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Strong, bold, and kind: self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Martin G. Kocher ,
Peter Martinsson ,
Kristian Ove R. Myrseth  and
Conny E. Wollbrant
Martin G. Kocher*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Munich, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539 Munich, Germany Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, 40530 Göteborg, Sweden School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, Gardens Point Campus, 4000 Brisbane, Australia
Peter Martinsson*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, 40530 Göteborg, Sweden
Kristian Ove R. Myrseth*
Affiliation:
School of Management, University of St Andrews, KY16 9RJ St Andrews, UK
Conny E. Wollbrant*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, 40530 Göteborg, Sweden
*
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
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Abstract

We develop a model that relates self-control to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas, and we test the model in a laboratory public goods experiment. As predicted, we find a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is at its strongest when the decision maker’s risk aversion is low and the cooperation levels of others high. We interpret the pattern as evidence for the notion that individuals may experience an impulse to act in self-interest—and that cooperative behavior benefits from self-control. Free-riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place.

Keywords

ExperimentPublic goodSelf-controlCooperationRiskC91D03H40
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 2017 , pp. 44 - 69
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9475-7) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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