This chapter presents the economic theory of “market failures” and articulates three examples of externalities and their pricing: a classic example from Pigou, the California Cap-and-Trade program, and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. This chapter also sets the table for presenting more critical theoretical perspectives.

Like information disseminated through online platforms, infectious diseases can cross international borders as they track the movement of people (and sometimes animals and goods) and spread globally. Hence, their control and management have major implications for international relations, and international law. Drawing on this analogy, this chapter looks to global health governance to formulate suggestions for the governance of online platforms. Successes in global health governance suggest that the principle of tackling low-hanging fruit first to build trust and momentum towards more challenging goals may extend to online platform governance. Progress beyond the low-hanging fruit appears more challenging: For one, disagreement on the issue of resource allocation in the online platform setting may lead to “outbreaks” of disinformation being relegated to regions of the world that may not be at the top of online platforms’ market priorities lists. Secondly, while there may be wide consensus on the harms of infectious disease outbreaks, the harms from the spread of disinformation are more contested. Relying on national definitions of disinformation would hardly yield coherent international cooperation. Global health governance would thus suggest that an internationally negotiated agreement on standards as it relates to disinformation may be necessary.

In this chapter, we present the major market failures and behavioural anomalies that are relevant to analyse energy and climate issues from an economic point of view. We start with a discussion on positive and negative externalities; next we discuss the public goods and common resource problem, followed by a presentation of the principal–agent and information problems, and then we provide a summary of the role of lack of competition in energy and energy-related markets. An important aspect described in this chapter is the role of behavioural anomalies, such as bounded rationality and bounded willpower. At the end of the chapter, we describe the most important energy and climate policies as well as the concept of sustainable development that should guide policy design. We also discuss issues in developing countries related to the topics discussed in the chapter.

Economics is a central science to the understanding of regulation. Regulatory economics focuses on economic concepts that are relevant in regulatory contexts. Chapter 1 introduces key concepts of economics and regulatory economics, referring to a branch of social sciences concerned with how society chooses to employ its scarce resources to produce goods and services. This chapter offers a brief discussion of economic concepts that have shaped regulation (e.g., monopoly, market failures). It also discusses behavioral economics, the commons, and principal-agent theory.

Explains why the usual American solution to economic problems, the free market, is inadequate to either explain how the economy really works or solve its problems.

As a continuation of the overall introduction to the book, Chapter 2 summarizes the main contributions of economics to understanding the role of education in society and to educational policy. The chapter details these contributions in three parts: (1) economists have demonstrated that education has an important economic dimension (that it has economic value), and they have inserted education policy near the center of the debate on economic development and material well-being; (2) they have formalized concrete models of student learning, both in and out of school, and have developed models of educational production, in which schools, districts, and states are economic decision units, allocating resources to produce educational outputs – and where incentives and resource allocation decisions affect the productivity of teachers and student learning, economists have been able to model a number of strategies that increase output and test them empirically; and (3) economists have also been at the forefront of applying new and increasingly sophisticated statistical techniques to estimate quantitatively the causal effects of various educational policies on student academic outcomes and adult economic and social outcomes.

As scholars and activists seek to define and promote greater corporate political responsibility (CPR), they will benefit from understanding practitioner perspectives and how executives are responding to rising scrutiny of their political influences, reputational risk and pressure from employees, customers and investors to get involved in civic, political, and societal issues. This chapter draws on firsthand conversations with practitioners, including executives in government affairs; sustainability; senior leadership; and diversity, equity and inclusion, during the launch of a university-based CPR initiative. I summarize practitioner motivations, interests, barriers and challenges related to engaging in conversations about CPR, as well as committing or acting to improve CPR. Following the summary, I present implications for further research and several possible paths forward, including leveraging practitioners’ value on accountability, sustaining external calls for transparency, strengthening awareness of systems, and reframing CPR as part of a larger dialogue around society’s “social contract.”

Chapter 16 establishes the concept of an externality, a situation where a decision carries additional costs or benefits to a party not involved in the decision-making process. The chapter classifies several types of externalities and explores how and why they lead to undesirable outcomes. Then potential solutions to externalities as well as their strengths and weaknesses are discussed: subsidies, taxes, regulation, and the assignment of property rights. The chapter ends with a discussion of cost–benefit analysis and its role in evaluating interventions aimed at combatting externality problems.

This chapter summarises the lessons from Parts I to IV and concludes. First, we revisit the major drivers of FinTech: finance, technology, and regulation. Second, we examine how each of these drivers brings its own challenges, which one or two of the other domains have the potential to mitigate. Third, we show how the global discussion on how to regulate FinTech is indicative of a broader regulatory trend to expect more from the financial system than the mere efficient distribution of capital; and we argue how financial regulation which promotes resilience, financial inclusion, and expansion of financial resources is well equipped to further the overarching objective of sustainable development. Fourth, we analyse further how FinTech (and FinTech-oriented financial regulation) may be used to advance sustainable development. Fifth, we analyse the constituent building blocks of a comprehensive FinTech strategy.

Economic, technological, and demographic changes after World War II created new pressures on species, habitats, and human environments. Concerns about human impacts on the environment mounted. Rachel Carson, Charles Elton, Barry Commoner, and others articulated concerns about pesticides and other harmful substances in air and water, introduced species, escalating extinction rates, and the modification and fragmentation of habitats. Ecologists, economists, and philosophers like Paul Ehrlich, Garrett Hardin, John Kenneth Galbraith, Lynne White, Norman Myers, and Arne Naess attributed these problems to varied causes, including population growth, tragedies of the commons, excessive resource consumption and disparities in consumption, militarism, the misuse of science and technology, externalities, and anthropocentrism. In response to these developments and to increasing awareness of the limitations of utilitarian conservation, a preservationist approach to conservation that seeks to protect species and regardless of their economic value became prominent.

This chapter argues that many of the fundamental challenges of sharing economy platforms can best be understood and dealt with by considering these platforms embedded in a sociotechnical ecosystem. This perspective also enables us to formulate many crucial questions about the design, governance, and regulation of sharing economy platforms. The chapter also provides a set of differentiating dimensions that can help with classifying various sharing economy platforms, guide decisions regarding ecosystem boundaries, and shape more relevant sociotechnical questions and hypotheses for a given sharing economy. Finally, the chapter provides a few examples of ecosystem-motivated issues and questions that include a broader consideration of socioeconomic externalities, decisions about modes of platform governance and the relative weight of internal versus external regulations, and public–private partnerships.