In Africa and other low-income regions, the modal result of the interplay between incumbents and opposition has been the resilience of very imperfect democracies or electoral autocracies, and not a broad trend of backsliding. This represents a puzzle, since low-income states with few long-standing democratic traditions have been generally viewed as the most vulnerable to autocratization. This chapter offers some tentative hypotheses for this apparent stability, focusing on the relationship between state capacity and democracy, and disaggregating them into their different components. Institutions of vertical accountability can generally exist (or in some cases flourish) with limited state capacity. These include formal political participation, such as elections and voting, which is often incentivized and subsidized by the international community, or citizen and civil society actions that are made possible by freedom of association and freedom of the press, which do not rely on state capacity. On the other hand, the consolidation of political institutions that advance horizontal accountability will be constrained by deficient state capacity. Judicial independence and legislative power as well as other independent checks on the executive branch of government will typically be more undermined by low capacity than the incumbent regime itself.

The array of countries examined in this book offers a range of cross-cutting themes and propositions. Indeed, a careful sifting of the chapters suggest important similarities and differences not only in terms of how the twelve states under examination have handled common problems and challenges in their efforts to interact with their national communities abroad but also in the underlying rationale(s) for engaging (or not) in said activities in the first place. This concluding chapter first discusses general insights concerning the motivations of states’ interactions with their national communities abroad and the reasons that explain those interactions. Next, it zooms in on specific themes and trends in some greater detail, including: the contested, and at times highly politicized, nature of defining national communities abroad; the mismatch between states’ material capabilities and their willingness to engage their communities abroad; and acts of “democratic repression” which suggest that the discussion on transnational authoritarianism needs to be complemented by a systematic examination of democratic countries’ repressive actions abroad.

Were nineteenth century war outcomes the main determinant of state trajectories in Latin America? In this chapter I turn from examining whether and to which degree war outcomes affected comparative state capacity levels and try to determining whether war outcomes were the main factor affecting the relative position of Latin American countries in the regional state capacity ranking. Exploring the conditions that predict the rank ordering of Latin American state capacity c. 1900—which has remained virtually the same ever since—has become a standard approach in the literature. In this chapter I explore this comparative historical puzzle by replicating previously used techniques. I use qualitative comparative analysis to show that accumulated victory and defeat throughout the nineteenth century is almost a sufficient condition for states to be in the upper and lower end of a state capacity ranking, respectively. I then use simple correlations to evaluate how war outcomes were related to a broad set of state capacity indicators at the turn of the century. Finally, I discuss case-specific expectations in longitudinal data that will be explored in the case studies.

What was the effect of war outcomes on key indicators of state formation in a post-war phase? In this chapter I demonstrate that victors and losers of war were set into different state capacity trajectories after war outcomes were revealed. I do this using a set of cutting-edge causal inference techniques to analyse the gap in state capacity that was generated between winners and losers in the time-period of most stringent warfare (1865-1913). After substantiating that the outcomes of these wars were determined by exogenous or fortuitous events, I provide a short description of my treatment—i.e., defeat—and outcomes—i.e., total revenues and railroad mileage as key indicators of state infrastructural capacity. My estimator, a difference-in-differences model, shows defeat had a negative long-term impact on state capacity which remains remarkably robust even after relaxing key assumptions. Finally, I use the synthetic control method to estimate how state capacity in Paraguay and Peru would have evolved in a counterfactual world where these countries were spared the most severe defeats in late nineteenth-century Latin America.

The chapter examines the role of forced displacement in increasing the demand for state intervention and expanding the size of the state bureaucracy in West Germany. It discusses the government elites’ strategies for dealing with the needs of expellees and receiving communities and reviews expellees’ ability to influence government policy. Statistical analysis is used to demonstrate that counties with a greater proportion of expellees to population had more civil servants per capita.

The chapter examines how the size and diversity of the migrant population shaped economic outcomes in western Poland using statistical analysis. It shows that when state institutions were extractive, the composition of the migrant population played no role in shaping economic performance. Once institutions became more inclusive, however, municipalities settled by more regionally diverse populations registered higher incomes and entrepreneurship rates. The chapter then rules out a series of alternative explanations for these findings.

This chapter introduces cases motivating the book and presents a three-step argument about the effects of forced migration on societal cooperation, state capacity, and economic development. It reviews evidence from post-WWII displacement in Poland and West Germany, discusses the applicability of the findings to other cases, and highlights the main contributions of the book.

The chapter examines the process of state building in the territory transferred from Germany to Poland in 1945, showing that mass uprooting shored up the demand for state-provided resources and weakened resistance to governance. It exploits the placement of the interwar border between Poland and Germany to estimate the effects of postwar population transfers on the size of the state. It then examines the political legacies of population transfers in post-1989 Poland.

As shown in this chapter, state capacity and security warranties are further key factors in the peace formula. In particular, besides certain institutional features, the overall strength of the state is a major determinant of political stability, as illustrated by examples and recent research on Iraq, Somalia, Niger and the origins of the Mafia in southern Italy. Drawing on cutting-edge studies, it is argued that being feared (by extremist groups) may be more important than being loved (by the population at large). In order to win the hearts and minds of the population, it is essential that first public safety is guaranteed and that basic services are delivered efficiently. This is easier said than done. It is shown that when foreign military aid aims at capacity building, it often backfires. In contrast, UN peacekeeping troops have been demonstrated to play a key role. We end this chapter by emphasizing the several domestic factors that can help the building of lasting state capacity, with a special emphasis on well-designed welfare programs such as Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal.

Peripheral-patronage states have several ways in which they can respond to the bind outlined in Chapter 2. These strategies – recruiting, concealing and insulating – are usually selected according to the state’s possession or lack of domestic capacity and autonomy from outside interference. Some states fail to strategize, finding themselves in the unusual position of being granted autonomy, but lacking the capacity to use the space it provides. Concealing, which involves an invitation of outside scrutiny with the intent to manage the process that follows, is the most interesting strategy because, when successful, it can erode the international norms its users invoke. Successful concealing is possible when the concealing state is both illegible to outsiders and capitalizes on an asymmetrically interdependent relationship with its larger partner in which each has the capacity to harm the other’s reputation. As a result, the concealing state receives the larger actor’s seal of approval for conduct that actually undermines the latter’s chosen norm.