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Like several of its regional counterparts, Brazil’s 1964 coup attacked a reformist government that threatened the interests of an entrenched elite. To fully understand this attack, we must examine those interests and perceived threats to them, particularly in the realms of culture, religion, and morality. The coup not only fit into international Cold War maneuvering; it also conformed to a decades-long trajectory of moralism-as-countersubversion. Brazil’s coup plotters defined their enemies in terms that were vague, circumscribed by traditionalism, and culturally determined. There was, that is, a determinative tension between the “modernizing conservatism” of the regime and anti-modern forces that helped create it. To putschists and hard-liners, many of whom did not share the developmentalism attributed to the regime’s modernizers, the coup and dictatorship should aim to restore Brazil to a mythic, moralistic, Christian, anti-communist, and hierarchical past. As a result, moralism itself became one of the outstanding characteristics of the regime – and the rise of powerful, often extreme Evangelical conservatism (outsized in Brazil today) grew into the regime’s lasting legacy. Brazil’s towering Evangelical Right, an indomitable hallmark of its twenty-first-century politics, thus owes much to the conspiracy that brought dictatorship to Brazil in 1964.
Marking the bicentennial of US-Brazil relations, this article assesses the fraught inception of the bilateral relationship and where it stands today. The United States, fueled by the ideals of its revolution, viewed itself in the nineteenth century as a beacon of democratic principles beset by powerful European discontents. Brazil’s position as an independent nation with deep ties to Portugal bred suspicion. The promulgation of Brazil’s 1824 Constitution offered a modicum of common ground, creating space for a political rapprochement culminating in formal recognition. The relationship thereafter was proper but distant. Brazil today is not a rival of the United States, but some worry that it has not done enough to distance itself from Washington’s antagonists. Indeed, while friendship and commonality have been common bywords of leaders in both nations, suspicion and ambivalence have been ever-present. If anything, the surprise is that both countries remain as close as they are today.
In an unprecedented ruling, in 2018, the Brazilian Consumer Protection Authority applied a fine to a popular online travel company named Decolar.com for allegedly favouring foreign consumers over Brazilian residents during the 2016 Olympics held in Rio de Janeiro. The accusation was that Decolar.com had offered hotel reservations at different prices according to the consumer’s location as identified through their internet protocol address, or IP address.
To our knowledge, this is the only case thus far in Brazil that reviewed the practice of charging different prices from different consumers based on their specific characteristics.
The proliferating Sino-US peer competition is increasingly impacting Latin American states and triggering uncertainty. As China’s expanding influence in the region challenges longstanding US supremacy in the western hemisphere and reshapes the strategic calculus for regional states, hedging behaviour becomes increasingly opportune. This most notably includes Brazil, the largest state in Latin America both politically and economically, whose hedging behaviour oscillated between governments, a characteristic normally associated with states facing higher systemic pressures. As such, how does the Sino-US peer competition impact Brazil’s hedging strategy? And why do coping behaviours differ on various indices between different administrations, from Lula to Bolsonaro? Findings suggest that depending on whether the incumbent government was left- or right-wing, Brazil’s hedge was recalibrated as either pro- or anti-US regional supremacy.
Behind the black boxes of algorithms promoting or adding friction to posts, technical design decisions made to affect behavior, and institutions stood up to make decisions about content online, it can be easy to lose track of the heteromation involved, the humans spreading disinformation and, on the other side, moderating or choosing not to moderate it. This can be aptly shown in the case of the spread of misinformation on WhatsApp during Brazil’s 2018 general elections. Since WhatsApp runs on a peer-to-peer architecture, there was no algorithm curating content according to the characteristics or demographics of the users, which is how filter bubbles work on Facebook. Instead, a human infrastructure was assembled to create a pro-Bolsonaro environment on WhatsApp and spread misinformation to bolster his candidacy. In this paper, we articulate the labor executed by the human infrastructure of misinformation as hetoromation.
This chapter focuses on Brazil’s ’Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments’ (ACFIs), which has received significant attention in the context of foreign investment facilitation. It describes the genesis and evolution of Brazil’s ACFI practice since 2015, from modest bilateral initiatives to leadership in plurilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The chapter adopts a three-pillar framework of the ACFI model and details the corresponding governance structure and supporting institutions established domestically within Brazil to implement the commitments and principles laid out in its ACFIs. The study highlights Brazil’s institutional reforms designed to effectively implement its ACFI obligations, emphasizing the concept of ’investment facilitation’ as the key driving force behind Brazil’s investment regulations. The chapter concludes with possible lessons for domestic governance challenges that states participating in a future WTO plurilateral agreement may encounter.
This chapter examines the politics of the negotiations surrounding the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement within the World Trade Organization (WTO). Historically, developing and emerging economies have opposed multilateral investment rules over concerns that they would favor developed countries and limit policy space. However, proposals for the IFD Agreement have gained momentum, thanks in part to Global South members such as Brazil and China, which have also advanced their preferences through bilateral and regional arrangements outside of the WTO. Despite promises to focus on technical aspects and avoid politically charged topics, negotiations continue to raise objections from other emerging economies such as India and South Africa over extending the WTO’s mandate and preserving policy space. The chapter compares the competing interests and strategies of India, Brazil, and China as they attempt to establish investment facilitation standards inside and outside of the WTO. While the standards they promote are similar, their political motivations may create obstacles to the consolidation of a final multilateral agreement.
Is there a history of neo-fascism in Brazil? The purpose of this Element is to analyze neo-fascism as a late phenomenon to understand its impacts and its connections with the so-called new rights, the radical right, as well as Bolsonarism. For this purpose, this Element is separated in three sections, addressing the formation of the first neo-fascist organizations after the Brazilian democratic transition; the development and articulation of a transnational network amidst a sharpening political crisis; and the emergence of a more complex and active Brazilian framework in the global extreme-right scenario in recent years. The main argument is that, despite being a late phenomenon, neo-fascism managed to articulate itself and have a political impact in Brazil, therefore eliciting further investigation to understand its complexity and diversity.
The predicted impending end of dekasegi marks an opportune moment to explore the almost unstudied repatriation of migrants from their country of ethnic origin (Japan) to their country of citizenship (primarily Brazil). I consider issues of adjustment and identity upon “return” through a case study of “Diogo Pacheco Moriyama,” a mestiço Japanese Brazilian who has lived and worked in Brazil, Japan, and the United States.
The chapter begins with a review of the historical and current socio-political context for sexual minority and gender diverse (SMGD) individuals living in Brazil, followed by relevant research on the associations between minority stress and well-being. A particular focus is devoted to presenting data collected as part of the SMGD-MN study. The chapter concludes with recommendations for future psychological research with SMGD communities in Brazil.
Seditious Spaces tells the story of the Tailor's Conspiracy, an anti-colonial, anti-racist plot in Bahia, Brazil that involved over thirty people of African descent and one dozen whites. On August 12, 1798, the plot was announced to residents through bulletins posted in public spaces across the city demanding racial equality, the end of slavery, and increases to soldiers' pay: an act that transformed the conspiracy into a case of sedition. Routinely acknowledged by experts as one of the first expressions of Brazilian independence, the conspiracy was the product of groups of men with differing statuses and agendas who came together and constructed a rebellion. In this first book-length study on the conspiracy in English, Greg L. Childs sheds light on how relations between freed people, slaves, soldiers, officers, market women, and others structured political life in Bahia, and how the conspirators drew on these structures to plot, help, and heal each other through the resistance.
This case study explores the State Grid Corporation of China’s (SGCC’s) localization strategies within the Belo Monte hydroelectric project in Brazil, highlighting the challenges and lessons learned by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as they expand into Latin America. Over recent decades, Chinese SOEs have emerged as potential collaborators for Latin American countries seeking investment and technology for critical infrastructure projects. SGCC’s involvement in constructing the Xingu-Estreito transmission line for the Belo Monte project stands as a prime example. This line, among the world’s largest and first to implement ±800kV ultra-high-voltage technology outside China, marks not only an engineering triumph for SGCC but also a significant business and legal accomplishment. The company adeptly navigated Brazil’s complex legal environment, tackling multifaceted regulatory, financial, and environmental challenges. This case study, based on government and corporate documents as well as confidential interviews, examines SGCC’s strategies for procurement, financial structuring, environmental licensing, and operational management in the context of this grandiose transmission line.
Brazilians in the United States voted overwhelmingly for right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro in 2022. What role did religion play? Based on exit polling, focus groups, and observation of local Brazilian churches, this article explores how Christianity drives support for right-wing populism among Brazilian migrants to the Boston area. Christians, and especially evangelicals, are significantly more likely to vote for Bolsonaro, and the priests and pastors of Brazilian migrant churches are particularly willing to discuss parties and candidates. Yet neither clergy endorsements nor political conversations at church explain this religious effect. I argue that indirect influence within congregations, which reinforces a conservative worldview in non-overtly political ways, helps explain why most observant evangelicals favor Bolsonaro. Migrants potentially influence the voting behavior of friends and family in Brazil, including via transnational religious communities, so their political attitudes can help bolster authoritarian populism in the homeland, as also seen in India and Turkey.
This concluding chapter first brings the reader up to date in Complexo da Maré and Rio de Janeiro. Since concluding fieldwork in 2015, much has changed in Brazil. Dilma Rousseff was impeached in 2016 and Jair Bolsonaro became president in 2018. More importantly for Rio de Janeiro, Wilson Witzel, an extreme right wing candidate, was elected governor in 2018 and took control of the state’s public security apparatus. The dynamics of policing and violence have changed accordingly. Rio’s public security apparatus confronted and violently engaged Rio’s gangs with an intensity never before seen. Police shot into densely populated favelas from helicopters, showing little restraint even when innocent bystanders were present. In 2019 alone, Rio police killed an estimated 1,600 citizens. This chapter reflects on these developments and contemplates possibilities for the future. Finally, it addresses the generalizability of the book’s findings for other cities in Brazil and beyond while suggesting several avenues for future research.
This chapter describes the issuance and litigation of utility models (UMs) in Brazil. Although considered patents in Brazil, UMs have a different treatment from patents of invention (PIs), having some specificities such as those related to the requirements for protection and the term of duration. This chapter will provide an overview of the Brazilian Patent System by outlining the scope of protection and requirements to obtain a UM patent in comparison with PIs, and by commenting on the enforcement of these rights in the judicial and administrative spheres.
Public experiences with the law in some neighborhoods are marked by an overwhelming police presence alongside deep-seated beliefs that legal agents are disinterested in ensuring public safety. This mutual experience of intrusive policing and legal cynicism has important implications for people’s recognition of the legitimacy of legal authority. In the context of a global city in the Global South, this study provides a quantitative assessment of the dynamics of perceived police intrusion and cynicism about police protection and the implications of those experiences for beliefs about the legitimacy of legal institutions. Drawing on a three-wave longitudinal survey representative of adult residents of eight neighborhoods in São Paulo, Brazil (N = 1,200), I demonstrate that perceived police intrusion and cynicism about police protection (a) are two sides of the same coin, being produced by similar social forces and dynamically reproducing each other and (b) operate to undermine police legitimacy. Integrating the legal cynicism and procedural justice theoretical frameworks, this study shows that intrusive as well as unheeding and neglectful policing practices can contribute to delegitimizing legal authority. I conclude with a discussion about the distribution of repression and protection and highlight the urgency of exploring public–authority relations in the Global South.
This chapter aims to discuss the presence and implications of using English Medium Instruction (EMI) in two contexts of the Global South; namely, Malaysia, a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Brazil in Latin America. In both countries language policy and planning are complex. EMI has been adopted following a recent trend towards the internationalization of the higher education system where English has also become the main language for research and publication. The dominance of Western scientific paradigms, the promotion of English as the language of education, and the dissemination of knowledge through English have led to a neglect of knowledge produced in languages other than English. Furthermore, the adoption of a single language threatens the role of other languages in higher education. This chapter examines this trend in face of the need to protect the national language as well as other languages to guarantee an ecology of knowledges and languages in higher education.
A partir de 2014, a política brasileira foi sacudida pela operação Lava Jato (LJ), uma iniciativa anticorrupção centrada no direito. A LJ expôs um grande esquema de corrupção na empresa nacional de petróleo, a Petrobras, envolvendo seus diretores, dirigentes de partidos políticos e grandes empreiteiras. Para alguns, a LJ representou um marco, um novo capítulo na história do Brasil, promovendo o “estado de direito” e um desejo coletivo de “acabar com a impunidade” na política e nos negócios. Para outros, a operação enfraqueceu a democracia e o estado de direito, abrindo caminho para uma liderança autocrática sob o ex-presidente Jair Bolsonaro. Este artigo contribui para esses debates ao analisar a LJ como um espaço de produção de “consciência jurídica.” Empiricamente, examina conversas lideradas por procuradores da LJ no Facebook entre 2017 e 2019. A questão central abordada é: “Quando os procuradores e o público falavam sobre a LJ, sobre o que falavam?” Os resultados se alinham às visões céticas sobre a operação, sugerindo que as interações entre os procuradores da LJ e seus seguidores no Facebook ajudaram a co-criar um quadro cultural que conflita com o “estado de direito.” Essas percepções oferecem implicações para estudos sobre consciência jurídica e esforços anticorrupção.
The strategy of tuberculosis (TB) contact investigation is essential for enhancing disease detection. We conducted a cross-sectional study to evaluate the yield of contact investigation for new TB cases, estimate the prevalence of TB, and identify characteristics of index cases associated with infection among contacts of new cases notified between 2010 and 2020 in São Paulo, Brazil. Out of 186466 index TB cases, 131055 (70.3%) underwent contact investigation. A total of 652286 contacts were screened, of which 451704 (69.2%) were examined. Of these, 12243 were diagnosed with active TB (yield of 1.9%), resulting in a number needed to screen of 53 and a number needed to test of 37 to identify one new TB case. The weighted prevalence for the total contacts screened was 2.8% (95% confidence interval [CI]: 2.7%–2.9%), suggesting underreporting of 6021 (95% CI: 5269–6673) cases. The likelihood of TB diagnosis was higher among contacts of cases identified through active case-finding, abnormal chest X-ray, pulmonary TB, or drug resistance, as well as among children, adults, women, individuals in socially vulnerable situations, and those with underlying clinical conditions. The study highlights significant TB underreporting among contacts, recommending strengthened contact investigation to promptly identify and treat new cases.
The functioning of the liberal order relies on the semiotic indeterminacy of its key concepts—they need to be broad enough to encompass multiple, and at times conflicting articulations—but the denotational open-endedness of these concepts also renders them particularly useful for efforts to unsettle liberal political projects. In Brazil, state institutions’ secularist commitments to retaining “religion” and its derivates as denotationally indeterminant both constrain efforts to combat Evangelical Christian “religious intolerance” against African origin religious traditions and enable Evangelical Christian graftings of the discourse of “religious intolerance” onto claims that frame the efforts to curb their attacks on religious and sexual minorities as a form of religious persecution. These effects are, however, rendered invisible by the state emphasis on the denotational open-endedness of “religious intolerance,” which obscures the different forms of enregisterment that organize the entextualization of the term in religious activist and government spaces in Brazil.