The underlying logics of how welfare states redistribute financial resources to their citizens have been studied intensively. Researchers have focussed on redistribution based on the principles of work, residency or taxpaying. However, family as a redistributive principle in its own right has never systematically been studied neither for a wide range of welfare regulations, nor for welfare benefits and obligations. Hence we do not know in how far the redistributive logics based on other redistributive principles are also found for the redistributive principle of the family. In this paper we address this question, using EUROMOD to analyse the degree of legally stipulated, family-related redistribution for forty-two hypothetical family forms. In our findings, all EU member-states show family-related redistribution in line with the ‘Robin Hood’ logic, with special redistribution to families with several children, single-earner families, and single parents.

Welfare state research is at a theoretical impasse insofar as it does not systematically speak to the types of social policy effort that may have not only redistributive but also productive consequences. Cautioning against imprudent use of the social investment label this paper argues for a better understanding of how traditional social policies have enabled society’s adaptation to socioeconomic changes and prevented costly experiences of poverty. Synthesizing ideas drawn from development studies in the Global South and welfare state studies in the Global North, and elaborating on the inclusive strand of welfare developmentalism, the paper conceptualizes what allows existing social policies to be simultaneously protective and productive. It reviews current welfare state research and argues that developmentalist ideas help re-centre the (re)productive role of social policy. It proposes principles for thinking coherently about what makes existing welfare state policies developmental, challenging their characterization as exclusively passive or activating. Recognizing the productive impact of existing social policies requires that we explicitly rethink how welfare state policy effort is understood.

Citizen trust is a prerequisite for the success of service provision. However, working relations are typically shaped by power asymmetries and one-sided dependencies, contributing to cautiousness towards or distrust of caseworkers (Dumbrill, 2006; de Boer and Coady, 2007). This article sheds light on the conditions and mechanisms that lead (some) citizens nevertheless to trust their caseworker. Based on thematic coding of semi-structured interviews with twenty-five German and sixteen Danish welfare users, our findings elucidate how shared problem perceptions and positive experiences in direct working relationships with committed, citizens-oriented caseworkers mitigate structural asymmetries and allow trust-building. In particular, they underscore the importance of personal bonding and positive emotions, including feelings of sympathy, or even friendship, and of being seen, understood and respected. Our article strengthens the interpersonal, micro-level perspective on trust-building in welfare service provision and provides new empirical insights into the role of personal relations in trust-adverse institutionalised contexts.

How does party support for gender equality in the labour market affect the gender voting gap? A well-established argument from the literature on gender and political behaviour states that working women tend to vote for left-wing parties more than men because they are stronger supporters of the welfare state. However, no study has assessed whether parties’ welfare positions affect the gender voting gap. Leveraging three decades of public opinion data from sixteen Western democracies, I provide evidence in support of that claim: increases in women’s labour force participation are associated with higher female/male voter ratios for the left, but only when those parties strongly support gender-egalitarian policies in the labour market. These findings confirm and add nuance to the previous understanding of the gap: by focusing on public opinion, previous research overlooked party behaviour. Therefore, my evidence elevates the importance of party strategy in explaining gender differences in voting.

In spite of the upturn in the economy and in employment that has been observed in the EU since 2013 to 2019 (and after COVID-19 crisis), the gap between the figures for indicators of economic growth and those for the trends in domestic living conditions continues to be very wide; growth and newly created jobs are not resulting in a generalised improvement in the welfare of the population. This paper seeks to demonstrate that the recovery period after the Great Recession has not been one of truly inclusive recovery and to provide tentative explanations for this. We focus on the five main EU countries before Brexit. We conclude that the incidence of poverty associated with part-time work is now somewhat greater (‘in-work poverty’) and also that there has been strong containment of wages in the leading countries of the EU over the period under study, and even falls in real wages. At least, redistribution policies have shown themselves to be effective in reducing poverty.

When observed in comparative perspective, until the early-1990s the Italian welfare state was clearly an outlier, characterized by an unbalanced allocation of resources among welfare sectors (so-called functional distortion) and towards social groups (distributive distortion). Since then, however, profound transformations have affected both the institutional architecture and the distributive profile of the Italian welfare state. Through an in-depth reconstruction of three decades of welfare reforms in Italy, this article shows how retrenchment and regulatory reforms in pension and labour market policies in an earlier phase (1992–2015), combined with the rather unexpected ‘expansionary turn’ in family and anti-poverty policies in more recent times (2016–2022), have partly reduced the comparative imbalances of the Italian welfare state, making it less of an outlier than in previous decades. To understand such puzzling developments, it relies on an explanatory framework centred on the interplay between socio-political demand and political supply, showing how the emergence of new coalitions, which for the first time mobilized latent social needs, combined with the reshuffling of the party system and the electoral success of parties challenging the austerity paradigm, quite unexpectedly contributed to make the Italian welfare state now look more ‘mainstream’ than in the past.

Recently, convergence liberals, such as Kevin Vallier, argue that the principle of social insurance could be publicly justified. Our paper challenges this marriage of convergence liberalism and welfare state. We begin by examining Vallier’s three reasons for the principle of social insurance: risk aversion, injustice and the promotion of political trust. We then argue that all these reasons are intelligibly objectionable. After examining five possible responses that convergence liberals may offer, this paper concludes that the principle of social insurance is not conclusively justified in the convergence conception of public justification.

While previous research has highlighted the significant role of language in conditioning migrants’ access to key institutions of the welfare state, the question of how individual migrants experience linguistic disadvantage has been less in focus. Drawing on a relational approach, the article moves beyond the idea of language barriers as a static structure of (in)equality or a matter of individual shortcomings. It demonstrates how language policies and language ideologies, and their entanglements with more general trends in welfare policies and ideologies, shape migrants’ relational experiences with the welfare states and their representatives, and what are the implications of such interactions – or the lack of interaction. Empirically, it builds on qualitative data collected in Belgium and Finland, showing how language barriers and discrimination can result in Kafkaesque administrative processes that produce both material and affective hardship for migrants in these national contexts.

Societies are experiencing deep and intertwined structural changes that may unsettle perceptions European citizens have of their economic and employment security. In turn, such perceptions likely alter people’s political positions. For instance, those worried by labour market competition may prefer greater social protection to compensate for the accrued risk, or prefer more closed economies where external borders provide protection (or perceived protection). We develop expectations about how such distinct reactions can emerge from distinct labour-market risks of globalization, or automation, or migration. We test these expectations using a conjoint experiment in 13 European countries on European-level social policy. Results broadly corroborate our expectations on how different concerns about sources of labour market competition yield support for different features of European-level social policy.

Poverty prevention is a central concern of welfare states, and the redistribution of financial resources has been a major strategy to realise it. The differences in addressees, extent, and conditions of this redistribution have been intensively studied. The relevance of family in poverty prevention policies, though, has hardly been analysed, although all forms of welfare redistribution “factor in” family in one way or another, and particularly so in poverty prevention. We analyse how family membership impacts welfare state redistribution to the poor to identify redistributive logics in terms of family, that is the unequal redistribution of public resources to particular family types. We systematically analyse and present the similarities and differences in these redistributive logics, using the micro-simulation model EUROMOD for the countries of the EU. The results show that poor families benefit from anti-poverty measures in form of additional benefits, but family-related financial obligations often exceed these.

Early childhood education and care (ECEC) is among the most important services for children and their parents as it promotes children’s development and enables mothers’ employment. Previous research has shown that there is an educational gradient as children of mothers with a low education level participate less in ECEC services, but less is known about the development of this inequality. This study, using EU-SILC survey data, focuses on the development of inequality in ECEC use of children under 3 years of age during 2004–2019, and on disparities between three categories of education levels among mothers. The results show that, together with increasing ECEC participation rates, overall inequality has increased in Europe. Inequality has increased between low- and other education levels, whereas in a few cases, a decrease has happened between medium- and high-educated mothers. It is important to pay attention to socioeconomic disparities with rising participation rates.

As climate change progresses, natural hazards are projected to continue to increase in frequency and intensity, posing a new form of social risk, implicating both the welfare and environmental state and raising the salience of ecosocial policy as a mechanism to attend to the distributional effects of climate change mitigation and adaptation. This study posits a novel conceptual framework for ecosocial policy and offers the US ecosocial safety net as a case analysis. While we conceptualise disaster relief policy as a mode of the environmental state, it includes unique ecosocial policies that constitute the backbone of the US ecosocial safety net. This study describes and compares the developmental and functional synergies between the US welfare and environmental state manifested in the form of an ecosocial safety net by explicating the Individual Assistance Program and the National Flood Insurance Program. Our findings reveal synergies between US disaster relief and welfare, including parallel developmental trends, philosophies of deserving/undeserving, functions of racial capitalism and relationships with economic growth. This study and its conceptual framework of ecosocial policy offer a groundwork for the study of ecosocial policy in other contexts.

The social protection of platform workers is considered one of the most precarious features and political challenges of this new form of employment. Still, there have only been a few empirical investigations on this issue to date. This article presents an explorative empirical analysis of the social protection of platform workers in Germany – a conservative welfare regime with a strong link between standard employment and institutionalised social protection. On the basis of an online survey amongst 719 self-employed platform workers, we examine how different employment patterns correspond to institutionalised protection against sickness and old age. We empirically explore different protection types and analyse how they differ regarding working conditions in platform work and individual social policy preferences. Findings reveal that conditions of platform work and social protection as well as demands and regulatory preferences vary notably across different clusters of platform workers. Still, the vast majority votes against obligatory social insurances for platform workers and favours self-employment over dependent employment. Against this background, we discuss challenges for future attempts aiming at improving social protection for platform workers. This study adds to the literature by empirically exploring platform workers’ social protection and social policy preferences, which have been overlooked to date.