

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Acemoglu, D. & Johnson, S. (2005). Unbundling institutions. *Journal of Political Economy*, 113(5), 949–995. <https://doi.org/10.1086/432166>
- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001). The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation. *American Economic Review*, 91(5), 1369–1401. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.5.1369>
- (2002). Reversal of fortune: Geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4), 1231–1294. <https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302320935025>
- (2005). Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth. *Handbook of Economic Growth*, 1, 385–472. [https://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-0684\(05\)01006-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01006-3)
- Achen, C. H. (2000, July). Why lagged dependent variables can suppress the explanatory power of other independent variables. *Annual Meeting of the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, University of California, Los Angeles*, 20(22), 7–20.
- Ackerman, B. A. (1991). *We The People*, vol. 1. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Adamičková, N. & Königová M. (2016). Lidé mají dostat právo sáhnout při ohrožení státu po zbrani. Online article. www.novinky.cz/domaci/clanek/lide-maji-dostat-pravo-sahnout-pri-ohrozeni-statu-po-zbrani-40018504
- Adjolohoun, S. H. (2017, May 16). Benin's fourth failed constitutional reform effort: The decisive legacy of participatory processes. Online article. <https://constitutionnet.org/news/benins-fourth-failed-constitutional-reform-effort-decisive-legacy-participatory-processes>
- Albert, R. (2009). Nonconstitutional amendments. *The Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence*, 22(1), 5–47.
- (2010). Constitutional handcuffs. *Arizona State Law Journal*, 42(3), 663–716.
- (2014). The structure of constitutional amendment rules. *Wake Forest Law Review*, 49, 913.
- (2015a). Amending constitutional amendment rules. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 13(3), 655–685. <https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mov040>
- (2015b). Constitutional amendment by stealth. *McGill Law Journal*, 60(4), 673–736. <https://doi.org/10.7202/1034051ar>

- (2015c). How unwritten constitutional norms change written constitutions. *Dublin University Law Journal*, 38(2), 387–418.
- (2015d). The unamendable core of the United States constitution. In A. Koltay (ed.), *Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of Expression*. Budapest: Wolters Kluwer. 13–40.
- (2018). Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. *Yale Journal of International Law*, 43, 1–85.
- (2019). *Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Albert, R., Nakashidze, M., & Olcay, T. (2018). The formalist resistance to unconstitutional constitutional amendments. *Hastings Law Journal*, 70, 639–670.
- Alessandri Palma, A. (1967). *Recuerdos de Gobierno*, vols. 1 & 2. Santiago: Editorial Nascimento.
- Amar, A. R. (1994). The consent of the governed: Constitutional amendment outside Article V. *Columbia Law Review*, 94(2), 457–508.
- American Civil Liberties Union. (n.d.). Background on the flag desecration amendment. Online article. www.aclu.org/other/background-flag-desecration-amendment
- Anckar, D. & Karvonen, L. (2015). Constitutional amendment methods in the democracies of the world. In P. Mikuli, A. Kulig, J. Karp, & G. Kuca (eds.), *Ustroje tradycje i porownania*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe. 205–218.
- Andrade Geywitz, C. (1991). *Reforma de la Constitución Política de la República de Chile de 1980*. Santiago: Editorial Jurídica de Chile.
- Andrews, J. T. & Montinola, G. R. (2004). Veto players and the rule of law in emerging democracies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 37(1), 55–87. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414003260125>
- Ansa. (2016, January 20). Renzi, se perdo referendum vado a casa. Online article. www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/topnews/2016/01/20/renzi-se-perdo-referendum-vado-a-casa_38468242-2355-4f1f-9312-9f22046f7548.html
- Arellanes Jiménez, P. E. (2014). El Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte: Antes, durante y después, afectaciones jurídicas en México. *IUS Revista del Instituto de Ciencias Jurídicas de Puebla*, 8(3), 257–274.
- Associated Press. (2023a, January 21). Slovakia holds referendum to enable snap election. Online article. [https://apnews.com/article/politics-slovakia-government-zuzana-caputova-bdee67a3c96d635187d8e94d2683ce0b](https://apnews.com/article/politics-slovakia-government-zuzana-caputova-bdee67a3c96d635187d8e94d2683ce0b?utm_source=copy&utm_medium=share)
- (2023b, January 25). Slovakia parliament changes constitution to enable snap vote. Online article. <https://apnews.com/article/politics-slovakia-government-zuzana-caputova-bdee67a3c96d635187d8e94d2683ce0b>
- Aus, J. P. (2008). The mechanisms of consensus: Coming to agreement on community asylum policy. In D. Naurin & H. Wallace (eds.), *Unveiling the Council of the European Union: Games Governments Play in Brussels*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 99–118.

- Australian Electoral Commission. (2024, March 10). Referendums FAQs. Website. <https://web.archive.org/web/20240310091603/https://www.aec.gov.au/referendums/aec/faqs.html>
- Ballotpedia. (n.d.). Single-subject rule for ballot initiatives. Online article. https://ballotpedia.org/Single-subject_rule_for_ballot_initiatives
- Bank, M. (2016). Parliament gears up to debate new EU firearms legislation. Online article. www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/parliament-gears-up-to-debate-new-eu-firearms-legislation
- Bánkuti, M., Halmai, G., & Schepple, K. L. (2015). Hungary's illiberal turn: Disabling the constitution. In *The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy*. Budapest: Central European University Press. 37–46.
- Bárcena Juárez, S. A. (2017). Involucramiento legislativo sin reelección: La productividad de los diputados federales en México, 1985–2015. *Política y Gobierno*, 24(1), 45–79.
- Barrientos Del Monte, F. & Añorve, D. (2014). México 2013: Acuerdos, reformas y descontento. *Revista de Ciencia Política (Santiago)*, 34(1), 221–247. <https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-090X2014000100011>
- Barro, R. J. (1997). *Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Becerra, R., Salazar, P., & Woldenberg, J. (2011). *La Mecánica del Cambio Político en México: Elecciones, Partidos y Reformas*. Mexico City: Cal y Arena.
- Benoit, K. (2001). Evaluating Hungary's mixed-member electoral system. In *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?* Oxford: Oxford University Press. 477–493.
- Bergman, M. E. (2019). Rejecting constitutional reform in the 2016 Italian referendum: Analyzing the effects of perceived discontent, incumbent performance and referendum-specific factors. *Contemporary Italian Politics*, 11(2), 177–191.
- Bernaschina, M. (1956). Génesis de la Constitución de 1925. *Anales de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales*, 3(5), 46–65.
- Blake, W., Cozza, J., Armstrong, D., & Friesen, A. (2023). Social capital, institutional rules, and constitutional amendment rates. *American Political Science Review*, 118(2), 1075–1083. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423000606>
- Boehmke, F. J., Brockway, M., Desmarais, B., Harden, J. J., LaCombe, S., Linder, F., et al. (2018). State innovativeness: Dynamic rate scores from SPID v.1.0. *Harvard Dataverse*. <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/GMVOI5>
- Boros, T. (2013). Constitutional amendments in Hungary: The government's struggle against the constitutional court. Online article. www.policysolutions.hu/userfiles/elemzes/21/nachrichten_aus_ungarn_februar_2013.pdf
- Bowman, G. (2006). The art of legislative drafting. *Amicus Curiae*, 2006(64), 2–9.
- Brennan, W. J., Jr. (1991). Why have a bill of rights? *Valparaiso University Law Review*, 26(1), 1–19.

- Breuer, A. (2008). Policymaking by referendum in presidential systems: Evidence from the Bolivian and Colombian cases. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 50(4), 59–89.
- Brown, A. J. (2008). In pursuit of the “genuine partnership”: Local government and federal constitutional reform in Australia. *University of New South Wales Law Journal*, 31(2), 435–466.
- Brown, A. R. (2022). *The Dead Hand's Grip: How Long Constitutions Bind States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brunner, M. (2013). *Parliaments and Legislative Activity: Motivations for Bill Introduction*. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden.
- Buchanan, J. M. & Tullock, G. (1965). *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy*, vol. 100. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Bucur, C. & Rasch, B. E. (2019). Institutions for amending constitutions. In R. D. Congleton., B. Grofman, & S. Voigt (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice*, vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 156–176.
- Bulkan, A. (2004). Democracy in disguise: Assessing the reforms to the fundamental rights provisions in Guyana. *Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law*, 32, 613.
- Bunikowski, D. (2018). The constitutional crisis in Poland, Schmittian questions and Kaczyński’s political and legal philosophy. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 26(3), 285–307.
- Burbank, S. B. & Friedman, B. (2002). Reconsidering judicial independence. In S. B. Burbank & B. Friedman (eds.), *Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Approach*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 9–42. <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452229577.n2>
- Burgess, J. W. (1890). *Political Science and Constitutional Law*, vols. 1 & 2. Boston: Ginn & Company.
- Cadem. (2022). Encuesta Plaza Pública Segunda Semana De Septiembre: Estudio 452. Pamphlet. <https://cadem.cl/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/PP-452-67-esta-de-acuerdo-con-que-Chile-tenga-una-nueva-Constitucion.pdf>
- Cámara de Diputados. (2013). Aprueban diputados reformas constitucionales en materia político-electoral. Online article. www3.diputados.gob.mx/camara_005_comunicacion/a_boletines/2013_2013/diciembre_diciembre/05_05/2701_aprueban_diputados_reformas_constitucionales_en_materia_politico_electoral
- (2023). Reformas Constitucionales por Decreto en orden cronológico. Website. www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/cpeum_crono.htm
- Cameron, C. M. (2002). Judicial independence: How can you tell it when you see it? And, who cares? In S. B. Burbank & B. Friedman (eds.), *Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Approach*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 134–147. <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452229577.n6>

- Cantú, F. (2019, June 24). The fingerprints of fraud: Evidence from Mexico's 1988 presidential election. *American Political Science Review*, 113(3), 710–726. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000285>
- Cárdenas Gracia, J. (1994). *Transición política y reforma constitucional en México*. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
- (1998). Hacia una constitución normativa. In *El significado actual de la Constitución: Memoria del simposio internacional*. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. 93–118.
- Carrubba, C. J., Friedman, B., Martin, A. D., & Vanberg, G. (2012). Who controls the content of Supreme Court opinions? *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(2), 400–412. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00557.x>
- Carrubba, C. J., Gabel, M., Helmke, G., Martin, A. D., & Staton, J. K. (2015). When parchment barriers matter: De jure judicial independence and the concentration of power. Unpublished manuscript.
- Cassel, D. (2009). Honduras: Coup d'état in constitutional clothing? *American Society of International Law Insights*, 13(9).
- Cecarini, L. & Bordignon, F. (2017). Referendum on Renzi: The 2016 vote on the Italian constitutional revision. *South European Society and Politics*, 22(3), 281–302.
- Centre for Population. (2024, July 16). National, state and territory population: September 2023. Website. <https://web.archive.org/web/20240716120843/> <https://population.gov.au/data-and-forecasts/key-data-releases/national-state-and-territory-population-september-2023>
- Cheibub, J., Elkins, Z., & Ginsburg, T. (2014). Beyond presidentialism and parliamentarism. *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(3), 515–544. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712341300032X>
- Chetty, R., Jackson, M. O., Kuchler, T., Stroebel, J., Hendren, N., Fluegge, R. B., et al. (2022). Social capital I: Measurement and associations with economic mobility. *Nature*, 608(7921), 108–121.
- Cincurova, S., Inotai, E., Gosling, T., & Ciobanu, C. (2023, January 20). Democracy digest: Slovakia set for referendum and early election. Online article. <https://balkaninsight.com/2023/01/20/democracy-digest-slovakia-set-for-referendum-and-early-election/>
- Cingranelli, D. L. & Richards, D. L. (2008). The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project. Website. www.humanrightsdata.com
- Clague, C., Keefer, P., Knack, S., & Olson, M. (1999). Contract-intensive money: Contract enforcement, property rights, and economic performance. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 4(2), 185–211. <https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1009854405184>
- Constitute Project. (2015). Mexico's constitution of 1917 with amendments through 2015. Website. www.constituteproject.org/countries/Americas/Mexico?lang=en

- Contiades, X. & Fotiadou, A. (2016). The determinants of constitutional amendability: Amendment models or amendment culture? *European Constitutional Law Review*, 12(1), 192–211. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S157401961600002X>
- Cooter, R. D., & Ginsburg, T. (1996). Comparative judicial discretion: An empirical test of economic models. *International Review of Law and Economics*, 16(3), 295–313. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188\(96\)00018-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(96)00018-X)
- Couto, C. G. & Arantes, R. B. (2008). Constitution, government and democracy in Brazil. *World Political Science*, 4(2), 1–33.
- Cox, A. (1996). The independence of the judiciary: History and purposes. *University of Dayton Law Review*, 21(3), 565–584.
- Cramton, R. C. (1964). The powers of the Michigan Civil Rights Commission. *Michigan Law Review*, 63(1), 5–58.
- CRC special report: Michigan constitutional issues – A brief Michigan constitutional history. (2010a, February). *Citizens Research Council of Michigan*, (360–02).
- CRC special report: Michigan constitutional issues – Amending the Michigan constitution: Trends and issues. (2010b, March). *Citizens Research Council*, (360–03).
- Crosson, J. M. (2019). Stalemate in the states: Agenda control rules and policy output in American legislatures. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 44(1), 3–33.
- Cuesta-López, V. (2012). The Spanish agenda initiative and the reform of its legal regime: A new chance for participatory democracy? In *Citizens' Initiatives in Europe*. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 193–211.
- Čuroš, P. (2022, September 28). Mária Kolíková is leaving. Online article. <https://verfassungsblog.de/maria-kolikova-is-leaving/>
- (2023). Attack or reform: Systemic interventions in the judiciary in Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. *Oñati Socio-legal Series*, 13(2), 626–658.
- Davala, M. & Chudo, R. (2021, January 27). Amendment to the Constitution of the Slovak Republic focuses on reform of the judiciary. Online article. www.hkv.sk/en/amendment-to-the-constitution-of-the-slovak-republic-focuses-on-reform-of-the-judiciary/
- De Londras, F. & Morgan, D. G. (2013). Constitutional amendment in Ireland. In X. Contiades (ed.), *Engineering Constitutional Change*. London: Routledge. 179–202.
- Debre, I. & Federman, J. (2023, January 4). Israel's new government unveils plan to weaken Supreme Court. Online article. <https://apnews.com/article/politics-israel-government-benjamin-netanyahu-5b240d4bc5d2fb8f533694fc6b7b7809>
- del Tronco Paganelli, J. & Hernández Estrada, M. I. (2017). Los cambios de política de tercer orden: Recursos, ideas y actores de veto en las reformas energética y educativa (México 2013–2014). *Revista Mexicana de Análisis Político y Administración Pública*, 6(2), 67–92.

- Di Mauro, D. & Memoli, V. (2018). Targeting the government in the referendum: The aborted 2016 Italian constitutional reform. *Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, 48(2), 133–154.
- Dishon, N. (2018). Temporary constitutional amendments as a means to undermine the democratic order: Insights from the Israeli experience. *Israel Law Review*, 51(3), 389–425.
- Dixon, R. (2011). Constitutional amendment rules: A comparative perspective. In R. Dixon & T. Ginsburg (eds.), *The Research Handbook in Comparative Constitutional Law*. Northampton, MA: Elgar Publishing. 96–111.
- (2014, August 18). Partial constitutional codes. *UNSW Law Research Paper*, (2014–37). <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2482377>
- (2019, October 26). Constitutional design deferred. *UNSW Law Research Paper*, (18–63). <https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3251095>
- Dixon, R. & Baldwin, G. (2019, March). Globalizing constitutional moments? A reflection on the Japanese Article 9 debate. *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, 67(1), 145–176. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avz002>
- Dixon, R. & Holden, R. (2012). Constitutional amendment rules: The denominator problem. In T. Ginsburg (ed.), *Comparative Constitutional Design, Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 195–218.
- Dixon, R. & Landau, D. (2015). Transnational constitutionalism and a limited doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 13(3), 606–638.
- (2018). Tiered constitutional design. *The George Washington Law Review*, 86 (438), 438–512.
- Dixon, R. & Uhlmann, F. (2018). The Swiss Constitution and a weak-form unconstitutional amendment doctrine? *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 16(1), 54–74.
- Domin, M. (2019, February 8). A part of the constitution is unconstitutional, the Slovak Constitutional Court has ruled. Online article. <https://verfassungsblog.de/a-part-of-the-constitution-is-unconstitutional-the-slovak-constitutional-court-has-ruled/>
- Dove, J. A. (2015). The effect of judicial independence on entrepreneurship in the US states. *Economic Systems*, 39(1), 72–96. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecosys.2014.06.006>
- (2016). Judicial independence and economic freedom in the US states. *Applied Economics Letters*, 23(1), 78–83. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2015.1051649>
- Doyle, O. & Walsh, R. (2020). Deliberation in constitutional amendment: Reappraising Ireland's deliberative mini-publics. *European Constitutional Law Review*, 16(3), 440–465.
- Drugda, S. (2021, September 14). The People v their representatives. Online article. <https://verfassungsblog.de/the-people-v-their-representatives/>

- Dul, J. (2016). Necessary condition analysis (NCA) logic and methodology of "necessary but not sufficient" causality. *Organizational Research Methods*, 19(1), 10–52. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1094428115584005>
- (2024). A different causal perspective with necessary condition analysis. *Journal of Business Research*, 177, 114618. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2024.114618>
- Dul, J., Van der Laan, E., & Kuik, R. (2020). A statistical significance test for necessary condition analysis. *Organizational Research Methods*, 23(2), 385–395. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1094428118795272>
- Dunn, J. A., Jr. (1974). The revision of the constitution in Belgium: A study in the institutionalization of ethnic conflict. *Western Political Quarterly*, 27(1), 143–163.
- Dura, J. (2023). Proposed restrictions on amending North Dakota constitution to go to voters. Online article. https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/proposed-restrictions-on-amending-north-dakota-constitution-to-go-to-voters/article_360cea56-d32d-11ed-bc2a-8f3475341a5e.html
- Economist. (2015, October 17). Not just hand-waving. Online article. www.economist.com/news/europe/21674774-italian-government-was-byword-instability-and-indecision-no-more-not-just-hand-waving
- Elazar, D. J. (1984). *American Federalism: A View from the States*, 3rd ed. New York: HarperCollins.
- Eldes, A., Fong, C., & Lowande, K. (2024). Information and confrontation in legislative oversight. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 49(2), 227–256. <https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12440>
- Elkins, Z., Ginsburg, T., & Melton, J. (2009). *The Endurance of National Constitutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Elkliit, J. (2010). Denmark. In D. Nohlen & P. Stöver (eds.), *Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook*. Baden-Baden, DE: Nomos Publishing House. 501–564.
- Elster, J. (2010). *Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ely, J. H. (1973). The wages of crying wolf: A comment on Roe v. Wade. *Yale Law Journal*, 82(5), 920–949.
- Epstein, L., Knight, J., & Shvetsova, O. (2001). The role of constitutional courts in the establishment and maintenance of democratic systems of government. *Law and Society Review*, 35(1), 117–164. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3185388>
- Escalante Gonzalbo, F. E. (2015). *Historia mínima del neoliberalismo*. Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico AC.
- European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). (2010, January 19). Report on constitutional amendment adopted by the Venice Commission at its 81st Plenary Session (Venice, 11–12 December 2009). CDL-AD(2010)001.

- Farrell, D., Harris, C., & Suiter, J. (2016). Bringing people into the heart of constitutional design: The Irish Constitutional Convention of 2012–14. In X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou (eds.), *Participatory Constitutional Change: The People as Amenders of the Constitution*. London: Routledge. 120–131.
- Feld, L. P. & Voigt, S. (2003). Economic growth and judicial independence: Cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 19(3), 497–527. [https://doi.org/10.1016/s0176-2680\(03\)00017-x](https://doi.org/10.1016/s0176-2680(03)00017-x)
- Ferejohn, J. A. (1997). The politics of imperfection: The amendment of constitutions. *Law & Social Inquiry*, 22(2), 501–530. www.jstor.org/stable/828796
- Ferejohn, J. A. & Kramer, L. D. (2002). Independent judges, dependent judiciary: Institutionalizing judicial restraint. *New York University Law Review*, 77(4), 962–1039.
- Ferejohn, J. A., McKelvey, R. D., & Packell, E. W. (1984). Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 1, 45–67.
- Ferrer Comella, V. (2009). *Constitutional Courts and Democratic Values: A European Perspective*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Finck, D. E. (1997). Judicial review: The United States Supreme Court versus the German Constitutional Court. *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, 20(1), 123.
- Finer, H. (1949). *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
- Finke, D., König, T., Proksch, S. O., & Tsebelis, G. (2013). *Reforming the European Union: Realizing the Impossible*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Fix-Fierro, H. (2017). ¿Por qué se reforma tanto la Constitución mexicana de 1917? Hacia la renovación del texto y la cultura de la Constitución. In G. Esquivel, F. Ibarra Palafox, & P. Salazar Ugarte (eds.), *Cien ensayos para el centenario: Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*. Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas UNAM (Estudios Políticos). 143–162.
- Fix-Fierro, H. & Valadés, D. (2015). Toward the reorganization and consolidation of the text of the Constitution of the United Mexican States of 1917: Introductory essay. Online article. <https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/9/4050/2a.pdf>
- (2016). *Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos: Texto reordenado y consolidado*. Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
- Follain, J. (2015, October 13). Renzi wins vote to overhaul Roman Senate in blow to elite. Online article. www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-13/renzi-wins-vote-to-overhaul-roman-senate-in-blow-to-elite
- Fruhstorfer, A. (2016). Moldova. In *Constitutional Politics in Central and Eastern Europe*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. 359–387.

- Fuentes, C. (2006). *Looking Backward, Defining the Future: Constitutional Design in Chile 1980–2005*. Philadelphia: Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
- (2015). Shifting the status quo: Constitutional reforms in Chile. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 57(1), 99–122.
- (2018). Debate constitucional en Chile; Reemplazo vía enmienda? *Política y Gobierno*, 25(2), 469–483.
- Fukuyama, F. (1995). Social capital and the global economy. *Foreign Affairs*, 74, 89.
- Gabel, M., Carrubba, C. J., Helmke, G., Martin, A. D., Staton, J. K. Ward, D., et al. (2024). CompLaw: A coding protocol and database for the comparative study of judicial review. *Journal of Law and Courts*, 1–27. <https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2024.4>
- Garcia, J. F. (2023). A failed but useful constitution-making process: How Bachelet's process contributed to constitution-making in Chile. *Global Constitutionalism*, 13(1), 1–11.
- Garlicki, L. (2007). Constitutional courts versus supreme courts. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 5(1), 44–68. <https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mol044>
- Gardbaum, S. (2018). What makes for more or less powerful constitutional courts? *Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law*, 29, 1.
- Gerkrath, J. (2013). Some remarks on the pending constitutional change in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. *European Public Law*, 19, 449.
- Gerlach, P. & Eriksson, K. (2021). Measuring cultural dimensions: External validity and internal consistency of Hofstede's VSM 2013 Scales. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 12, 662604.
- Gibler, D. M. & Randazzo, K. A. (2011). Testing the effects of independent judiciaries on the likelihood of democratic backsliding. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(3), 696–709. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00504.x>
- Giles Navarro, C. A. (2018). Las reformas a la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. *Instituto Belisario Domínguez*, 33, 1–11.
- Ginsburg, T. & Huq, A. (2018). Democracy's near misses. *Journal of Democracy*, 29 (4), 16–30.
- Ginsburg, T. & Melton, J. (2015). Does the constitutional amendment rule matter at all? Amendment cultures and the challenges of measuring amendment difficulty. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 13(3), 686–713.
- Glaeser, E. L., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2004). Do institutions cause growth? *Journal of Economic Growth*, 9(3), 271–303. <https://doi.org/10.1023/b:joeg.0000038933.16398.ed>
- Goldenberg, T. (2023, February 2). Israeli AG: Netanyahu cannot be involved in legal overhaul. Online article. <https://apnews.com/article/politics-israel-government-benjamin-netanyahu-fraud-d93f12b9ba68e89f8dceb5743833ff03>

- Goertz, G. (2017). *Multimethod Research, Causal Mechanisms, and Case Studies: An Integrated Approach*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Goertz, G. & Starr, H. (2002). *Necessary Conditions: Theory, Methodology, and Applications*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Goguel, F. (1963). Le référendum du 28 Octobre et les élections des 18–25 Novembre 1962. *Revue française de science politique*, 13(2), 289–314.
- Goldey, D. B. (1963). The French referendum and election of 1962: The national campaigns. *Political Studies*, 11(3), 287–307.
- Goldman, B. T. (2012). The switch in time that saved nine: A study of Justice Owen Roberts's vote in *West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish*. Online article. <https://repository.upenn.edu/handle/20.500.14332/8554>
- Goossens, J. & Cannoot, P. (2015). Belgian federalism after the sixth state reform. *Perspectives on Federalism*, 7(2), 29–55.
- Goossens, J. & Hendriks, F. (2021). Belgium. In J. Martí-Henneberg (ed.), *European Regions, 1870–2020*. New York: Springer. 21–29.
- González Oropeza, M. (1998). Una nueva constitución para México. In *El significado actual de la Constitución: Memoria del simposio internacional*. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. 309–317.
- González-Ocantos, E. & Meléndez, C. (2024). Rethinking the role of issue-voting in referenda: Conjoint and vote choice analyses of preferences for constitutional change in Chile. *Comparative Politics*, 56(2), 219–242.
- Gutmann, J. & Voigt, S. (2018). The rule of law: Measurement and deep roots. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 54, 68–82. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpol eco.2018.04.001>
- (2020). Judicial independence in the EU: A puzzle. *European Journal of Law and Economics*, 49(1), 83–100. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-018-9577-8>
- Haggard, S., MacIntyre, A., & Tiede, L. (2008). The rule of law and economic development. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11, 205–234. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.081205.100244>
- Halbfinger, D. & Rasgon, A. (2020, June 9). Israel court rejects law legalizing thousands of settlement homes. Online article. www.nytimes.com/2020/06/09/world/middleeast/israel-supreme-court-west-bank-settlements.html
- Hamon, L. (1963). Voting patterns in Gaullist France: An analysis of the last referendum and elections. *The World Today*, 19(4), 146–155.
- Harrison, C. (2022, May 20). A look at what is – and isn't – in Chile's constitutional draft. Online article. www.as-coa.org/articles/look-what-and-isnt-chiles-constitutional-draft
- Hayek, F. (2006). *The Constitution of Liberty*. New York: Routledge.
- Hayo, B. & Voigt, S. (2007). Explaining de facto judicial independence. *International Review of Law and Economics*, 27(3), 269–290. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2007.07.004>

- (2010). Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of government? *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 38(3), 283–305. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2010.07.007>
- (2014). Mapping constitutionally safeguarded judicial independence: A global survey. *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies*, 11(1), 159–195. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12038>
- (2016). Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence. *International Review of Law and Economics*, 48, 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2016.06.003>
- (2019). The long-term relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence. *Economics Letters*, 183, 108603. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108603>
- Heiss, C. & Navia, P. (2007). You win some, you lose some: Constitutional reforms in Chile's transition to democracy. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 49 (3), 163–190.
- Helmke, G. & Rosenbluth, F. (2009). Regimes and the rule of law: Judicial independence in comparative perspective. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12, 345–366. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.040907.121521>
- Hendrix, S. (2023, October 11). As Israel reels, Netanyahu agrees to share power with opposition party. Online article. www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/11/israel-unity-government-netanyahu-gantz/
- Henisz, W. J. (2000). The institutional environment for economic growth. *Economics & Politics*, 12(1), 1–31. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00066>
- High Court. (2006, December 14). Zappone & Anor -v- Revenue Commissioners & Ors. Website. <https://web.archive.org/web/20150923230051/http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IHC/2006/H404.html>
- Hill, D. B. (1981). Political culture and female political representation. *The Journal of Politics*, 43(1), 159–168.
- Hofstede, G. (2001). *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J., & Minkov, M. (2010). *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind*, 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Holmes, S. (1988). Precommitment and the paradox of democracy. In J. Elster & R. Slagstad (eds.), *Constitutionalism and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 195–240.
- Horowitz, D. L. (2006). Constitutional courts: A primer for decision makers. *Journal of Democracy*, 17(4), 125–137. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2006.0063>
- Howard, R. M. & Carey, H. F. (2004). Is an independent judiciary necessary for democracy? *Judicature*, 87, 284–291.
- Howell, W., Adler, S., Cameron, C. & Riemann, C. (2000). Divided government and the legislative productivity of Congress. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 25(2), 285–312.

- Ibarra Palafox, F. (2016). Identidad y constitucionalismo. Reflexiones sobre la reforma constitucional y su vigencia. In L. R. Guerrero Galván & C. M. Pelayo Moller (eds.), *100 años de la Constitución Mexicana: de las garantías individuales a los derechos humanos*. Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas UNAM. 59–74.
- Ingles, J. & Kasler, K. (2023, August 8). Ohio voters reject measure that would have made it harder to change constitution. Online article. www.npr.org/2023/08/08/1191679261/ohio-election-results-issue1-abortion-state-constitution-amendment-ballot-voters
- Jacob, H., Blankenburg, E., Kritzer, H. M., Provine, D. M., & Sanders, J. (1996). *Courts, Law, and Politics in Comparative Perspective*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Kalyvas, A. (2012). Constituent power. In A. Ophir & A. L. Stoler (eds.), *Political Concepts: A Critical Lexicon*. New York: Fordham University Press. 87–117.
- Keith, L. C. (2002). Constitutional provisions for individual human rights (1977–1996): Are they more than mere “window dressing”? *Political Research Quarterly*, 55(1), 111–143. <https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290205500105>
- (2011). *Political Repression: Courts and the Law*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Keith, L. C., Tate, C. N., & Poe, S. C. (2009). Is the law a mere parchment barrier to human rights abuse? *The Journal of Politics*, 71(2), 644–660. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609090513>
- Kim, J. (2021). Some reflections on constitutional amendment movement in the first half of Moon Jae-In government: With special reference to the role of the judicial bodies. *Korea Observer*, 52(4), 575–601.
- Kingsley, P. (2023a, September 12). Israel's Supreme Court weighs law that limits its own power. Online article. www.nytimes.com/2023/09/12/world/middleeast/israel-supreme-court-power-limit.html
- (2023b, January 12). Netanyahu surges ahead with judicial overhaul, prompting fury in Israel. Online article. www.nytimes.com/2023/01/12/world/middleeast/netanyahu-israel-judicial-reform.html
- Klug, H. (2015). The Constitution in comparative perspective. In M. Tushnet, M. A. Graber, & S. Levinson (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the U.S. Constitution*. New York: Oxford University Press. 943–966.
- Kornhauser, L. A. (2002). Is judicial independence a useful concept? In S. B. Burbank & B. Friedman (eds.), *Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Approach*. New York: SAGE Publications. 45–55.
- Krehbiel, K. (1998). *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
- Kydland, F. E. & Prescott, E. C. (1977, June). Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans. *The Journal of Political Economy*, 85(3), 473–491.

- La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Pop-Eleches, C., & Shleifer, A. (2004). Judicial checks and balances. *Journal of Political Economy*, 112(2), 445–470. <https://doi.org/10.1086/381480>
- Lakatos, I. (1978). *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lalík, T. (2020a). The Slovak Constitutional Court on unconstitutional constitutional amendment (PL. ÚS 21/2014). *European Constitutional Law Review*, 16(2), 328–343. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1574019620000140>
- (2020b, December 18). Slovakia on its way to illiberal democracy: Nullifying the power of the constitutional court to review constitutional amendments. Online article. www.iconnectblog.com/slovakia-on-its-way-to-illiberal-democracy-nullifying-the-power-of-the-constitutional-court-to-review-constitutional-amendments/
- Landau, D. E. & Dixon, R. (2023). Utopian constitutionalism in Chile. *Global Constitutionalism*, 13(1), 1–11. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045381723000266>
- Landau, D. E., Dixon, R., & Roznai, Y. (2019a). From an unconstitutional constitutional amendment to an unconstitutional constitution? Lessons from Honduras. *Global Constitutionalism*, 8(1), 40–70. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s2045381718000151>
- Landau, D. E., Roznai, Y., & Dixon, R. (2019b). Term limits and the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine: Lessons from Latin America. In A. Baturo & R. Elgie (eds.), *The Politics of Presidential Term Limits*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 53–74.
- Lane, J. (2011). *Constitutions and Political Theory*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Law, D. S. & Versteeg, M. (2013). Sham constitutions. *California Law Review*, 101(4), 863–952.
- Lehoucq, F. (2002). The 1999 elections in Guatemala. *Electoral Studies*, 21(1), 107–114.
- Lieber, D. & Amon, M. (2023, June 29). Israel's Netanyahu revives judicial overhaul stripped of most controversial piece. Online article. www.wsj.com/articles/netanyahu-revives-judicial-overhaul-stripped-of-most-controversial-piece-33160de
- Lieber, D. & Boxerman, A. (2022, November 15). Israel's right-wing lawmakers aim to remake supreme court. Online article. www.wsj.com/articles/israels-right-wing-lawmakers-aim-to-remake-supreme-court-11668506325
- Lijphart, A. (2012). *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Democracies*, 2nd ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Linzer, D. A. & Staton, J. K. (2015). A global measure of judicial independence, 1948–2012. *Journal of Law and Courts*, 3(2), 223–256. <https://doi.org/10.1086/682150>
- Lorenz, A. (2005). How to measure constitutional rigidity: Four concepts and two alternatives. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 17(3), 339–361.

- (2016). How differently actors cope with demanding constitutional amendment rules: Two types of constitutional politics in federal democracies. *Regional & Federal Studies*, 26(5), 729–748.
- Lupia, A. (1994). Shortcuts versus encyclopedias: Information and voting behavior in California insurance reform elections. *American Political Science Review*, 88, 63–76.
- (2006). How elitism undermines the study of voter competence. *Critical Review*, 18, 217–232.
- Lutz, D. S. (1994). Toward a theory of constitutional amendment. *American Political Science Review*, 88(2), 355–370.
- (2006). *Principles of Constitutional Design*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Madison, J. (1788). The Federalist No. 62. Website. <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-04-02-0212>
- Magaloni, B. (2006). *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mansoor, S. (2023, March 27). Netanyahu is beholden to the Israeli far-right on the judicial overhaul plan. Online article. <https://time.com/6266434/israel-protests-netanyahu-far-right/>
- Marshall, M. G. (2016). Polity IV Project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2013. Website. www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
- Marshfield, J. L. (2017). Court and informal constitutional change in the states. *New England Law Review*, 51(453), 453–518.
- (2018). The amendment effect. *Boston University Law Review*, 98(1), 55–126.
- Martínez-Barahona, E. (2012). Constitutional courts and constitutional change: Analyzing the cases of presidential re-election in Latin America. In D. Nolte & A. Schilling-Vacaflor (eds.), *New Constitutionalism in Latin America*. Farnham, UK: Ashgate. 289–312.
- Mayer-Serra, C. E. (2017). Reforma de la Constitución: la economía política del Pacto por México. *Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales*, 62(230), 21–49. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0185-1918\(17\)30016-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0185-1918(17)30016-8)
- McKernan, B. (2023, September 12). What is Israel's judicial overhaul about and what happens next? Online article. www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/24/what-is-israel-judicial-overhaul-vote-about-what-happens-next
- Melton, J. & Ginsburg, T. (2014). Does de jure judicial independence really matter? A reevaluation of explanations for judicial independence. *Journal of Law and Courts*, 2(2), 187–217. <https://doi.org/10.1086/676999>
- Metelska-Szaniawska, K. (2021). Post-socialist constitutions: The de jure-de facto gap, its effects and determinants. *Economics of Transition and Institutional Change*, 29(2), 175–196. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ecot.12261>
- Metelska-Szaniawska, K. & Lewkowicz, J. (2021). Post-socialist illiberal democracies: Do de jure constitutional rights matter? *Constitutional Political Economy*, 32(2), 233–265. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-020-09316-4>

- Ministerio del Interior. (1925). *Actas Oficiales de las Sesiones celebradas por la Comisión y Sub-comisiones encargadas del estudio del Proyecto de Nueva Constitución Política de la República*. Santiago: Imprenta Universitaria.
- Mitchell, J. (2023, April 23). North Dakota voters to decide on constitutional initiative procedures in 2024. Online article. <https://news.ballotpedia.org/2023/04/18/north-dakota-voters-to-decide-on-constitutional-initiative-procedures-in-2024/>
- Mondak, J. J. & Canache, D. (2014). Personality and political culture in the American states. *Political Research Quarterly*, 67(1), 26–41.
- Morisey, M. (2007). Flag desecration, religion and patriotism. *Rutgers Journal of Law & Religion*, 9, 1.
- Nacif, B. (2002). Understanding party discipline in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies: The centralized party model. In B. Nacif & S. Morgenstern (eds.), *Legislative Politics in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 254–284.
- Nanda, V. P. (1974). The constitutional framework and the current political crisis in India. *Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly*, 2, 859.
- Nash, J. (1951). Non-cooperative games. *Annals of Mathematics*, 54, 286–295.
- Navia, P. (2018). If you can fix it, why replace it? Democratizing the Pinochet Constitution in Chile. *Política y Gobierno*, 25(2), 485–499.
- Negretto, G. L. (2012). Replacing and amending constitutions: The logic of constitutional change in Latin America. *Law & Society Review*, 46(4), 749–779.
- Negri, F. & Rebessi, E. (2018). Was Mattarella worth the trouble? Explaining the failure of the 2016 Italian constitutional referendum. *Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, 48(2), 177–196.
- Neuborne, B. (2003). The supreme court of India. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 1(3), 476–510.
- Nev. Const. art. 16, § 1.
- Nev. Const. art. 19, § 2.
- Nevada Secretary of State. (n.d.). Petition district maps. Website. www.nvsos.gov/sos/elections/initiatives-referenda/petition-district-maps
- New York Times. (2005, June 10). Israeli Supreme Court backs Gaza pullout plan. Online article. www.nytimes.com/2005/06/10/world/africa/israeli-supreme-court-backs-gaza-pullout-plan.html
- Nicas, J. (2023, December 17). Chile's Left forced a new constitution: Then the Right took control. Online article. www.nytimes.com/2023/12/17/world/americas/chile-constitution-referendum-vote.html
- North, D. C. & Weingast, B. R. (1989). Constitutions and commitment: The evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England. *The Journal of Economic History*, 49(4), 803–832. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022050700009451>
- North, D. C., Summerhill, W., & Weingast, B. (2000). Order, disorder and economic change: Latin America vs. North America. In B. Bueno de Mesquita

- & H. L. Root (eds.), *Governing for Prosperity*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 17–58.
- Oliver, J. E. & Wood, T. J. (2014). Conspiracy theories and the paranoid style(s) of mass opinion. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(4), 952–966.
- Orange Files. (2013, October 21). Amendments to the fundamental law. Online article. <https://theorangefiles.hu/amendments-to-the-fundamental-law/>
- Orozco Pulido, J. M. (2020). Drafting a constitution is not drafting a statute: An analysis of the Mexican Constitution and hyper-amending pathologies from the legislative drafting perspective. *Mexican Law Review*, 13(1), 203–217. <https://doi.org/10.22201/ijj.24485306e.2020.1.14814>
- Ortiz Gallegos, J. E. (2007). Los círculos feudales de la política en México. *Este país*, 1–10.
- Pacto por México. (2012). Online article. www.foroconsultivo.org.mx/FCCyT/sites/default/files/pacto_por_mexico.pdf
- PLAC. (2014). A step-by-step process of amending the Nigerian Constitution. Online article. <https://placng.org/i/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Step-by-Step-Guide-to-the-Process-of-Amending-the-Nigerian-Constitution.pdf>
- Plato. (2008). N. Denyer (ed.), *Protagoras*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Plevák, O. (2021, July 23). Firearm ownership rights embedded into Czech constitution. Online article. www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/fire-arm-ownership-rights-embedded-into-czech-constitution/
- Pou Giménez, F. (2018). Constitutionalism old, new and unbound: The case of Mexico. In C. Crawford & D. Bonilla Maldonado (eds.), *Constitutionalism in the Americas*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 155–187.
- Powell, E. J. & Staton, J. K. (2009). Domestic judicial institutions and human rights treaty violation. *International Studies Quarterly*, 53(1), 149–174. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.01527.x>
- Pozas-Loyo, A. & Saavedra-Herrera, C. (2021). Mexico. *The International Review of Constitutional Reform: 2020*. Austin: University of Texas. 208–211.
- Pozas-Loyo, A., Saavedra-Herrera, C., & Pou-Giménez, F. (2022, September 2). When more leads to more: Constitutional amendments and interpretation in Mexico 1917–2020. *Law & Social Inquiry*, 1–32. <https://doi.org/10.1017/lsi.2022.35>
- Putnam, R. D. (2001). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community – Revised and Updated*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R., & Nonetti, R. Y. (1993). *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Raifeartaigh, U. N. (1997). Reconciling bail law with the presumption of innocence. *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, 17, 1.
- Ramseyer, J. M. & Rasmusen, E. (2003). *Measuring Judicial Independence: The Political Economy of Judging in Japan*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Randazzo, K. A., Gibler, D. M., & Reid, R. (2016). Examining the development of judicial independence. *Political Research Quarterly*, 69(3), 583–593. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912916656277>
- Rasch, B. E. (2000). Parliamentary floor voting procedures and agenda setting in Europe. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 25(1), 3–23.
- Rasch, B. E. & Congleton, R. D. (2006). Amendment procedures and constitutional stability. In R. D. Congleton & B. Swedenborg (eds.), *Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 536–561.
- Reuters. (2020a, July 6). Ahead of run-off vote, Polish president proposes constitutional ban on gay adoption. Online article. www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-election/ahead-of-run-off-vote-polish-president-proposes-constitutional-ban-on-lgbt-adoption-idUSKBN2471FT/
- Reuters. (2020b, April 15). Poland's PiS seeks constitutional change to extend president's term. Online article. www.reuters.com/article/us-health-corona-virus-poland-constitution/polands-pis-seeks-constitutional-change-to-extend-presidents-term-idUSKCN21X3CJ/
- Rice, T. M. & Sumberg, A. F. (1997). Civic culture and government performance in the American states. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 27(1), 99–114.
- Ríos-Figueroa, J. (2007). Fragmentation of power and the emergence of an effective judiciary in Mexico, 1994–2002. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 49(1), 31–57. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2007.tb00373.x>
- (2011). Institutions for constitutional justice in Latin America. In G. Helmke & J. Ríos-Figueroa (eds.), *Courts in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 27–54.
- Ríos-Figueroa, J. & Staton, J. K. (2014). An evaluation of cross-national measures of judicial independence. *The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, 30(1), 104–137. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ews029>
- Rivera León, M. A. (2017). Understanding constitutional amendments in Mexico: Perpetuum mobile constitution. *Mexican Law Review*, 9, 3–27.
- Rogoff, M. A. (2008). Fifty years of constitutional evolution in France: The 2008 amendments and beyond. *The Financial Crisis of 2008: French and American Responses – Proceedings of the 2010 Franco-American Legal Seminar*. <https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1793210>
- Roy, T. & Swamy, A.V. (2022). Land rights. In *Law and the Economy in a Young Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 15–44.
- Roznai, Y. (2017). Unconstitutional constitutional change. *New England Law Review*, 51(3), 555–577.
- (2022). Constitutional transformation: Hungary. In D. S. Law (ed.), *Constitutionalism in Context*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 136–156.
- Sadurski, W. (2020a). Constitutional democracy in the time of elected authoritarians. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 18(2), 324–333.

- (2020b). Constitutional design: Lessons from Poland's democratic backsliding. *Constitutional Studies*, 6(1), 59–79.
- Salazar Ugarte, P. (2013). *Política Y Derecho: Derecho y garantías – Cinco ensayos latinoamericanos*. Mexico City: Fontamara.
- Salzberger, E. & Fenn, P. (1999). Judicial independence: Some evidence from the English Court of Appeal. *The Journal of Law and Economics*, 42(2), 831–847. <https://doi.org/10.1086/467444>
- Sánchez, A., Magaloni, B., & Magar, E. (2011). Legalist versus interpretativist: The Supreme Court and the democratic transition in Mexico. In G. Helmke & J. Ríos-Figueroa (eds.), *Courts in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 187–218.
- Santoni, M. & Zucchini, F. (2004). Does policy stability increase the constitutional court's independence? The case of Italy during the first republic (1956–1992). *Public Choice*, 120(3), 439–401. <https://doi.org/10.1023/b:puch.0000044291.11088.75>
- Sartori, G. (1970). Concept misformation in comparative politics. *American Political Science Review*, 64(4), 1033–1053.
- Sauer, C. (2021, October 28). Luxembourg's constitutional crescendo: Will incremental reforms succeed where overhaul failed? Online article. <https://constitutionnet.org/news/luxembourgs-constitutional-crescendo-will-incremental-reforms-succeed-where-overhaul-failed>
- Scalia, A. & Gutmann, A. (1997). *A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law: An Essay*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Schneier, E. V. (2006). *Crafting Constitutional Democracies: The Politics of Institutional Design*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Schwartz, S. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 25, 1–65.
- Serna de la Garza, J. M. (2016). *El sistema federal mexicano: trayectoria y características*. Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas.
- Sharkansky, I. (1969). The utility of Elazar's political culture: A research note. *Polity*, 2(1), 66–83.
- Shepsle, K. A. & Weingast, B. R. (1987). The institutional foundations of committee power. *American Political Science Review*, 81(1), 85–104. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1960780>
- Smyth, J. C. (2023a, May 15). GOP state lawmakers try to restrict ballot initiatives, partly to thwart abortion protections. Online article. <https://apnews.com/article/democracy-ballot-initiatives-abortion-republicans-ohio-missouri-c48033311370f071ccece0da975818cb>
- (2023b, November 24). Ohio voters just passed abortion protections: When and how they take effect is before the courts. Online article. <https://apnews.com/article/abortion-ohio-constitutional-amendment-republicans-courts-fb1762537585350caeee589d68fe5a0d>

- Soederberg, S. (2005). The rise of neoliberalism in Mexico: From a developmental to a competition state. In S. Soederberg, G. Menz, & P. G. Cerny (eds.), *Internalizing Globalization: The Rise of Neoliberalism and the Decline of National Varieties of Capitalism*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. 167–182.
- Sosa, E. (2015). The movement against the coup in Honduras. In *Handbook of Social Movements Across Latin America*. Dordrecht: Springer. 313–326.
- Stanton, K. A. (1997a). The transformation of a political regime: Chile's 1925 constitution. Conference paper. Guadalajara: 1997 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association.
- (1997b). Transforming a political regime: The Chilean Constitution of 1925. Doctoral dissertation. Chicago: University of Chicago, Dept. of Political Science.
- Staton, J. K. (2018). Judicial independence research beyond the crossroads. In R. M. Howard & K. A. Randazzo (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Judicial Behavior*. London: Routledge. 355–369.
- Steuer, M. & Láštic, E. (2024). The Slovak constitutional court: The promise of Dworkinian adjudication? In K. Póczta (ed.), *Constitutional Review in Central and Eastern Europe*. London: Routledge. 244–273.
- Stohler, S., Bateman, D., & Woodward Burns, R. (2022). Judicial power and the shifting purpose of Article V. *Studies in American Political Development*, 36(2), 84–103.
- Stone Sweet, A. (2007). The politics of constitutional review in France and Europe. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 5(1), 69–92. <https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mol041>
- Strøm, K., Müller, W. C., & Bergman, T. (eds.). (2003). *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Student. (1931). The Lanarkshire milk experiment. *Biometrika*, 23(3/4), 398–406. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2332424>
- Sturm, A. L. (1963). *Constitution-Making in Michigan, 1961–1962: Michigan Governmental Studies No. 43*. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan.
- Tarabar, D. & Young, A. T. (2021). What constitutes a constitutional amendment culture? *European Journal of Political Economy*, 66, 101953.
- Thomson, R., Stokman, F. N., Achen, C. H., & König, T. (eds.). (2006). *The European Union Decides*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tiernan, S. (2020). *The History of Marriage Equality in Ireland: A Social Revolution Begins*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Torres Alonso, E. (2016). Pacto por México: Una nueva vuelta de tuerca al reformismo mexicano. *RAIGAL. Revista Interdisciplinaria de Ciencias Sociales*, 2, 8–22.
- Torres-Artunduaga, C. & García-Jaramillo, S. (2020). Democratizing the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments: The puzzle of amending the judiciary branch. *ICL Journal*, 14(1), 1–42.

- Tribe, L. H. (1995). Taking text and structure seriously: Reflections on free-form method in constitutional interpretation. *Harvard Law Review*, 108(6), 1221–1303.
- Tsebelis, G. (1991). *Nested Games*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- (1995). Decision making in political systems: Veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism. *British Journal of Political Science*, 25(3), 289–325. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400007225>
- (2002). *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- (2012). The rules of decisionmaking in EU institutions. In T. Eger & H. B. Schäfer (eds.), *Research Handbook on the Economics of European Union Law*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 29–54.
- (2017a). Compromesso astorico: The role of the senate after the Italian constitutional reform. *Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, 47(1), 87–104.
- (2017b). The time inconsistency of long constitutions: Evidence from the world. *European Journal of Political Research*, 56(4), 820–845.
- (2018a). Back to the Pinochet Constitution: A response. *Política y Gobierno*, 25 (2), 501–510.
- (2018b). How can we keep direct democracy and avoid “Kolotoumba.” *Homo Oeconomicus*, 35(1), 81–90.
- (2018c). Veto players and constitutional change: Can Pinochet’s constitution be unlocked? *Política y Gobierno*, 25(1), 3–30.
- (2022). Constitutional rigidity matters: A veto players approach. *British Journal of Political Science*, 52(1), 280–299. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123420000411>
- Tsebelis, G. & Alemán, E. (2005). Presidential conditional agenda setting in Latin America. *World Politics*, 57(3), 396–420.
- Tsebelis, G. & Atilano-Robles, E. (2024). Why are constitutional amendments in Mexico so frequent? *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 0(0). <https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X241254400>
- Tsebelis, G. & Hahm, H. (2014). Suspending vetoes: How the euro countries achieved unanimity in the fiscal compact. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21(10), 1388–1411. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.929167>
- Tsebelis, G. & Nardi, D. J. (2016). A long constitution is a (positively) bad constitution: Evidence from OECD countries. *British Journal of Political Science*, 46(02), 457–478.
- Tyushka, A. (2014). A liberationist constitution? Maidan’s revolutionary agenda and challenges for constitutional reform in Ukraine. *European View*, 13(1), 21–28. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-014-0291-9>
- Uitz, R. (2015). Can you tell when an illiberal democracy is in the making? An appeal to comparative constitutional scholarship from Hungary. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 13(1), 279–300.

- Uleri, P. V. (2012). Institutions of citizens' political participation in Italy: Crooked forms, hindered institutionalization. In *Citizens' Initiatives in Europe*. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 71–88.
- Valenzuela, A. (1977). *Political Brokers in Chile: Local Government in a Centralized Polity*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Vanberg, G. (2001). Legislative-judicial relations: A game-theoretic approach to constitutional review. *American Journal of Political Science*, 45, 346–361.
- Vandenbosch, S. (1991). Political culture and corporal punishment in public schools. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 21(2), 117–121.
- VanderMay, M. C. (1996). The role of the judiciary in India's constitutional democracy. *Hastings International and Comparative Law Review*, 20, 103.
- Velasco-Rivera, M. (2019). The political sources of constitutional amendment (non) difficulty in Mexico. In R. Albert, C. Bernal, & J. Z. Benvindo (eds.), *Constitutional Change and Transformation in Latin America*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. 243–268.
- (2021). Constitutional rigidity: The Mexican experiment. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 19(3), 1042–1061. <https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moab087>
- Venice Commission. (2012, June 20). Opinion on the revision of the Constitution of Belgium (Opinion No. 679 / 2012). Online article. www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD%282012%29010-e
- Versteeg, M. & Zackin, E. (2016). Constitutions unentrenched: Toward an alternative theory of constitutional design. *American Political Science Review*, 110(4), 657–674.
- Vial, G. (1987). "La Constitución de 1925", *Historia de Chile, 1891–1973*, vol. 3. Santiago: Editorial Santillana del Pacífico.
- Voigt, S. (2009, December). Explaining constitutional garrulity. *International Review of Law and Economics*, 29(4), 290–303.
- (2021). Mind the gap: Analyzing the divergence between constitutional text and constitutional reality. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 19(5), 1778–1809. <https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moab060>
- Voigt, S., Gutmann, J., & Feld, L. P. (2015). Economic growth and judicial independence, a dozen years on: Cross-country evidence using an updated set of indicators. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 38, 197–211. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpol eco.2015.01.004>
- Von Neumann, J. & Morgenstern, O. (1944). *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Vrbin, T. (2023, March 6). Heightened requirements to put measures on the Arkansas ballot awaits Sanders' signature. Online article. <https://arkansasadvocate.com/2023/03/06/heightened-requirements-to-put-measures-on-the-arkansas-ballot-awaits-sanders-signature/>
- Waldron, J. (1999). *Law and Disagreement*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- White House. (2023, April 29). Remarks by President Biden at the White House Correspondents' Dinner. Website. www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/04/30/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-white-house-correspondents-dinner/
- Williams, K. (2018). Keeping and bearing arms in Czech. In *Taming the Corpus*. Cham: Springer. 147–166.
- Wilson, K. G., Sandoz, E. K., Kitchens, J., & Roberts, M. (2010). The Valued Living Questionnaire: Defining and measuring valued action within a behavioral framework. *The Psychological Record*, 60, 249–272.
- Woldenberg, J. (2012). *Historia mínima de la transición democrática en México*. Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico AC.
- Wolff, J. (2020). The turbulent end of an era in Bolivia: Contested elections, the ouster of Evo Morales, and the beginning of a transition towards an uncertain future. *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 40(2), 163–186.
- Yap, P. J. (2015). The conundrum of unconstitutional constitutional amendments. *Global Constitutionalism*, 4(1), 114–136.
- Zamitiz Gamboa, H. (2017). La reforma político-electoral 2014–2015: ¿híbrido institucional o avance gradual del sistema democrático en México? *Estudios Políticos*, 40, 11–46.
- Zamora, S. (1992). The Americanization of Mexican law: Non-trade issues in the North American Free Trade Agreement. *Law and Policy in International Business*, 24, 391.
- Zernike, K. & Wines, M. (2023, April 23). Losing ballot issues on abortion, G.O.P. now tries to keep them off the ballot. Online article. www.nytimes.com/2023/04/23/us/republicans-abortion-voting