Following democracy’s global advance in the late twentieth century, recent patterns of democratic “backsliding” have generated extensive scholarly debate. Since backsliding towards autocracy is often the work of elected leaders operating within democratic institutions, it challenges conventional thinking about democratic consolidation, the enforcement of institutional checks and balances, and the reproduction of democratic norms. Drawing insights from classic literature on democratic transitions and consolidation, this volume examines the nature of contemporary threats to democracy, recognizing that the central challenge is not always to induce the compliance of those who lose elections, but rather those who emerge victorious and turn the institutional leverage of incumbency into a source of ongoing competitive advantage. There is, then, both a “loser’s dilemma” and a “winner’s dilemma” embedded in the study of democratic resiliency. Patterns of backsliding have revealed the contingent and potentially contested underpinnings of democratic institutions in any political order, given the presence (whether latent or active) of authoritarian political and cultural currents. Democracy is, therefore, best understood not as a standardized regime template or a static endpoint of political development, but rather as a dialectical frontier that advances ‒ and sometimes recedes ‒ according to the dynamic interplay countervailing forces.

This chapter examines the relationship between a politicized public sector and democratic backsliding. It is argued that politicization of public employment is an important, if understudied, component of the institutional landscape that makes democracy vulnerable. Bureaucratic politicization increases the likelihood that backsliding becomes endogenous by generating electoral advantages for incumbents and by raising the stakes of control over government. Politicization of the state administration allows incumbents to dole out patronage jobs; introduce political loyalty tests as a precondition for accessing basic government services; press public employees into campaign-related work; and utilize state funds for political purposes. Building on this volume’s aim of untangling the relationship between institutional subversion and backsliding, particular attention is given to the timing and sequencing of these processes. Evidence from Eastern Europe and a global sample shed light on how governments in countries that once seemed to be the front-runners of democratization concentrated political power by extending the economic reach of the state and subverting public sector independence. This study contributes to research on the illiberal political economy that supports backsliding regimes and their capture of key levers of political power.

For more than seven and a half decades, India has enjoyed the moniker of “world’s largest democracy.” In addition to this distinction, the country is the most enduring democracy in the developing world. India adopted universal suffrage in 1947, despite an extremely low per capita income. Since then, the country has sustained its commitment to democratic governance despite poverty, inequality, unprecedented diversity, and sprawling geography (Varshney 2013). This makes India both an important outlier as well as an exemplar for poor, multiethnic democracies the world over (Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011).

This chapter explores the possibilities and dilemmas that civil society actors face in resisting and reversing democratic backsliding through examples from around the world. It examines the conditions that shape civil society activism under backsliding and the roles it has played in containing or reversing autocratization. As it shows, in a number of cases civil society resistance has been critical in restraining and reversing backsliding. But it has been better able to counter backsliding when popular support for the backsliding leader has eroded and the opposition is able to work through institutions rather than having to work against them. As backsliding proceeds, institutional channels for influence deteriorate. As a result, there is a critical window during which civil society resistance stands a better chance of containing backsliding: before electoral processes and institutional constraints on executives are fully captured. Once capture occurs, civil society resistance moves to the much more dangerous and difficult task of confronting rather than preventing dictatorship.

Free and fair elections have come under increasing threat in the United States. Two critical dimensions are identified to this threat: challenges to ballot access, and challenges to the integrity of the administration of elections. The first has been a long-standing feature of US politics, characterized in recent years by voter identification laws, restrictive registration processes, and rules and procedures that impose unequal burdens on voters. Challenges to election administration are more recent, and threaten to undermine decades of administrative improvements. This chapter provides a snapshot of the threat to election administration, assessing the degree to which state legislative attention is a response to pandemic-era changes or an effort to concentrate election authority in partisan officials. A new data set is presented on election reform legislation in the states in the eighteen months following the election of 2020. While reporting considerable variation across states, it is found  that partisanship, electoral competition, and a declining proportion of the non-Hispanic white population drive efforts to undermine elections’ integrity, expressions of a dangerously polarizing and potentially antidemocratic dynamic in US electoral politics.

Democratic backsliding in Eastern Europe is often seen as a relatively recent phenomenon, closely connected to the fallout of the Great Financial Crisis and affecting mostly third wave democracies. It is also often associated with strongmen taking over mainstream conservative parties, winning elections, and then taking advantage of existing democratic institutions to concentrate their power. This chapter in contrast argues that democratic backsliding is enabled by a long-term struggle over political dominance in which mainstream conservative political parties seek to cement their power on domestic and European levels. This struggle is multidimensional, encompassing the articulation of a conservative ideology and a tactical strategy to retain power, and far precedes the Great Financial Crisis. To make the case, the chapter looks at how German Christian Democracy has reinvented itself in reaction to 1968 and its aftermath. German Christian Democracy is a crucial case. As the biggest member state of the EU, where Christian Democracy has remained an important political player and has shaped the Eastern enlargement of the EU, it is key to understanding the international context which has enabled the likes of Viktor Orbán to come to power and dismantle democracy.

Constitutional hardball consists of practices that are consistent with the formal requirements of constitutional democracy but that destabilize and potentially transform it. This Chapter examines why political actors engage in hardball, focusing first on their short-term political motivations and then turning to the function of constitutional hardball within reasonably well-functioning constitutional democracies. The Chapter ends with a discussion of what might be done to convert constitutional hardball into ordinary political maneuvering, conclude that such efforts are unlikely to succeed and might be inappropriate (though not illiberal) efforts to halt more or less ordinary transformations in political practices.

The concluding chapter discusses the implications of Hong Kong’s contentious politics within the global context of democratic backsliding and spontaneous mass mobilizations. We highlight the contributions of our theoretical framework and the implications of Hong Kong’s contentious pathways for hybrid regimes and beyond.

Chapter 5 elucidates how the Anti-Extradition Movement erupted despite the lack of political opportunities in the post-Umbrella period. We demonstrate how abeyance networks from previous mobilizations and an online petition campaign transformed the idea of extradition into a widely perceived existential threat, galvanizing popular support for the movement and leading to the confluence of the masses.

Virtually all philosophical discussions of the rule of law’s meaning assume that the proper horizon of the concept is the national legal system, or what I call “the rule of law writ small.”  But governments are bound by a web of transnational legal obligations that should also be considered part of the rule of law’s scope. Analyzing whether the rule of law is honored against the backdrop of both national and transnational law gives us “the rule of law writ large.”  This concept has particular force in the context of backsliding (and democracy-restoring) governments when autocrats first pull their governments away from transnational norms before newly elected democrats seek to restore compliance with those norms. While both sorts of governments may change domestic law, and pack political institutions with those who share their values and fire those who get in their way, only the democracy restorers can be said to be honoring the rule of law writ large.

Blander’s epilogue contextualizes Ezrahi’s current work within his previous research corpus as well as interweaving new concepts: depth skepticism, modest democracy, and the right to dream. Blander describes three spheres of democratic backsliding and the rise of populism: legal-institutional, social, and intellectual freedom. She suggests that Ezrahi introduces a deep explanation of these troubling trends. Blander introduces the concept of “Depth Skepticism,” which applies to philosophers, among them Ezrahi, who searched for deeper layers of the human experience in order to identify the causes of sociopolitical phenomena. The epilogue follows Ezrahi’s intellectual journey, identifying a connecting thread from his early work “The Descent of Icarus,” revealing the interaction between science, enlightenment, and democracy through “Imagined Democracies,” portraying the role of science in creating the epistemological foundations of modern democracy, to the current volume introducing the cosmological shift from Nature/Culture to a blurred “HumaNature” cosmology and how it affects democratic foundations. This shift calls for a “modest democracy” that accommodates reason, emotions, and ambivalence. It views democracy as a constructive utopia, allowing individuals and groups the “right to dream” within nonviolent pursuits. This democracy fosters compromise, balances power, and tolerates contradictions, embodying a constant state of becoming.