The introduction explains the book’s argument that individuals impacted by the repercussions of interstate disputes dealt with by the Court should and can be further integrated into its procedure and considered in its legal reasoning. Through the lens of social idealism, it explains how the Court’s effectiveness and legitimacy may be compromised due to its reluctant approach towards individuals. It also clarifies the method, methodology, scope, and structure of the book.

This title explores the principles and mechanisms for the reparation of human rights violations under international human rights law. It discusses the obligation of states to provide full reparation for harm suffered as a result of human rights violations, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of nonrepetition. The section examines the legal standards for determining and quantifying reparation, the procedural aspects of reparation processes, and the role of international and national bodies in monitoring and enforcing reparation awards. It also highlights the challenges in ensuring effective and timely reparation, the importance of victim participation in reparation processes, and the impact of reparation on the rehabilitation and empowerment of victims. By analyzing the principles and practices of reparation, this title aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms for addressing the consequences of human rights violations and the importance of reparation in achieving justice and reconciliation.

This part focuses on the foundational aspects of international human rights law, exploring its theoretical, historical, and philosophical underpinnings. It examines the evolution of human rights ideas, the influence of various philosophical traditions, and the ongoing debates about the nature and universality of human rights. The sections address the epistemological ruptures between philosophy and law, and between law and justice, highlighting the challenges in reconciling these perspectives within a coherent human rights framework. The part also delves into normative pluralism, discussing the coexistence and interaction of multiple legal systems and norms within the global human rights framework. It covers treaty-based structures, customary international law, general principles of law, and the role of judicial decisions and soft law instruments. By critically analyzing these foundational elements, this part aims to provide a deeper understanding of the principles and values that underpin international human rights law and to highlight the complexities and nuances involved in defining and protecting human rights in diverse cultural and legal contexts.

Many of our pressing questions about price personalization concern its current practice and potential regulations. We could be tempted to move directly to those hard questions because many – but not all – consumers, scholars, and regulators already believe with some confidence that price personalization harms consumers or treats them unfairly. In this chapter, I pause to unpack intuitions about harm and unfairness and consider systematically what the normative problems with price personalization might be so that our understanding can inform what we look for in existing practice and what we aim to achieve with new regulations.

Despite their centrality within discussions on AI governance, fairness, justice, and equality remain elusive and essentially contested concepts: even when some shared understanding concerning their meaning can be found on an abstract level, people may still disagree on their relation and realization. In this chapter, we aim to clear up some uncertainties concerning these notions. Taking one particular interpretation of fairness as our point of departure (fairness as nonarbitrariness), we first investigate the distinction between procedural and substantive conceptions of fairness (Section 4.2). We then discuss the relationship between fairness, justice, and equality (Section 4.3). Starting with an exploration of Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness, we then position distributive approaches toward issues of justice and fairness against socio-relational ones. In a final step, we consider the limitations of techno-solutionism and attempts to formalize fairness by design (Section 4.4). Throughout this chapter, we illustrate how the design and regulation of fair AI systems is not an insular exercise: attention must not only be paid to the procedures by which these systems are governed and the outcomes they produce, but also to the social processes, structures, and relationships that inform, and are co-shaped by, their functioning.

We have little basis to doubt (a) that we have good reasons to worship God, (b) that God is worthy of worship, (c) that worship of God is reasonable, (d) that it is unreasonable not to worship God, and (e) that worshipping God is obligatory. But none of these normative states of affairs amounts to or entails our owing God worship. The central aim of this chapter is to show that we do not by nature owe God worship; our owing God worship could be no more than a contingent matter. That our owing God worship is contingent does not entail or even suggest that there is any imperfection or limitation in God, and there are good reasons to hold that it is an attractive view of the relationship between God and humans that our owing God worship is a matter of a special contingent relationship between God and us rather than something that holds by nature.

This chapter covers the common ethical and legal issues that arise in psychiatry. It begins with an overview of the four ethical principles guiding medical practice: autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. A brief discussion of parens patriae and police power follow, highlighting their particular applications in psychiatry. The chapter then goes on to illustrate how the balancing of these principles guides everyday ethical and legal issues. Confidentiality and its exceptions in the interests of safety and prevention of abuse/neglect are covered in detail. Next, informed consent and decision-making are explored. The requirements for informed consent are reviewed, leading into a discussion of those instances when an individual lacks capacity for informed consent (surrogate decision-making, involuntary admission and treatment, and exceptions). Finally, the chapter closes with an examination of the prohibitions against dual relationships, including sexual relationships, with patients.

Several chapters in this volume draw attention to the multiple human rights violations that international migrants face on their journey. This chapter argues that simply calling for a strengthening of migrants’ rights is not enough. If we want to combat the de facto lawlessness of modern migration regimes and the resulting rightlessness of international migrants, we need to enhance not only migrants’ legal rights, but also their political agency and hence develop new political institutions which are accountable to both citizens and migrants. Yet, rather than advocating a global reform, this chapter proposes a model of demoi-cratic migration governance. Migrants’ mobility and membership rights should no longer remain within the absolute discretion of single states or nations but should become the object of reciprocal decision-making between them. Compared with both national and global reforms, demoi-cratic decision-making has a double advantage. It protects the continued existence of bounded political communities which form its central building blocks while at the same time strengthening the voice of international migrants by transforming the citizens of all participating states into potential migrants who, via their national representatives, can codetermine the rights that they will be granted in other member states.

Here I examine the relation between freedom and value, both in the sense of a person’s own values and the inherent value of liberty itself. I then show the relation between liberty, so conceived, and democratic institutions and practices.

This chapter outlines the book’s motivations, its main argument, and competing positions to which the book’s arguments contrast.