We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected]
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
We develop a model that relates self-control to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas, and we test the model in a laboratory public goods experiment. As predicted, we find a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is at its strongest when the decision maker’s risk aversion is low and the cooperation levels of others high. We interpret the pattern as evidence for the notion that individuals may experience an impulse to act in self-interest—and that cooperative behavior benefits from self-control. Free-riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place.
Punishment has been shown to be an effective reinforcement mechanism. Intentional or not, punishment will likely generate spillover effects that extend beyond one’s immediate decision environment, and these spillovers are not as well understood. We seek to understand these secondary spillover effects in a controlled lab setting using a standard social dilemma: the voluntary contributions mechanism. We find that spillovers occur when others observe punishment outside their own social dilemma. However, the direction of the spillover effect depends crucially on personal punishment history and whether one is personally exempt from punishment or not.
When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk mis-coordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. To study this, we extend a threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute through an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. Through a series of experiments, we show that the presence of an intermediary increases public good success and subjects’ earnings only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct donations to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary has a negative impact, complicating the donation environment, decreasing contributions and public good success.
The impact of the financial crisis has reignited debate about the scope and scale of public sector restructuring and its consequences for the workforce in Britain. The economic crisis precipitated austerity measures concentrated on expenditure reductions with the intention of reducing the public deficit. Because the public sector pay bill comprises over half of current public spending, achieving deficit reduction has major consequences for the total pay bill and the workforce. This article assesses the restructuring of the public sector and public sector employment relations in Britain and identifies underlying continuities in public sector restructuring over recent decades. Drawing on and repositioning New Labour’s legacy, the Coalition government used the economic crisis to establish a pro-austerity frame that has legitimated deep cuts in public sector employment and involved measures to refashion public sector employment relations. The article considers the consequences of this agenda and responses by trade unions and indicates some of the limits and uncertain prospects for public sector restructuring under conditions of austerity.
In this paper, we present a series of environmental policies that were implemented by the city-state of Athens during the Classical period (508–323 BCE) through a specific set of environmental institutions. They included: waste management, the implementation of a recycling process regarding animal manure as well as hygiene practices. Special administrative bodies were set up for this purpose with the power to impose heavy fines to offenders, and the actual job of environmental protection was contracted out to private operators. We argue that the success of the Athenian environmental institutions should primarily be attributed to the economic stimuli that the Athenian state provided to their staff so as to perform their duties efficiently, as well as to the imposition of fines and/or other penalties if they provided subpar services. We finally provide proposals as to how the Athenian environmental policies may be seen as an inspiration for our modern societies.
Total cost estimates for crime in the USA are both out-of-date and incomplete. We estimated incidence and costs of personal crimes (both violent and non-violent) and property crimes in 2017. Incidence came from national arrest data, multi-state estimates of police-reported crimes per arrest, national victimization and road crash surveys, and police underreporting studies. We updated and expanded upon published unit costs. Estimated crime costs totaled $2.6 trillion ($620 billion in monetary costs plus quality of life losses valued at $1.95 trillion; 95 % uncertainty interval $2.2–$3.0 trillion). Violent crime accounted for 85 % of costs. Principal contributors to the 10.9 million quality-adjusted life years lost were sexual violence, physical assault/robbery, and child maltreatment. Monetary expenditures caused by criminal victimization represent 3 % of Gross Domestic Product – equivalent to the amount spent on national defense. These estimates exclude the additional costs of preventing and avoiding crime such as enhanced lighting and burglar alarms. They also exclude crimes against businesses and most white-collar and corporate offenses.
Benefit–cost analysis (BCA) is often viewed as measuring the efficiency of a policy independent of the distribution of its consequences. The role of distributional effects on policy choice is disputed; either: (a) the policy that maximizes net benefits should be selected and distributional concerns should be addressed through other measures, such as tax and transfer programs or (b) BCA should be supplemented with distributional analysis and decision-makers should weigh efficiency and distribution in policy choice. The separation of efficiency and distribution is misleading. The measure of efficiency depends on the numéraire chosen for the analysis, whether monetary values or some other good (unless individuals have the same rates of substitution between them). The choice of numéraire is not neutral; it can affect the ranking of policies by calculated net benefits. Alternative evaluation methods, such as BCA using a different numéraire, weighted BCA, or a social welfare function (SWF), may better integrate concerns about distribution and efficiency. The most appropriate numéraire, distributional weights, or SWFs cannot be measured or statistically estimated; it is a normative choice.
Although benefit-cost analysis (BCA) can be traced back to European thinkers, its first practical applications were in the United States. Recent years have witnessed a growing demand for economic appraisals of policies in different sectors in Europe, but the implementation rate is still low compared to that in the United States. This article introduces a symposium that includes four articles that present current examples of how BCA is being applied in different sectors and in different institutional settings in Europe. They deal with environmental valuation in the United Kingdom, economic analysis for investment in Sweden’s transport sector, economic versus financial returns in European Union investment project appraisal, and BCA in EU chemicals legislation. The goal is to stimulate continuing discussion on the implementation of BCA, not only in Europe but also worldwide.
Behavioral economics and happiness research have many important implications for the conduct of benefit-cost analysis as well as for policy design and implementation. By identifying ways in which we may act irrationally and providing new perspectives on the relationship between our circumstances and our sense of well-being, this research raises numerous questions regarding the evaluation of individual and societal welfare and the desirability of alternative policies. In this special issue, we present a series of articles that explore these concerns and provide significant new insights.
Behavioral economists have identified certain biases in decision making that lead people to make decisions that harm themselves, but there is insufficient guidance for estimating benefits in the presence of such behavioral failures. This gap in principles and standards for benefit-cost analysis has led government agencies at times to adopt arbitrary and excessive benefit valuations. This article describes an approach to incorporating behavioral market failures into benefit estimation, first by advocating a behavioral transfer test to use before applying behavioral findings from narrow contexts to broader populations subject to regulation, and then by comparing the outcomes from the self-harming behavior to a policy reference point in which people are assumed to be fully informed and to act fully rationally in their own self-interest. This approach, which is grounded on systematic, well-documented, and context-specific findings of behavioral failings, would reduce instances of agencies assuming that behavioral findings in some contexts provide sufficient rationale for overriding consumer preferences in other contexts. It would also establish a consistent approach to government policy by, for example, creating symmetry between advancing policies that seek to discourage consumption of products for which consumers underestimate the health risks and fostering accurate risk beliefs to address erroneous individual choices based on risk overestimation.
This study analyzes the value of agricultural research to Florida by examining the effect of research spending on agricultural productivity, as measured by a total factor productivity index, and profitability, as measured by net farm income. Results suggest that research expenditures do increase agricultural productivity in the state. However, agricultural productivity does not affect net cash income. Further, the economic rents to the productivity gains do not accrue to land values. Instead, the economic value of research innovations accrues more to consumers than to producers. Thus, consumers are the ultimate beneficiaries of agricultural research in Florida, thereby justifying public funding for agricultural research.
We consider the measurement of performance in the public sector in general, focussing on local government and the provision of library services by English local authorities in particular. We will consider two methodologies that assess the performance of local authorities in terms of the efficiency with which they provide services and consider methods that allow us to account for exogenous influences on performance, such as the socio-economic profile of the population served by the authority. We find that although both methods' results appear similar, the implications for potential cost savings vary widely. Omitting to account for background factors leads to an overstatement of the level of inefficiency and hence the scope for reducing expenditure.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.