We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected]
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
The Introduction starts by exploring three varieties of constitutional theory: normative, conceptual and positive. It then offers an account of the basic concept of a constitution, noting how it differs from its various conceptions. This section also defends the analytical structure of this volume into values, modalities and institutions as part of the basic concept of a constitution. The third section turns to constitutional norms, both written and unwritten, and their role within even a codified constitution. Finally, we look at the variety of constitutionalisms as a product of the essential contestability of the values, modalities and institutions of any conception of the constitution, be that conception theorised normatively, conceptually or positively (or draw on elements of all three approaches). This diversity is exemplified by the contrasting views of the contributors to this volume.
This chapter demonstrates that despite Wagner’s claims that traditional operatic compositional schemes limited the composer’s ability to project drama successfully, he relied on these procedures in the operas from Die Feen through Lohengrin, and continued to use them thereafter in the mature music dramas. Analysis of Wagner’s first six operas demonstrates that Wagner utilised the formal conventions of Italian opera, including clearly articulated cabalettas, far more frequently than has previously been noted. The conventional Italian form accounts for one-third to one-half of musical numbers in these works. The chapter includes close analysis of four numbers (from Die Feen, Der fliegende Holländer, Tannhäuser and Lohengrin) and tabular presentation of all of Wagner’s appropriations of this formal convention in the first part of his career. The chapter further identifies vestiges and transformations of la solita forma in the later music dramas, concluding with speculation on why these formal devices have eluded critical commentary until now.
The chapter considers unwritten constitutional conventions (CCs). They are best known from Westminster systems, where they are embedded in ordinary jurisprudence. They can also be identified in the United States, France (both in the ancien régime and today), and Norway. In these countries their existence and causal efficacy can be shown by historical and current practices. The aim of the chapter is positive (explanatory), not normative. It discusses how CCs arise and evolve and the mechanisms by which they influence decision-makers.
Agent-based simulations and human-subject experiments explore the emergence of respect for property in a specialization and exchange economy with costless theft. Software agents, driven by reciprocity and hill-climbing heuristics and parameterized to replicate humans when property is exogenously protected, are employed to predict human behavior when property can be freely appropriated. Agents do not predict human behavior in a new set of experiments because subjects innovate, constructing a property convention of “mutual taking” in 5 out of the 6 experimental sessions that allows exchange to crowd out theft. When the same convention is made available to agents, they adopt it and again replicate human behavior. Property emerges as a social convention that exploits the capacity for reciprocity to sustain trade.
Does monitoring past conduct facilitate intertemporal cooperation? We designed an experiment characterized by strategic uncertainty and multiple equilibria where coordinating on the efficient outcome is a challenge. Participants, interacting anonymously in a group, could pay a cost either to obtain information about their counterparts, or to create a freely available public record of individual conduct. Both monitoring institutions were actively employed. However, groups were unable to attain higher levels of cooperation compared to a treatment without monitoring. Information about past conduct alone thus appears to be ineffective in overcoming coordination challenges.
This introductory chapter presents the aims of the book and its rationale in Section 1.1, including some insight into the author’s experience of teaching sign language for many years. Next, Section 1.2 provides some suggestions for how you can best use the book to advance your learning and provides explanation for some of the terminology and conventions used in the book. This section also provides some awareness of the systemic barriers faced by many sign language teachers and the limited amount of research on BSL teaching and learning. The following section, Section 1.3, then gives some details about the research and evidence basis of the book in order to provide the reader with some awareness of current research and understanding of this visual nature of the language. Lastly, Section 1.4 addresses a few questions that students commonly ask and expels some common myths around learning BSL.
This chapter describes the journey that the scientific assessment travels from author nomination through to the drafting and reviewing of the emerging report, and explores the social scientific order that structures and imprints on the IPCC’s writing of climate change through the process. It is in the initial stages of the scientific assessment, in the government nomination and author selection processes, that asymmetries in global knowledge of climate change and their effects become apparent. While developed countries have institutionalised processes for identifying and nominating experts, the majority of developing countries do not submit any author nominations. Once compiled, it is scientific conventions and measures of authority that are used to select and appoint the expertise necessary to fulfil the government approved outline of the report. However, when these activities are situated in broader patterns and practices of knowledge production, it becomes apparent that these reproduce the structures and exclusions of the existing global knowledge economy. These asymmetries are also apparent in the order of relations in the author teams and the submission of government review comments, which reduces the space for more diverse understandings and knowledges of climate change that are relevant to and reflect the interests and needs of all IPCC member governments. The IPCC has attempted to address these asymmetries through selection criteria and other mechanisms to shape the social order of authorship, which to date have proven more successful in broadening gender representation than ensuring the full participation of developing country authors in the assessment.
The feeling of shame (aischunē) is a dramatic key of the Gorgias, notably revealed by Callicles, who accuses both the master of rhetoric Gorgias and Polus of surrendering to Socrates’ refutation out of shame, before yielding himself to the feeling he declared himself immune to. But shame is not only a literary pattern in the dialogue: its function is closely connected to the kind of refutation of each interlocutor. It can be minimally said that shame is a natural effect of refutation, and optimally that it is an essential lever for Socrates to make his interlocutors acknowledge their deep moral commitments. This chapter aims at distinguishing several levels, rather than kinds, of shame among the interlocutors of the Gorgias: shame as sensitivity to others’ opinion, shame as an indication of the beliefs and values we are committed to, and shame as a potential step towards a better understanding of the real good. Though these levels sometimes overlap in the narrative, such distinctions may aid in understanding the role of shame for each interlocutor. Shame remains, for Plato, an ambiguous emotion, which must be used in a certain way to perform purification of wrong opinions.
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the present book, by outlining its objectives, providing a working definition for ritual, and introducting the concept of the ritual perspective. The chappter also introduces the conventions used in this book and overviews its contents.
Informality has long been valued in England, and this is true of the political process as well as the institution of the judiciary. In both cases, it is assumed that the senior figures will have absorbed unwritten conventions and will by osmosis naturally understand their respective role in the UK constitution. Much is now starting to change, at least as far as the English judiciary is concerned. It is, first, argued that informal judicial institutions did not become redundant when the separation of powers was formally introduced with a program of modernization of the judiciary in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. Selected illustrations of persisting informal judicial institutions are then discussed in relation to the deliberative processes in senior courts; to judicial selection and appointments; and to the disciplinary process. Second, informal judicial institutions are deeply connected with the UK constitutional tradition. The Brexit litigation laid bare the challenges of containing political behavior within certain boundaries, and the unwritten conventions which have bound the judiciary and the executive might now be instinctively understood and shared by only one of these two parties.
How should we perceive the relationship between Athenians and Boiotians in the Archaic and Classical periods (550–323 BCE)? Previous scholarship regarded it as rife with hostility, perpetually locked in mutual fear, only rarely interspersed with times of peace or alliance. In this introduction, the speech given by the Boiotian general Pagondas prior to the Battle of Delion (424 BCE) will be used to argue that his arguments about moralistic behaviour, commemoration and borderland interaction between the neighbours were an exception, rather than the rule, unlike conclusions of previous scholars. Following this speech, the chapter turns to a description of the geographical layout of both regions and how these were intertwined and connected. After this description, the three themes of the book – norms of interstate relations, geopolitical considerations and commemorative practices – are elaborated upon to show what the current state of scholarship on these issues is. It stresses that human experience and nature are complex and multifocal and should therefore treated as such, rather than aim for an overarching framework to capture the lived experience.
Narratives and conventions have received considerable attention in recent discussions of the valuation of financial assets. Narratives and conventions, however, can only be effective to the extent that they attract and persuade audiences, and this article makes the case for paying more attention to those audiences. In particular, the article argues that financial assets can only be established as assets if there is a group of potential investors that has been persuaded to accept them as such: to take them seriously as potential investments. The article coins the term asset circles to refer to such groups and supports the argument with a discussion of venture capital and its role in the production of unicorns: private companies with extraordinary valuations. Venture capital firms may be thought of as value entrepreneurs, and much of the venture capital process is oriented towards constructing both value narratives for the companies they invest in and asset circles prepared to accept those value narratives. Their aim in these processes is a profitable exit, in which the venture capital firm converts its investment back into cash at a considerable profit through either an acquisition or a flotation.
Constitutions come in shapes and sizes. What do we actually mean by a constitution? Does this conception encompass all fundamental legal practices and norms for organising political societies’ legal and leadership systems – commonly denoted as ‘small c constitutions’? Or are we only referring to the so-called ‘large C’ constitutions: the official, formal legally binding document that countries proclaim as ‘Constitution. This chapter explores the different concepts, definitions and elements thereof. Whatever the definition or character of the document, a constitution will have to have a higher status than other forms of written law, Hans Kelsen held, otherwise it would not be a real constitution. Does that always hold true. The chapter also discusses constitutions as a belief system, and constitutionalism.
In this chapter we start by defining an intergenerational game and its equilibria. We then discuss conventions of behavior, their relationship to intergenerational-game equilibria, and what it takes to make such conventions stable. This is followed by describing the relationship between our use of the term “social learning” and what standard economic theory interprets it to mean. At the end of the chapter we discuss two other types of games, dynastic games (Anderlini, Gerardi, and Laguno, 2008) and overlapping generations games (Kandori, 1992), which also have generational structures.
This is a book on advice, its importance for decision making, and its influence on the evolution of conventions of behavior. The idea is simple. As societies progress, old generations of social agents die and are replaced by new ones. We are interested in what happens in this transition as the old guard instructs the new arrivals about the wisdom of their ways. Do new entrants listen to and follow the advice of their elders or dismiss it? Is intergenerational advice welfare-improving or can it be destructive? Many times wise advice is rejected only to have new generations repeat the mistakes of their parents instead of learning from them. The advice offered from one generation to the next allows for a type of social learning that leads to the creation of conventions of behavior.
With reelection secure, Lincoln calls for US House approval of Thirteenth Amendment, and campaign launched in early 1865 to win passage. Lincoln also suggests Reconstruction policy may change when war is over, and efforts to enact Reconstruction legislation is revived. Black political convention in New Orleans in January 1865 calls for political and legal equality, but also reveals tensions within free black community. Tennessee convention, although contentious, drafts amendments to state constitution abolishing slavery and creating loyalist government, but refuses to implement racial equality, despite petition from black Tennesseans. US House passes Thirteenth Amendment in late January.
Under Andrew Johnson’s policy, Mississippi begins process of Reconstruction, while governments of Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana extend and solidify their authority. Freedpeople mobilize and organize to articulate and instantiate freedom, underscored by black convention in Nashville in August 1865 that calls for political and legal equality. Mississippi Reconstruction convention in August is the first such convention held by unreconstructed state under Johnson’s policy. Convention highlighted by acrimonious debate over abolition of slavery. Some delegates express view – articulated by conservative Unionists – that Emancipation Proclamation had only freed slaves but had not abolished slavery, and that Mississippi is under no obligation to abolish slavery as a condition of restoration to the Union. Mississippi abolishes slavery, but process bodes ill for Johnson’s policy.
In protecting the marine environment from vessel-source oil pollution, compensation for victims of damage is of great importance. International conventions regarding compensation for such damage have been adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization. This article analyses the extent to which South Africa has implemented the provisions of these international conventions into its domestic laws and identifies issues that remain in the South African legal system. The article reveals that, although South Africa has improved its legal system for compensation for damage from vessel-source oil pollution, claimants in respect of damage from large vessel-source persistent oil pollution and vessel-source bunker oil pollution are still not adequately compensated. This article finds that acceding to the 1996 Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, the 2001 Bunker Convention and the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol would be of great interest and benefit to South Africa.
Lockeans regard taxation as a—perhaps sometimes permissible—infringement of moral property entitlements. This essay discusses whether, or in what form, this charge is defensible. In doing so, it will explore the truth and the limits of the conventionalist reply of Murphy and Nagel to Lockean challenges to taxation. It argues that there is a moral rationale for property conventions that is independent of the question whether and how one can acquire natural, pre-conventional property rights in the state of nature, that this rationale sets a moral standard for how good property conventions are and whether they are justifiable at all, and that once property conventions are in place, people’s moral property entitlements are at least partly determined by these conventions, sometimes even by unjustifiable ones that ought to be reformed. Because taxation can be a part of property conventions, taxation as such is not an infringement of moral property entitlements. But the essay will also argue that some taxation—excessive taxation—does infringe on moral property entitlements. This is because the moral rationale for property conventions sets some standards for what owners should be entitled to, and so excessive taxation will infringe upon moral entitlements that are partly not convention-based.