspires field tests that could direct experiments using threshold public goods and Lindahl's framework toward applications that transform value into revenue.

The current system of decision making in land use law is not transparent and is open to biased or personal corruption. This gives rise to the possibility of unequal treatment under the law, especially given the judicial reluctance to interfere in reviewing the decision making process. Our solution is an auction mechanism to overcome these problems, under which the local government would be bound to award land use rights to the highest bidder and where offers will be examined in light of their contribution to the society’s best interest. Such mechanism has possible benefits in terms of transparency and insurance against favouritism or arbitrariness. The auction mechanism proposes the use of a simple metric (i.e., revealed private value of the competing claims) by which the local government can give a transparent, non-arbitrary, observable, and verifiable response. This mechanism, so we argue, treats each and every person’s choices with equal concern and respect. In this sense, the auction is procedurally fair by being conducted between potential bargainers that enjoy equality in background conditions and when means for offsetting brute bad lack are utilized.

Perceived characteristics of thin markets are described and approaches to furthering their study are suggested. Design features of a laboratory thin market, patterned after a typical livestock marketing situation, are described. Price bias and variation from a “thick” private negotiation market with 22 traders is compared to that from a “thin” auction market with 8 traders. No systematic price bias was found in any of the markets. Price variation was actually lower in the thin auction market.