Individuals often need to self-promote for social and professional recognition. In this paper, we investigate the existence of a gender gap in self-promotion of a prosocial action and explore its link with modesty norms. Using a novel experiment that combines both lab and field elements, we show that women are up to five times less likely to self-promote than men. We find suggestive evidence that the difference in behaviour across gender is determined by women’s social image concerns of being perceived as immodest. We find that the provision of a justification to self-promote has two important consequences: (i) it leads to an increase in self-promotion by women and (ii) contributes to the elimination of the gender gap in self-promotion behaviour.

When are far right parties punished for their extreme positions? We argue that the punishments of deviant position-taking are conditional on the degree to which a far right party is normalized or stigmatized in the party system. When the far right is treated as normal, the costs suffered from these parties’ extreme positions decrease, as moderate voters discount the authenticity of their commitment to such positions. We use a survey experiment to test this argument in Spain, finding evidence for discounting on the far right’s extreme anti-LGBTQ+ statements, but not on its embrace of authoritarian history. This study thus shows that normalization and stigmatization of the far right can change how its extreme positions are interpreted by voters.

Considering the alarming energy demand for cooling and seeking sustainable cooling alternatives to over-reliance on air conditioning, our pre-registered study is the first attempt to apply social norm nudges on two cooling behaviors – lighter clothing and the use of personal cooling devices (PCDs). To examine and compare the effectiveness of a descriptive norm message, an injunctive norm signal from leadership, and the two norms combined, we conducted an online randomized controlled survey experiment among financial employees (n = 743) in Guangdong, China. We measured their behavioral intentions before and after the intervention, and their level of commitment to these behaviors as an alternative outcome. We found that while single-norm conditions did not lead to desirable increases in lighter clothing, the both-norm condition nudged participants toward selecting lighter work clothes and boosted commitment to lighter clothing. Outcomes related to the use of PCDs were not affected by any of the norm conditions. These mixed findings present a cautionary tale for designing social norm interventions in office spaces and highlight the boundaries of their effectiveness in energy-saving behaviors.

A key question about human societies is how social norms of cooperation are enforced. Subjects who violate norms are often targeted by their peers for punishment. In an experiment with small teams we examine whether subjects treat punishment itself as a second-order public good. Results do not support this view and rather suggest a hard-wired taste for punishment; subjects are engaged in a cooperative task but ignore the public good characteristics of punishment.

We investigate how information about the preferences of others affects the persistence of ‘bad’ social norms. One view is that bad norms thrive even when people are informed of the preferences of others, since the bad norm is an equilibrium of a coordination game. The other view is based on pluralistic ignorance, in which uncertainty about others’ preferences is crucial. In an experiment, we find clear support for the pluralistic ignorance perspective . In addition, the strength of social interactions is important for a bad norm to persist. These findings help in understanding the causes of such bad norms, and in designing interventions to change them.

This paper examines the relationship between norm enforcement and in-group favouritism behaviour. Using a new two-stage allocation experiment with punishments, we investigate whether in-group favouritism is considered as a social norm in itself or as a violation of a different norm, such as egalitarian norm. We find that which norm of behaviour is enforced depends on who the punisher is. If the punishers belong to the in-group, in-group favouritism is considered a norm and it does not get punished. If the punishers belong to the out-group, in-group favouritism is frequently punished. If the punishers belong to no group and merely observe in-group favouritism (the third-party), they do not seem to care sufficiently to be willing to punish this behaviour. Our results shed a new light on the effectiveness of altruistic norm enforcement when group identities are taken into account and help to explain why in-group favouritism is widespread across societies.

Empirical studies cast doubt on the efficiency assumption made in standard economic models of household behavior. In couples, the allocation of time between activities remains highly differentiated by gender. In this paper we examine whether couples deviate from efficiency in household production, using an experimental design. We compare the allocation of gendered vs. gender-neutral domestic tasks. Our results show that women in the household overspecialize in “feminine tasks” and men in “masculine tasks” compared to what their comparative advantage would require, hence revealing the influence of gender roles and stereotypes on the couples’ behavior.

Transfers of resources in dictator games vary significantly by the characteristics of recipients. We focus on social norms and demonstrate that variation in the recipient changes both giving and injunctive norms and may offer an explanation for differences in giving. We elicit generosity using dictator games, and social norms using incentivized coordination games, with two different recipient types: an anonymous student and a charitable organization. A within-subjects design ensures that other factors are held constant. Our results show that differences in giving behavior are closely related to differences in social norms of giving across contexts. Controlling for individual differences in beliefs about the norm, subjects do not weight compliance with the norms in the student recipient or charity recipient dictator game differently. These results suggest that the impact of context on giving co-occurs with an impact on social norms.

Past studies on laboratory corruption games have not been able to find consistent evidence that subjects make “immoral” decisions. A possible reason, and also a critique of laboratory corruption games, is that the experiment may fail to trigger the intended immorality frame in the minds of the participants, leading many to question the very raison d’être of laboratory corruption games. To test this idea, we compare behavior in a harassment bribery game with a strategically identical but neutrally framed ultimatum game. The results show that fewer people, both as briber and bribee, engage in corruption in the bribery frame than in the alternative and the average bribe amount is lesser in the former than in the latter. These suggest that moral costs are indeed at work. A third treatment, which relabels the bribery game in neutral language, indicates that the observed treatment effect arises not from the neutral language of the ultimatum game but from a change in the sense of entitlement between the bribery and ultimatum game frames. To provide further support that the bribery game does measure moral costs, we elicit the shared perceptions of appropriateness of the actions or social norm, under the two frames. We show that the social norm governing the bribery game frame and ultimatum game frame are indeed different and that the perceived sense of social appropriateness plays a crucial role in determining the actual behavior in the two frames. Furthermore, merely relabelling the bribery game in neutral language makes no difference to the social appropriateness norm governing it. This indicates that, just as in the case of actual behavior, the observed difference in social appropriateness norm between bribery game and ultimatum game comes from the difference in entitlement too. Finally, we comment on the external validity of behavior in lab corruption games.

A popular empirical technique to measure norms uses coordination games to elicit what subjects in an experiment consider appropriate behavior in a given situation (Krupka and Weber in J Eur Econ Assoc 11(3):495–524, 2013). The Krupka–Weber method works under the assumption that subjects use their normative expectations to solve the coordination game. However, subjects might use alternative focal points to coordinate, in which case the method may deliver distorted measurements of the social norm. We test the vulnerability of the Krupka–Weber method to the presence of alternative salient focal points in two series of experiments with more than 3000 subjects. We find that the method is robust, especially when there are clear normative expectations about what constitutes appropriate behavior.

This paper contributes to the ongoing methodological debate on context-free versus in-context presentation of experimental tasks. We report an experiment using the paradigm of a bribery experiment. In one condition, the task is presented in a typical bribery context, the other one uses abstract wording. Though the underlying context is heavily loaded with negative ethical preconceptions, we do not find significant differences with our 18 independent observations per treatment. We conjecture that the experimental design transmits the essential features of a bribery situation already with neutral framing, such that the presentation does not add substantially to subjects’ interpretation of the task.

While the opportunity to punish selfish and reward generous behavior coexist in many instances in daily life, in most laboratory studies, the demand for punishment and reward are studied separately from one another. This paper presents the results from an experiment measuring the demand for reward and punishment by ‘unaffected’ third parties, separately and jointly. We find that the demand for costly punishment is substantially lower when individuals are also given the ability to reward. Similarly, the demand for costly reward is lower when individuals can also punish. The evidence indicates the reason for this is that costly punishment and reward are not only used to alter the material payoff of others as assumed by recent economic models, but also as a signal of disapproval and approval of others’ actions, respectively. When the opportunity exists, subjects often choose to withhold reward as a form of costless punishment, and to withhold punishment as a form of costless reward. We conclude that restricting the available options to punishing (rewarding) only, may lead to an increase in the demand for costly punishment (reward).

Evidence shows that the willingness of individuals to avenge punishment inflicted upon them for transgressions they committed constitutes a significant obstacle toward upholding social norms and cooperation. The drivers of this behavior, however, are not well understood. We hypothesize that ulterior motive attribution—the tendency to assign ulterior motives to punishers for their actions—increases the likelihood of counter-punishment. We exogenously manipulate the ability to attribute ulterior motives to punishers by having the punisher be either an unaffected third party or a second party who, as the victim of a transgression, may be driven to punish by a desire to take revenge. We show that survey respondents consider second-party punishment to be substantially more likely to be driven by ulterior motives than an identical, payoff-equalizing punishment meted out by a third party. In line with our hypothesis, we find that second-party punishment is 66.3% more likely to trigger counter-punishment than third-party punishment in a lab experiment. The loss in earnings due to counter-punishment is 64.6% higher for second-party punishers than third-party punishers, all else equal.

We establish whether the efficacy of mutual monitoring in fostering cooperation is dependent on the degree of approval motivation within teams. Approval motivation is defined as the desire to produce positive perceptions in others and the incentive to acquire the approval of others as well as the desire to avoid disapproval, (Martin in J Personality Assess 48(5):508–519, 1984). Contrary to the theoretical predictions, the results from the experiment suggest that mutual monitoring was not effective in fostering cooperation in teams. Furthermore, the efficacy of mutual monitoring in fostering cooperation was not correlated with the degree of approval motivation within teams.

We study the robustness of Krupka and Weber's method (2013) for eliciting social norms. In two online experiments with more than 1200 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk, we find that participants’ response patterns are invariant to differences in the salience of the monetarily incentivized coordination aspect. We further demonstrate that asking participants for their personal first- and second-order beliefs without monetary incentives results in qualitatively identical responses in the case that beliefs and social norms are well aligned. Overall, Krupka and Weber's method produces remarkably robust response patterns.

Böckenholt and van der Heijden’s results regarding compliance with insurance regulations—that the enforcement activities of a regulatory agency were relatively unpredictive of compliance—are consistent with findings from other domains (e.g., tax adherence), where personal factors and informal social controls have been shown to play a more significant role. However, the specific form of informal social control investigated in Böckenholt and van der Heijden’s study (the perceived approval/disapproval of friends and family) is not the only kind of informal social control that has proven effective in spurring compliance. Descriptive social norms, which involve perceptions not of what others approve but of what others actually do, also influence compliance decisions powerfully. Yet, the role of descriptive social norms in rule adherence is often underappreciated by governed and governors alike. The consequences of this relative lack of recognition are discussed within the arena of compliance with pro-environmental regulations and requests.

Understanding and predicting human cooperative behaviour and belief dynamics remains a major challenge both from the scientific and practical perspectives. Because of the complexity and multiplicity of material, social and cognitive factors involved, both empirical and theoretical work tends to focus only on some snippets of the puzzle. Recently, a mathematical theory has been proposed that integrates material, social and cognitive aspects of behaviour and beliefs dynamics to explain how people make decisions in social dilemmas within heterogeneous groups. Here we apply this theory in two countries, China and Spain, through four long-term behavioural experiments utilising the Common Pool Resources game and the Collective Risk game. Our results show that material considerations carry the smallest weight in decision-making, while personal norms tend to be the most important factor. Empirical and normative expectations have intermediate weight in decision-making. Cognitive dissonance, social projection, logic constraints and cultural background play important roles in both decision-making and beliefs dynamics. At the individual level, we observe differences in the weights that people assign to factors involved in the decision-making and belief updating process. We identify different types of prosociality and rule-following associated with cultural differences, various channels for the effects of messaging, and culturally dependent interactions between sensitivity to messaging and conformity. Our results can put policy and information design on firmer ground, highlighting the need for interventions tailored to the situation at hand and to individual characteristics. Overall, this work demonstrates the theoretical and practical power of the theory in providing a more comprehensive understanding of human behaviour and beliefs.

This study empirically examines gender inequality in tolerance for women's opinions and identifies how the provision of normative gender-egalitarian message can mitigate this inequality by conducting online randomized experiments in Japan. In this experiment, I asked the participants to evaluate the agreement score for 10 anonymous statements and implemented two types of random interventions: disclosing the gender of the statement poster and providing normative statement for gender equality. The results of both cross-sectional and panel data analyses showed that people significantly reduced the agreement score for women's opinions compared with men's and non-gender disclosure opinions. Meanwhile, the negative impact of female gender disclosure was neutralized when participants were provided with a normative message.