The witholding of equal public recognition of national, cultural and language identity often causes severe anguish to sub-state peoples and sometimes leads to war. For this reason, political philosophy has an important responsibility to think through the moral grounds and the appropriate means of recognition. This chapter draws a moral map of the recognitional debate, outlining three normative camps: nonrecognition, monorecognition, and recognitional pluralism. I argue for recognitional pluralism, in two steps. The first step establishes, contra nonrecognition, that nations, cultures and languages are recognition-worthy, and that this is so for two reasons: they give people access to cultural life-worlds, and they are sources of dignity. The second step builds the case for a pluralistic means of according public recognition. To do so, I argue, against monorecognition, that egalitarian recognition of life-world access and dignity is to be the driving principle. Within the pluralist camp, I argue for the principle of equal services, which implies that the state accords comparable cultural services to the cultural groups that share a state or territory. Examples of this can be found in equal language rights regimes, egalitarian public holiday systems, as well as in multinational federalism.

This chapter starts by showing that the DCM is a rotation matrix, and vice versa. I introduce Euler matrices as important examples of rotation matrices. I give examples extracting angle–axis information from a DCM. This chapter includes a study of what tensors are, and their role in this subject.

Wagner’s music had theorists continuously scratching their heads. Its fabled newness challenged not only established analytical systems to flex their theoretical muscles but also called for wholly new approaches. This chapter examines early attempts (c.1880–1910) to come to terms with Wagner’s formal and harmonic challenges – crystallised, as ever, in the iconic Tristan chord. Early efforts, by such figures as Karl Mayrberger, Cyrill Kistler, Max Arend, Cyrill Kynast and Emil Ergo, were focused on identifying the most suitable model of tonal harmony among Hauptmann’s, Sechter’s and, later, Riemann’s influential systems and expanding its reach to encompass Wagner’s progressive harmonies. In these discussions, Wagner’s musical structures became nothing less than a battleground for the validity and theoretical prowess of rival conceptions of harmony. It was left to a younger generation of theorists, chief among them Georg Capellen and Ernst Kurth, to reject these nineteenth-century models altogether and to reformulate extended theories of harmony on new foundations.

Wagner’s ‘relationship with music theory’, Alexander Rehding drily notes in his contribution to the present volume, ‘was complicated’ (p. 205). One could say something similar about music theory’s relationship with Wagner. On the one hand Wagner’s music, and especially its harmonic structure, has long served as a touchstone for theoretical models both old and new. At the same time, however, music analysts more often than not have appeared intimidated by the complexity of Wagner’s works, their multi-layeredness and their sheer unwieldiness. Already in 1981, the late Anthony Newcomb noted in the first of a series of remarkably forward-looking articles on Wagner analysis that American music theory was ‘unwilling to touch messy Wagnerian opera with [its] bright Schenkerian tools’.1 To be sure, much has changed since then: not only have Schenkerians (or at least some of them) embraced Wagner, but also the toolbox of both North American and global music theory has expanded considerably over the last three or four decades, not to mention how much broader the perspective of music theory and analysis in general (what they are, what they can do and what they can be about) has become. Still, a survey of general music theory journals or analysis of conference programmes from the past two decades quickly makes clear that Wagner’s music is not exactly one of the discipline’s main preoccupations.

The story of Shelley’s life is inextricably linked with the stories of the women who influenced his work, and of the children for whom he was responsible. This chapter explores the ways in which this superficially least domestic of men produced a body of work shaped in fundamental ways by his relationships with the women and children in his family, as well as by those with a small number of other women who existed beyond its boundaries. It traces Shelley’s relationships with Harriet Westbrook, Elizabeth Hitchener, Mary Godwin, Claire Clairmont, Teresa Viviani, and Jane Williams in and out of his biography and his poetry, arguing that although neither these women nor the children in their care could always live up to Shelley’s vision of ideal, uncircumscribed companionship, they were no less important to either his life or his art because of their complicated, flesh-and-blood reality.

This chapter studies the elements of an interest-based natural property right. To acquire a prima facie right in a resource, the claimant must use it productively and claim exclusivity to its use in terms others will understand. But the prima facie right may be overridden by either of two provisos. The sufficiency proviso limits property rights when a proprietor’s use of a resource does not leave others sufficient access to the same type of resource for their own needs. The necessity proviso limits natural rights when someone who does not hold property in a resource needs access to it to repel some serious threat to life or property. This chapter illustrates legal doctrines for capturing animals and other articles of personal property, occupying unowned land, and appropriating water flow by use. This chapter contrasts productive use with Locke’s treatments of labor, waste, and spoliation, and it contrasts claim communication with Pufendorf and Grotius’s treatments of possession. This chapter also considers familiar criticisms of rights-based property theories, involving hypotheticals with radioactive tomato juice or ham sandwiches embedded in cement.

This chapter discusses the relationship between Shelley and one of his closest friends: Thomas Love Peacock. It sketches the origins and development of that friendship and suggests some reasons for its significance. Particular attention is paid to the very different casts of mind of the two men, something that is especially evident in Peacock’s criticism of what he regarded as Shelley’s culpable neglect of reality, in both his life and his art. Such criticism has its most enduring literary manifestation in Peacock’s caricature of Shelley as Scythrop Glowry in Nightmare Abbey – a novel by which Shelley, to his credit, was delighted. The chapter concludes with an account of Peacock’s peculiarly reticent Memoirs of Percy Bysshe Shelley, in which he sought to defend the biographical dignity of the poet against a malicious and frequently error-prone ‘tribunal of public opinion’.

This chapter examines the unstable intellectual situation of Marx’s Paris Manuscripts, in which an abstract conception of the Hegelian subject–object that had allegedly been naturalized by Feuerbach into the pair human–nature jostles, on the one hand, with a recognition on Marx’s part of a historical dimension lacking in Feuerbach but which had already been present in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and, on the other, with an emerging familiarity with radical politics. Marx’s conception of the human as Gattungswesen, the basis of a communism that as fully developed naturalism equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism, is still indebted to that of Feuerbach. At the same time, he is developing his own conception of the human that resolutely carries Aristotle’s theory of soul through into the case of rational soul where Aristotle himself suffered a failure of nerve.

This chapter highlights a diversity of women’s roles during the Revolution of Dignity, which aligns well with a hybrid model of women’s participation in a contemporary revolution. Drawing on rich data from oral history projects, the book identifies twelve main domains of women’s activism, including art production, crowdsourcing, food provision, legal aid, medical services, public order, and public relations. This chapter challenges a binary construction of women’s involvement in stereotypically feminine or stereotypically masculine activities during a period of mass mobilization. The patriarchal model of women’s participation in a revolution assumes a gender-based division of labor within a revolutionary movement, which reinforces preexisting patriarchal norms in society. The emancipatory model, on the contrary, assumes women’s access to formal positions of leadership within the movement. Located between these two extremes, the hybrid model of women’s participation in a revolution acknowledges the diversity and fluidity of women’s roles. According to the hybrid model, women might adopt three different strategies: (1) acquiescence to a traditional gender-based division of labor, (2) appropriation of the masculine forms of resistance, and (3) adoption of gender-neutral roles or switching from stereotypically feminine to stereotypically masculine roles.

The introduction explains the setting of the ethnography at the intersections of law, NGOs, the Indian state, and the global anti-trafficking regime. It explains the sequence of interventions the book will follow, from rescues to courts to shelters, prescribed by Indian law and implemented by legal actors and NGOs. It lays out the sites and processes the book will explore through encounters between those implementing these interventions, and those experiencing them. It outlines the book’s central aims: how it uses the intersections of anti-trafficking and anti-prostitution interventions as points of entry to foreground how sex workers navigate them, critique the prevalent assumptions and preferred solutions of the global anti-trafficking regime, and explore the complex relationship between law and NGOs in India. It discusses the broader concerns and approaches these interventions bring to the governance of prostitution – global humanitarianism, policing and criminal justice, the paternalism of the Indian state and NGOs, neoliberal women’s empowerment programs, and an anti-immigrant sociopolitical climate. The introduction also explains the author’s methods, research design, and positionality, and the organization of the book.

This chapter discusses how torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment (‘other ill-treatment’) applies to the treatment of members of any armed force. Life in the military can be brutal even without a recruit ever facing the enemy in combat. Many armed forces or non-State armed groups have initiation rites that often involve degrading, and sometimes inhuman treatment. Once incorporated into any armed force (whether State or non-State), recruits may suffer intermittent or regular beatings at the hands of other soldiers or their commanders. This may be a form of sanction for poor performance but it may also be part and parcel of their existence in the military. Positions of authority in any armed force offer an opportunity to engage in gratuitous, unlawful violence – typically without the fear of ever being held accountable. Recruits—male as well as female—may be subjected to sexual violence or even raped. Children, who continue to be recruited into some armed forces and many non-State armed groups (often by force), are especially vulnerable to abuse and harm.