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Bibliography

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 April 2025

George Tsebelis
George Tsebelis
Affiliation:
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Type
Chapter
Information
Changing the Rules
Constitutional Amendments in Democracies
 , pp. 277 - 299
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NC
This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY-NC 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/cclicenses/

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  • Bibliography
  • George Tsebelis, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
  • Book: Changing the Rules
  • Online publication: 24 April 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009597234.015
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  • Bibliography
  • George Tsebelis, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
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  • George Tsebelis, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
  • Book: Changing the Rules
  • Online publication: 24 April 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009597234.015
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