This brief chapter, closing Part I, concludes that the individual is procedurally involved in such contexts to a minor extent and offers reflections on the reasons for this. It discusses the culture of state-centrism at the Court, its passive approach to procedural mechanisms, and certain fears it likely has. The reasons are challenged in this chapter, which ends with a brief word on how transparency practices can also contribute to the further integration of individuals in the procedural law of the World Court.

This chapter argues that the relationship between administrative law and constitutional law is significant and that this relationship sheds light on the nature of both areas of law. The chapter develops the idea that administrative law regulates delegates and constitutional law regulates delegators. This idea, the chapter argues, helps us make sense of the nature and content of administrative law, as well as how it relates to constitutional law.

In democracies based on elections, representation brings a novel kind of freedom to the fore, one that does not need to be associated with the citizen’s direct action or presence in the place where decisions are made, as is the case in direct democracy. It enlarges the space and meaning of politics in ways that cannot easily be reduced to electoral authorization and consent, and it invariably connects with both the lawmaking institution and the citizens’ voluntary participation, their equal right to define the political direction of their country but also claim, vindicate, and monitor their representatives. This chapter analyzes “political representation” in its actors, components and processes and compared it to other forms (as statistical sample and embodiment) and finally discusses the implications of the mixture of representation and democracy in contemporary politics.

This chapter examines the relationship between the administrative state and constitutional values and structures with reference to German and American legal and political theory. It recovers from these intertwined traditions three analytical approaches to the administrative state. The first analytical approach understands the administrative state to implement the constitution. The second understands the administrative state to generate new constitutional structures and values. The third understands the administrative state to displace the constitution with patterns and practices of rule that lie outside of the existing governance framework. These frameworks foreground normative analysis of how the administrative state ought to relate to general democratic principles and the specific constitutional rules that institutionalize them. I argue for a differentiated and developmental understanding of the relationship between democracy, constitution, and administration. The concrete administration of democratic values should allow constitutional rules to shift in light of social and historical context. The administrative state should not be strictly limited by, but rather should facilitate critical interrogation of, the constitution’s current instantiation of democratic values. The administrative state can and should hold the constitution open for the introduction and proliferation of new institutional configurations and forms of public life.

The chapter offers a unique perspective on strategy development and the role of a strategist, highlighting the importance of context-specific thinking, flexibility, and reflection. The chapter begins by examining Dayan’s early experiences as a revolutionary guerrilla fighter, which shaped his view of war as a phenomenon that can only be understood in its local, concrete geographical, cultural, and political contexts. This dismissal of rigid, established military patterns is central to Dayan’s approach to strategy development throughout his career. The chapter then explores Dayan’s unique approach to strategy development, which was characterized by contextualized learning, the application of the 80:20 principle for setting priorities, delegation and empowerment, time management for maximum flexibility, and the use of meetings to generate and test new ideas. Dayan’s ability to hold two opposing points of view simultaneously and his love for the land of Israel are also discussed. Overall, the chapter offers valuable insights into the development of a strategist and the importance of context-specific thinking and flexibility in strategy development.

This chapter examines the foundations and evolution of papal legation in the Middle Ages. It frames the development of this ecclesiastical office in the context of burgeoning papal authority and its reception in Christian lands. And it posits the growth of legation as a natural and effective response to the Roman Curia’s administrative, bureaucratic, and legal needs.

Chapter 9 discusses the rules applicable to investment funds investing in digital assets. We discuss the question of which cases the additional MiCA provisions apply to (Section 9.2) and consider the particularities of the general CASP rules laid down in Title V MiCA in the context of investment funds (Section 9.3) before we look into outsourcing (including brokerage and portfolio management and advice) in Section 9.4 and fund-specific questions regarding safekeeping and custody (Section 9.5). Section 9.6 concludes.

In the Pounds parable, a nobleman, disliked among his people, goes abroad, and returns to prove himself a good administrator, though one with harsh standards, as is Jesus in the parable in regard to his enemies. In Genesis, Joseph, disliked by his brothers, had gone abroad to Egypt and proved there to be a good administrator in the time of the famine, but one who, for a time, treated his brothers harshly.

Chapter 8 discusses MiCA’s rules on crypto custody. After examining international developments (Section 8.2), we discuss the scope of MiCA’s custody rules (Section 8.3) prior to analysing the impact of MiCA’s general requirements for CASPs (e.g., fiduciary duties and safekeeping rules) (Section 8.4) and discussing Article 75 MiCA on crypto custody in-depth (Section 8.5). We go on by exploring how crypto custodians regulated by MiCA interact with other regulated intermediaries that safekeep assets either as their main business or as side services to supplement their brokerage or asset management services (Section 8.6), and then, we conclude (Section 8.7).

Chapter 7 discusses the activity-based bespoke rules on cryptoasset service providers (CASPs) in Title V MiCA, except Crypto Custody (cf. Chapter 8). Section 7.2 analyses the scope of Title V MiCA before we proceed to licensing and authorisation requirements (Section 7.3), followed by the joint conditions for all CASPs (Section 7.4), after which we provide an analysis of the specific conditions for certain cryptoasset services (Section 7.5) and then present a conclusion (Section 7.6).

The Introduction gives an overview of the book’s most important findings and contributions. Since international relations are anarchical and international legal norms are incomplete or in tension with other norms, there is potential for contestation whenever a general norm is applied to specific situations. The reactions of others to proposed norm interpretations can alter norms and their strength. The second section describes the book’s rhetorical approach, and the third section summarizes the main theoretical contributions. First, the "alternate endings" typology shows that it matters whether dispute parties (dis)agree on the norm frame or behavioral claim. Frame agreement is an internal source of stability. Moreover, the typology can guide assessment of how contestation affects norm strength. Second, I describe the focus on audience reactions, argumentation, and speakers (including delegation to agents) when analyzing extrinsic influences on the persistence of norm interpretations, and thus of alternate endings. The fourth section discusses the main contributions to the existing literature on norm strength, the dual quality of norms, legal argumentation and interpretive communities, and delegation to courts and other relevant agents. The Introduction then discusses the research design and methodology, before concluding with an overview of the remaining chapters.

This chapter compares the short-lived norm recognition in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war with the persistent norm recognition in the 1267 sanctions regime. Delegation to agents – weapons inspectors (Iraq) and the Ombudsperson (1267 sanctions regime) – played a significant role due to its consensual and potentially ongoing nature. The chapter thus focuses on how delegation affects the relative stability of norm recognition. The different problem structures both agents faced made the Ombudsperson more effective in managing norm contestation than the United Nations (UN) weapons inspectors: Certainty over the output legitimacy of its work and compliance constituencies that exert social pressure on the UN Security Council (UNSC) to continue delegating have made it easier to build a reputation as credible and effective. While norm recognition persists, the indirect costs of delegation for the UNSC have led to tensions in the delegation relationship, rendering resolution of the claim disagreement between the UNSC and European Court of Justice (ECJ) unlikely. Moreover, the chapter shows that contestation over the 2003 Iraq war reduced the clarity, and thus the social strength, of chapter VII norms, but contestation increased the social strength of due process rights in targeted sanctions. The effect on relative norm strength is more difficult to determine due to the claim disagreement.

Scholars often conflate the concepts of pooling (how states make collective decisions) and delegation (authorizing an international body to act) in examining the authority of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). We clarify the difference by showing how states “soft pool” decision-making through informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) without creating legal obligations or delegating authority. IIGOs such as the G-groups are growing in prevalence and importance because soft pooling allows states to make collective decisions that are politically binding in nonlegal ways. We examine organizational characteristics of IIGOs that allow states to minimize sovereignty costs while cooperating through soft pooling – including the use of consensus to express shared expectations through declarations and memoranda of understanding and administrative structures such as rotating chairs to avoid delegating to an independent secretariat. We review these understudied organizational alternatives, explaining how soft pooling makes IIGOs authoritative even as states retain sovereignty.