The title of the Convention and article I both refer to the obligation to prevent genocide. However, the Convention provides no other guidance on the scope of this obligation. In its 2007 judgment in Bosnia v. Serbia the International Court of Justice held that Serbia had had been in breach of its obligation to prevent genocide because it failed to exert pressure on Bosnian Serb forces who were preparing to commit genocide at Srebrenica. The doctrine developed by the Court was quite radical in that it recognized an extraterritoriaoutside their own gterritory unless l dimension of the obligation, one that varied in scope depending upon the influence the State Party was capable of exerting. Prevention of genocide is also contemplated in the General Assembly resolution on the responsibility to protect. Means employed to prevent genocide must be otherwise lawful. States cannot use force to prevent genocide unless authorised pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations.

This chapter introduces an idea that has enjoyed a remarkable, if hotly contested, development in the post-Cold War era: humanitarian intervention. Based on a commitment to principles of humanity and respect for life, such action seeks to alleviate the unnecessary suffering caused by violent conflict through intervening in another state, with force under limited conditions. The chapter outlines the origins of humanitarianism and the history of humanitarian intervention before discussing the shift to the responsibility to protect (R2P). As world politics becomes ever more complex, debate about global responsibilities to protect suffering strangers will continue to shape the theory and practice of international relations. While abuse of human beings has not become less widespread, the preoccupation with COVID-19 and domestic priorities meant that little consideration was given to robust action against middle powers perpetrating mass atrocities in such places as Myanmar and Tigray, let alone against major powers in Ukraine and Xinjiang.

Chapter 7 examines the legality of humanitarian intervention and the extent to which certain interventions might qualify as being excused despite the lack of a legal basis.

Chapter 10 focuses on the somewhat controversial doctrine of humanitarian intervention. It assesses the issue of whether the doctrine can be reconciled with the UN Charter, before examining state practice in connection with the doctrine, including taking a look at Cold War and post-Cold War practice in assessing the position of the doctrine during the UN era. Given that the forcible entry by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the Kosovo crisis in 1999 proved something of a landmark in terms of events that have shaped the path of the modern doctrine, the status of the doctrine in the immediate aftermath of this intervention is given particular attention, as well as the impact that the war in Ukraine has had and whether there is an obligation to intervene in the context of genocides. The chapter then looks at the Syrian civil war and the relevance of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention to that particularly tragic conflict, which continues at the time of writing. A conception of the doctrine that has come to dominate contemporary debates is that of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’. Given its relatively recent rise to prominence, its impact upon the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is assessed.

This chapter discusses whether and in what circumstances states can resort to the use of force

After 2011, the Syrian opposition took on the Assad government directly through military means and indirectly by establishing pockets of rule beyond the government’s reach. As rebels took control of many government-held locations, they sparked the establishment of insurgent governing institutions in hundreds of communities. Local opposition-run institutions in the form of civilian-led local councils proliferated, dotting the provinces of Aleppo, Idlib, rural Damascus, Raqqa, Hama, and Homs. They worked to deliver basic relief and restore public services, sometimes in collaboration with, but often operating separately from, their armed counterparts. The boundaries of this “political marketplace”1 grew increasingly porous as a number of foreign states and private actors directly championed clients of their choosing, bolstering their favorites with financial and military support.2

Protest in the face of authoritarian rule necessitates a kind of audacity rarely, if ever, called for in daily life. When uprising turns to revolt and revolt to civil war, new questions arise: What comes next? What combination of suffering and joy does the future hold? And to whom should one now turn to manage those matters previously entrusted to the state? Even as new political possibilities arise, the stuff of ordinary life does not disappear but instead must be managed on terms that are both newly expansive and constrained. As people confront the hopes and hardships that come with rebellion, bread must be baked, crimes punished, and garbage collected.

This chapter focuses on peacemaking between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire after the signing of the armistice in 1918 and how it relied on the idea of minority protection and humanitarian intervention that dated back to nineteenth-century treaty agreements and diplomatic dealings.

This chapter covers the international law governing the use of force between states – the jus ad bellum. This is in contrast to the jus in bello – the law of armed conflict, or international humanitarian law – which regulates the conduct of hostilities once under way (see Chapter 11). Since at least 1945 the use of force by states has been prohibited, except in self-defence or when authorised by the United Nations Security Council. This chapter analyses the prohibition, the two exceptions, and the controversial issue of humanitarian intervention and its close relative, the ‘responsibility to protect’.

The chapter examines the ICJ’s contribution to the law on the use of force. The author considers the Court’s case law on the prohibition of the use of force and its potential exceptions, most notably the law on individual and collective self-defence. He identifies the main conceptualisations, inconsistencies, disagreements, and limitations of the Court’s opinions, arguing that although the Court initially had a significant influence, it has faded significantly over the years as a result of what appears to be a conscious or strategic decision of its judges.

Over the past few decades, it has become increasingly difficult for major powers to translate battlefield victories into favourable political outcomes. As a result, US military engagements in the Middle East, Russian engagements in its “near abroad” and in Syria, French engagements in sub-Saharan Africa, and the African Union’s war in Somalia have turned into protracted missions with little prospect of decisive victory. This chapter examines the phenomenon of “endless war,” asking why it has become so difficult to bring wars to an end and what can be done about it. It shows that the problem is global, rooted in the changing nature, purposes, and attitudes of war. As wars become less about resolving disputes between states and more about the internal composition of states, and as those contests become ever more internationalized, the capacity of actors to sustain war have increased while incentives to pursue peace have declined. The first part examines the “endless war” thesis that grounds the problem in US liberal hegemony. The second part offers a brief explanation of factors that extend a war’s duration and inhibit peace. The third discusses how these issues might be addressed.

How can force be used to pursue human security? Treatments of this issue are surprisingly rare.  This chapter addresses the potentially positive uses of force to address basic human needs under the new doctrine of human security in international law.   International laws, cases, and regimes addressing the constituent elements of human security are addressed in turn: personal and political security, economic, food, health, community and environmental security. The evolving structure and function of UN Peacekeeping Operations is demonstrated through cases of specific missions. Finally, the possibilities of 2001’s "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine are debated.

This chapter argues that an adequate account of group rights requires an embedded understanding of moral duties and rights within the context of common action for a common good. Drawing from Alasdair MacIntyre, I explain why group agency for a common good, through various social practices, grounds a framework of natural justice with correlative duties and rights, including various group moral rights. This account of natural justice is completed by an appeal to the common agency of an institutionalised political community for a political common good. I argue that human rights are a subset of moral rights, which ‘cry out’ as a matter of justice for political enforcement or realisation, whether against violations of fundamental natural law precepts or dereliction of core political responsibilities. These include group rights where the protected aspects of personal human flourishing are pursued through the common action of groups, such as families, trade unions, religious communities, and political communities. Moreover, group rights are essential to human rights – human rights presuppose the group moral right of political authority to administer justice for the common good.