We experimentally test different rule-based contribution mechanisms in a repeated 4-player public goods game with endowment heterogeneity and compare them to a VCM, distinguishing between a random and an effort-based allocation of endowments. We find that endowment heterogeneities limit the efficiency gains from these rule-based contribution schemes under random allocation. Under effort-based allocations, substantial efficiency gains relative to a VCM occur. These are largely driven by significant reductions of contributions in VCM, while the rule-based mechanisms generate stable efficiency levels, even though falling short in realizing the maximal efficiency gains. Our results indicate that the procedure of endowment allocation impacts the perception of what constitutes a fair burden sharing.

This dissertation presents the results of a series of common pool experiments conducted in three regions of rural Colombia with individuals who face a social dilemma in their everyday lives that is similar to what was presented in the experiment. The research objectives are to develop an empirical characterization of how individual behavior deviates from purely self-interested Nash behavior and to further our understanding of the effects of alternative institutions to promote more conservative choices in common pool experiments.

Groups of five subjects participated in a 20-period common pool resource game framed as a harvest decision from a fishery. Every group first played 10 rounds of a baseline limited access common pool resource game and then 10 additional rounds under one of five institutions: face-to-face communication, one of two external regulations, and communication combined with one of the two regulations. The two external regulations consisted of an individual harvest quota that was set at the efficient outcome, but differ with respect to the level of enforcement. A total of 420 individuals participated in the experiments, with individual earnings averaging slightly more than a day's wages. The results are presented in three essays.

The first essay, What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users?, develops and tests several models of pure Nash strategies of individuals who extract from a common pool resource when they are motivated by combinations of self-interest, altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion or conformity. The results suggest that a model which balances self-interest with a strong preference for conformity best describes average strategies. The data are inconsistent with a model of pure self-interest, as well as models that combine self-interest with individual preferences for altruism, reciprocity and inequity aversion.

The second essay, Communication and Regulation to Conserve Common Pool Resources, tests for interaction effects between formal regulations imposed on a community to conserve a local natural resource and non-binding verbal agreements to do the same. The results indicate that formal regulations and informal communication are mutually reinforcing in some instances, but this result is not robust across regions or regulations. Therefore, the hypothesis of a complementary relationship of formal and informal control of local natural resources cannot be supported in general; instead the effects are likely to be community-specific. There is some evidence to suggest that these effects are correlated with the relative importance of formal regulations versus informal community efforts in the community.

The third essay, Within and Between Group Variation in Individual Strategies in Common Pools, analyzes the relative effects of groups and individuals within groups in explaining variation in individual harvest decisions for particular institutions, and uses a hierarchical linear model to examine how these sources of variation may vary across institutions. Communication serves to effectively coordinate individual strategies within groups, but these coordinated strategies vary considerably among groups. In contrast, externally-imposed regulatory schemes (as well as unregulated limited access) produce significant variation in the individual strategies within groups, but these strategies are roughly replicated across groups so that there is little between-group variation.

There is conflicting evidence about whether abundant resources are indeed a blessing or a curse. We make use of specially designed economic experiments to investigate how resource abundance affects cooperation in the absence or presence of regulatory institutions. We observe that in the absence of regulatory institutions, there is less cooperation in groups with access to large resource pools than in groups with access to small resource pools. However, if regulatory institutions are present, we show that there is more cooperation in groups with access to large resource pools than in groups with access to small resource pools. Our findings also reveal that resource users are more willing to regulate access to abundant than to small resource pools. These findings provide causal evidence for the “paradox of plenty” and identify the causes for the pitfalls and potentials of resource wealth.

There has been limited research on African policy instruments’ historical and institutional nature in health policy literature. However, in the field of health systems research, there are many examples that show the permanent use of financing instruments inspired by liberal (pro-market) ideas such as user fees, performance bonuses, or private practice of medicine in Africa. Through an analysis of archives (1840–1960), this article shows the presence of these instruments in the health system during the French colonial period in Senegal. Thus, this study shows that these financing policy instruments’ institutional presence and longevity are part of a liberal approach that predates international organizations’ contemporary (and liberal) promotion. This study uses a historical and institutionalist approach to understand the context, actors, and underlying factors that allowed for this historical continuity, resulting in the permanence of these instruments.

Marginal utility (MU) theories of consumer demand assume that consumers try to maximise a generic benefit (‘utility’) by selecting purchases giving equal MU per unit of cost, from which are predicted the observed relationships between price changes and quantities of demanded consumer goods. Attempts to remedy the explanatory shortcomings of MU theory usually supplement it with additional assumptions. This paper proposes taking that approach to its logical conclusion by using consumer and psychological research findings not to supplement but to replace the concept of utility entirely with realistic explanations of consumer behaviour.

National innovation systems (NISs) have been important in the literature since the 1990s for highlighting the institutional performance of economies and promoting economic development. Inclusion in systemic innovation activities is an emerging area of research. However, the definition of inclusion within innovative activities remains unclear and is associated with numerous forms and characteristics depending on the context visited. Our work highlights the conceptual gap that exists around the notion of inclusive innovation by characterising three forms of inclusion in relation to innovation activities. We thus set out, in the form of a typology, three distinct framings which enable us to identify three different levels associated with specific institutional mechanisms and forms of inclusion. This typology makes it possible to identify appropriate innovation policies, depending on how inclusive innovation is characterised (low, medium, and high). It also helps to clarify the inclusive nature of innovation in NIS approaches.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China play a critical role in national economic development and the country's positioning on the global stage. Chinese SOEs have undergone substantial transformations from traditional government-run entities to a variety of corporate forms exhibiting different levels of state involvement. Despite their substantial influence, the internal diversity of SOEs – from wholly state-owned to mixed-ownership – has not been thoroughly examined. This paper provides an overview of SOEs' critical roles in the Chinese economy, the relationship between SOEs and privately owned enterprises (POEs), and the challenges of SOEs in different stages of Chinese economic development. It then introduces five research papers that explore the institutional, strategic, and organizational perspectives on how SOEs manage the dual pressures of state and market logic, respond to policy adjustments, tackle leadership challenges, and navigate current global trends such as digital transformation, technological innovation, and environmental sustainability. In this paper, we provide important implications for policy and managerial practices and highlight a future research agenda for the heterogeneity of Chinese SOEs, and how SOEs respond to these challenges in the evolving geopolitical landscape, adapt their strategies, and manage relationships with foreign governments and enterprises under such conditions.

Public Humanities projects notoriously begin with the bootstrapping commitment of one or two long-suffering and visionary individuals. If they can make it past the turbulent narrows of their beginnings, they often only endure through unrecognized and little-rewarded labor. Gatherings of public humanists can be exercises in commiseration. When you determine that you have enough funding to last one more year, celebration is in order. Such travails naturally lead to the question of how public humanities programs can move beyond being nice extras to become more central to the concerns of our home institutions. How, in short, can the work of public humanists be institutionalized and become part of the everyday humdrum of academic life rather than the desperate scrabbling of the righteous, committed, frantic, and overtired?

Grounded in Hofstede cultural dimensions theory, we examine how informal institutional factors shape cross-country venture capital (VC) flows. Separating VC activity into flows, our method studies how an increment in inflows supports ventures, and an increment in outflows more investing activity. Results suggest that (1) uncertainty avoidance negatively affects investors and ventures (the last with a larger effect), (2) individualistic attitudes equally support both investors and ventures, and (3) a higher level of power distance contributes to a larger private investors sector, an effect that is greater under strong formal institutions (FIs). Effects of masculinity, long-term orientation, and indulgence are inconclusive. Results are robust to various specifications, use of instruments, and endogeneity treatments. The implication is that the optimal characteristics of informal institutions for fostering VC activity differ depending on the level of FIs, as both institutions interact to affect both investors and ventures.

Institutional food is renowned for being monotonous and unappetising, yet the accuracy of these prescribed diets is difficult to verify archaeologically. Desiccated plant remains from beneath the floorboards at Hyde Park Barracks in Sydney offer a rare insight into the culture of food at the Female Immigration Depot (1848–1887) and the Destitute Asylum (1862–1886). Here, the author reveals the wide range of unofficial plant foods accessed by inhabitants at these two institutions—representing resources sourced from across the British Empire—and the sometimes-illicit nature of their consumption, highlighting the importance of incorporating archaeological evidence into discussions of institutional life.

The objective of feminist institutionalist (FI) political science is to expose institutions that perpetuate gender inequalities. The nature of these entities and the best strategies for studying them remain hotly debated topics. Some scholars identify ethnography as a valuable methodology for FI research. However, novices to this methodology might need help navigating it. In this theory-generating article, we aim to bridge the gap between different approaches to FI and ethnographic methodologies. We propose ethnographic approaches suitable for scholars who see gendered institutions as real entities that constrain and enable human practices, as well as those who perceive them as sedimented clusters of meanings. We illustrate our arguments using a partially fictional empirical example, inspired by findings from our own ethnographic research. We hope that this article will promote increased engagement, both theoretical and empirical, with ethnography among FI scholars.

This essay is in celebration of the contributions of Mario Rizzo. I argue that among contemporary economists in the Austrian School of Economics tradition it is Rizzo that advanced, more than his contemporaries, the scientific research program of rational choice as if the choosers were human beings; the dynamic subjectivism and the agony of choice and social interaction; the causal processes and the institutional dynamics that make up a complex social order; and the role of law, politics and civil society in shaping commercial life. In making this argument, I attempt to arbitrage the contributions of two essays of Rizzo’s: ‘Law Amid Flux’ and ‘The Genetic-Causal Tradition and Modern Economic Theory’.

We explore gender attitudes towards competition in the United Arab Emirates—a traditionally patriarchal society which in recent times has adopted numerous policies to empower women and promote their role in the labor force. The experimental treatments vary whether individuals compete in single-sex or mixed-sex groups. In contrast to previous studies, women in our sample are not less willing to compete than men. In fact, once we control for individual performance, Emirati women are more likely to select into competition. Our analysis shows that neither women nor men shy away from competition, and both compete more than what would be optimal in monetary terms as the fraction of men in their group increases. We offer a detailed survey of the literature and discuss possible reasons for the lack of gender differences in our experiment.