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We estimate the effect of temperature on the economic activity of Mexico utilizing 42 years of quarterly panel data of economic growth at the state level. Our findings elicit a concave relationship between economic growth and temperature that is maximized at around 20°C. Temperatures below or above this level are associated with lower growth rates. Temperature affects aggregate economic activity mainly through the effect it has on the growth of the primary and secondary sectors. In addition, the estimated sensitivity of economic growth to temperature has not decreased within our sample period which indicates that adaptation to climate change has been limited. When combining our panel estimates with temperature projections by the year 2100, our results suggest that quarterly economic growth might be reduced by 0.4 percentage points, on average, under an intermediate scenario of climate change with reductions as large as 1.0 percentage point during the spring and summer quarters.
This chapter examines the potential economic impact of investing in long-term care systems. Long-term care systems often indirectly burden informal caregivers, primarily women, leading to a significant loss of potential income and economic growth opportunities. Without adequately compensated, trained care professionals, it’s challenging for unpaid informal caregivers to increase their labour market participation. A comprehensive long-term care system must include support programs and policy changes that encourage both informal and formal caregivers to participate fully in the workforce, which is vital for economic growth and productivity.
Arguments that corruption is “grease for the wheels,” benefiting economic growth, are difficult to sustain. State-level findings show that extensive corruption tends to leave a state poorer, and more economically unequal, than states where the problem is less significant. Citizens’ ability to respond to those difficulties by political means is in turn influenced by corruption itself, general levels of political participation, the strength or weakness of trust in officials and fellow citizens, the amount and quality of political news coverage in the mass media, and a state’s social composition. Problems of low trust could conceivably be addressed via effective universally applied public policies, but those in turn can challenge, and be challenged by, key aspects of America’s long-term bargain between government and citizens and by citizens’ expectations of each other. Corruption often undermines trust, and trust can underwrite effective reforms, but the relationships are complex and contingent upon levels of trust that are neither too low nor too high.
While the passage of the 2018 Gender Parity Law was a step in the right direction, progress on women's political empowerment in Japan has been slow. With a combined effort from advocacy groups, political parties, and the international community to include more women on ballots and support them to electoral success, Japan can move the needle on gender equity in politics.
There is now a Happiness Revolution to go along with the earlier Industrial and Demographic Revolutions. The Happiness Revolution is captured using people's happiness scores, as reported in public surveys, whereas the earlier revolutions are reflected by economic production (such as GDP) and life expectancy. Increases in happiness are chiefly due to social-science welfare policies that alleviate people's foremost concerns – those centering on family life, health, and jobs. This Element traces the course of the Happiness Revolution throughout Europe since the 1980s when comprehensive and comparable data on people's happiness first become available. Which countries lead and which lag? How is happiness distributed – are the rich happier than the poor, men than women, old than young, native than foreign born, city than countryfolk? How has the COVID-19 pandemic impacted happiness? These are among the questions addressed in this Element. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Expo 70 in Osaka was a watershed, in the histories of post-war Japan and of exhibitions. Following the Tokyo Olympics, it substantiated Japan’s reemergence on the international stage of the Cold War world. In time, it also proved a turning point from the productionism of the immediate post-war years to the consumerism of the 1970s and 1980s. Most significant, it confirmed the Japanese state’s embrace of mega-events as a way of implementing the national planning regime, and thereby canalizing development. This chapter explores Expo 70 in detail, situating it in both the post-war reemergence of international exhibitions around the world and the benefits and costs of high economic growth in Japan. It shows how the Expo became a magnet, for intellectuals and creatives, both for and against, and for visitors, who flocked in greater numbers than for any expo before. It also explores in detail how the expo became a media event. Newspapers and TV attested to the implacable but manifold nature of development, which was evident in the ability of the Expo to conjure infrastructure and catalyse demand, even while it accommodated a fractured world, teeming crowds, and intransigent protest.
Entrepreneurship has been expunged from contemporary mainstream economics despite being an important driver and cause of economic development and growth. However, whereas Evolutionary Economics recognizes value-creative entrepreneurship, its role and impact tend to still be understated and the vast implications not fully understood. This Element attempts to remedy this by theorizing on how entrepreneurship impacts and drives market economies, the implications for economic change and renewal, and how the pursuit of new value creation determines the evolution of an economy. We find that allowing for entrepreneurial new value creation – innovative entrepreneurship – produces a different and more dynamic understanding of the market as a process, the role of knowledge and uncertainty, economic evolution and progress, as well as has important implications for political economy.
We study a growth model with two types of agents who are heterogeneous in their degree of family altruism. We prove that every equilibrium path of consumption, bequests, and capital converges to a unique steady state and study the effect of altruism on the properties of steady-state equilibrium. We show that aggregate income is positively related to both level of altruism and altruism heterogeneity. When altruism heterogeneity is low or moderate, income inequality follows an inverse U-shaped pattern relative to the level of altruism. These observations are consistent with the cross-country Kuznets curve linking different steady-state levels of income to steady-state levels of inequality. When altruism heterogeneity is high, income inequality decreases with the level of altruism. Our results suggest that heterogeneous altruism is a possible mechanism linking economic growth and income inequality.
This chapter explains how the market process creates the right capital and technology to promote the process of development. It explains how an institutional environment of economic freedom best promotes the process of development and provides empirical evidence to support this view. It then reviews how economic freedom has evolved in countries that had sweatshops identified in the first edition of this book.
Chapter 6 studies East Asian economic growth and development strategy. It starts with a section on how economic growth and the theory of growth have been constructed. It then discusses the East Asian economic miracle – rapid growth in GDP per capita with relative equity. Most East Asian countries have chosen a hybrid path, often emulating each other and building on recent successes. Most adopted the developmental-state strategy to different degrees and at different points, and they generally view modernization as a way to regain their past glories. This chapter focuses on material wealth production, with a particular emphasis on how East Asian nations adapt and innovate. It also discusses the consequences of East Asian growth in terms of the rise and fall of nations, the “rich nation, strong army”, the contest of political systems, and the environment. Uneven economic growth is a source of a shifting balance of power.
Edited by
Daniel Benoliel, University of Haifa, Israel,Peter K. Yu, Texas A & M University School of Law,Francis Gurry, World Intellectual Property Organization,Keun Lee, Seoul National University
Innovation is at the core of economic development, growth, and structural change. Yet, it does not spur in nor flow to all corners of the world. This chapter reviews and describes empirically the uneven geographical distribution of innovation and its dynamics, at both the national and subnational levels. It also compares such distribution in relation to other indicators of economic activity. The chapter then examines the potential consequences of such unequal distribution, particularly for its possible influence on inter-regional income inequality, and discusses how inevitable they might be. In light of available evidence, it explores what the role of policy could be.
Edited by
Daniel Benoliel, University of Haifa, Israel,Peter K. Yu, Texas A & M University School of Law,Francis Gurry, World Intellectual Property Organization,Keun Lee, Seoul National University
Women do not receive their fair share when it comes to patenting and are far less likely to own patents. This disparity is due in part to the inherent biases in science, technology, and the patent system and in part to the high costs of the patent application process. This chapter therefore proposes an unconventional new regime of unregistered patent rights to relieve women and other disadvantaged inventors of such costs and biases and thereby increase their access to patent protections. To explain the proposal, this chapter details the challenges facing women and other disadvantaged inventors in applying for patents as well as the fact that other intellectual property regimes, such as copyright and trademark, allow such unregistered rights. The chapter also addresses a number of objections that the proposal would inevitably raise. In particular, it shows that, because the proposed unregistered patent system would grant rights for only three years and protect only against direct and knowing copying, these rights would be unlikely to deter incremental or complementary innovation. Such rights would also be fully subject to invalidation under a preponderance of the evidence standard.
Edited by
Daniel Benoliel, University of Haifa, Israel,Peter K. Yu, Texas A & M University School of Law,Francis Gurry, World Intellectual Property Organization,Keun Lee, Seoul National University
Without enhancing their innovation capabilities, latecomer countries will be subject to the middle-income trap, and global inequality will not be reduced. This chapter thus discusses the roles of diverse forms of intellectual property rights (IPR) in promoting innovation among latecomers. It argues, first, that utility model or petit patents can be a useful form of IPR for recognizing and encouraging innovation by latecomers in their earlier stage of development, and, secondly, that latecomer firms in sectors involving tacit knowledge can rely on trademarks, rather than regular patents, as the main forms of IPR in their innovation and growth pathways. This chapter further discusses the negative impacts of strong IPR protection in Northern economies on the exports by Southern or catch-up economies to Northern markets. As a means to overcome this barrier, the chapter discusses the role of leapfrogging strategy, where latecomers pursue different technological trajectories from those of incumbent countries.
Examining a sixteen-year period of oil labour history in Iran, beginning with the inauguration of Iran’s Third Development Plan in 1962, this analysis highlights a timeline where rapid economic growth persisted until 1976, subsequently leading to an economic crisis in 1977 and culminating in the revolution of 1978–79. Contrary to typical revolutionary patterns, this study argues that the Iranian Revolution was precipitated not merely by the short-lived economic recession but by more than a decade of rapid economic expansion beforehand. Despite varying interpretations of the economic and political roots of the 1978–79 revolution, there is a consensus among scholars about the decisive role played by the oil industry workers’ entrance into the revolutionary scene, which was pivotal for the revolution’s significant momentum. Revisiting the chronology of the revolution, this exploration delves into how workers in the Iranian oil industry prominently emerged during these upheavals and investigates how an industry, whose labour movements were historically shaped by a secular work and life culture, gradually came to embrace the Islamic leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. Ultimately, this analysis seeks to examine the evolution of the positions of Iran’s oil working class in the year leading up to the collapse of the monarchy in Iran, striving to achieve a broader understanding of the determinative power of labour movements in political upheavals.
This chapter proposes a framework for estimating the investment in human capital from health improvement or activities that improve life expectancy and reduce morbidity rates. The measurement framework builds on and extends the Jorgenson-Fraumeni income-based approach for estimating human capital to account for the effect of health on human capital. This economic approach to measuring health human capital differs from the welfare-based approach that estimates the economic effect of health improvements on the quality of life and well-being of individuals. The framework is then implemented for Canada, and the investment in health human capital for the period from 1970 to 2020 is estimated. The estimated investment in health human capital based on the income approach was found to be lower than health expenditures in Canada. This suggests that much of the health expenditures should be classified as consumption rather than as an investment that increases earnings.
While reaction ruled, Germany was in the midst of rapid industrialization, urbanization, and overall modernization, and the Jews were often considered as prime agents of this development. However, a close look discloses Jewish communities living mainly in small towns, working in local commerce and in traditional branches of industry. Still, it seems that they were moving forward more quickly than others, more easily accepting change, enjoying more favorable demographic trends, and quickly improving their educational level. As a typical example, the chapter presents a sketch of one family history, that of the Liebermanns, who held on to their commercial interests in cotton and silk, but then slowly expanded to become larger-scale industrial entrepreneurs, centered in Berlin and later in Silesia too, gradually moving to more modern and more large-scale production sectors. On the whole, the Jewish way of modernization added one more route to the multiple varieties of such routes in Germany. Through their unique perspective, the various possibilities of moving towards modernity are more easily perceived, enriching the overall picture of this process as a whole, especially in Germany.
Increase in life expectancy will affect future welfare through changes in the stock of human capital and financial wealth. In projecting these changes it is important to differentiate between the direct demographic effect (a change in the population age structure) and the indirect behavioural change (a change in age-specific economic characteristics). Using a multi-country dynamic (general equilibrium) economic model, this chapter assesses the effects of increasing life expectancy on economic growth and inequality in European countries. The economic model accounts for both the direct effect of changes in the age structure of the population, given the economic characteristics, and the indirect effect of population changes on age-specific economic behaviour in a globalized economy. Projections for the period 2020-2100 show that future life expectancy improvements: (1) will have a negative impact on consumption and output per capita; (2) will negatively affect the accumulation of assets (more so in high-income compared to middle-income European countries due to the more generous pension systems in high-income countries); and (3) will lead to an increase in the intergenerational income inequality due to the fall in asset income at old age. However, it also finds that more generous old-age public transfer systems mitigate the negative impact of life expectancy gains on inequality.
This paper develops a monetary R&D-driven endogenous growth model featuring endogenous innovation scales and the price-marginal cost markup. To endogenize the step size of quality improvement, we propose a tradeoff mechanism between the risk of innovation failure and the benefit of innovation success in R&D firms. Several findings emerge from the analysis. First, a rise in the nominal interest rate decreases economic growth; however, its relationship with social welfare is ambiguous. Second, either strengthening patent protection or raising the professional knowledge of R&D firms leads to an ambiguous effect on economic growth. Third, the Friedman rule of a zero nominal interest rate fails to be optimal in view of the social welfare maximum. Finally, our numerical analysis indicates that the extent of patent protection and the level of an R&D firm’s professional knowledge play a crucial role in determining the optimal interest rate.
Even though International Relations (IR) research increasingly recognises the unprecedented urgency of environmental degradation and the resulting ecological injustices, only few IR scholars have probed into the role of economic growth as a fundamental driver of global unsustainability. We level two critiques at the field of IR from a post-growth perspective. First, most IR theories are complicit in naturalising economic growth as a fundamental condition of global order. Second, IR scholarship has neglected to engage seriously with post-growth thinking. What happens when we start to question the background economic assumptions of the current international system? How might a global politics of post-growth challenge and enrich IR and environmental politics? This Editors Forum brings together a diverse group of scholars from across the globe to reflect on these pertinent questions. As a whole, the Forum begins to address the complicity and neglect critiques. To varying degrees, each contribution considers what IR can learn from post-growth research (both conceptually and empirically), and vice versa. In this introductory article, we set the stage for such an engagement by reviewing an interdisciplinary body of relevant work and synthesising the key contributions from a total of seven Forum articles.