This chapter of the handbook introduces some core elements of moral decision making by framing it from one particular perspective: expected utility theory. In its classic form, expected utility theory focuses on the outcomes of actions: the expected utility of a decision is the sum of the values associated with the different possible outcomes of the decision weighted by the probability of their occurrence. As such, expected utility theory is well suited to explain the moral choices recommended by utilitarianism, which characterizes right actions in terms of the maximization of aggregate utility. As the authors point out, however, expected utility theory can be also used to model nonutilitarian decision making by assigning utilities to actions themselves, not just their outcomes. This action-based form of expected utility theory can readily accommodate the fact that people tend to assign low utility to actions that violate moral norms. Further, action-based expected utility theory can explain a wide range of phenomena revealed by empirical research on moral decision making, such as interpersonal disagreement about fairness, in-group bias, and outcome neglect.

This paper presents the main topics, arguments, and positions in the philosophy of AI at present (excluding ethics). Apart from the basic concepts of intelligence and computation, the main topics of artificial cognition are perception, action, meaning, rational choice, free will, consciousness, and normativity. Through a better understanding of these topics, the philosophy of AI contributes to our understanding of the nature, prospects, and value of AI. Furthermore, these topics can be understood more deeply through the discussion of AI; so we suggest that “AI philosophy” provides a new method for philosophy.

This chapter examines how poet, orator, and early speech therapist John Thelwall engages with embodied materialist models of involuntary, yet autonomous, utterance to support his lifelong belief in the necessity of free and active speech. It investigates how Thelwall’s work presents both politicised notions of the speaking body and a physiological and sometimes pathologised understanding of political silencing and argues that Thelwall’s later elocutionary work develops a concern with embodied speech already fundamental to his more overtly political writing, resulting in a theory of speech production and impediment which remains suggestive of a radical politics in its materialist conception of the human body’s operation and agency. Drawing on his unpublished ‘Derby Manuscript’, the chapter considers how Thelwall’s cross-disciplinary theory of ‘rhythmus’, which positions the elements of elocution as fundamental physical laws, rather than practical or cultural rules, gives credence to the notion of speech as a materially potent force.

In this chapter, I argue that the locus of freedom should be seen as socially constituted practices and ways of life rather than individual actions.

All CA research starts from single-case analysis (SCA) so as not to lose participants’ orientations exhibited in the details of individual cases. However, SCA can itself be a publishable outcome of CA research. This chapter, first, illustrates how previous SCA research has extracted candidate interactional practices and procedures, whose elaboration is left to subsequent research, and/or has advanced challenging claims concerning various human and social scientific concepts (such as grammar and action), using the previously explicated practices and procedures as analytic tools. Then, it demonstrates how SCA proceeds, and argues that the strength of SCA lies in its capacity to dig deeply into all the details of each case. Exploring the depth of a single case and examining various cases of a phenomenon are alternative methods for increasing the groundedness of the claims being advanced. Finally, the chapter suggests the possibility of applying SCA to practical issues.

We describe the N = 1 four-dimensional off-shell supergravity, the susy transformation rules and action, and then the susy algebra closure.

Parents and grandparents face unprecedented challenges in supporting their children to survive, cope with and adapt to the impacts of climate change while simultaneously preparing them for the greater negative impacts predicted in the future. This chapter draws on multidisciplinary research in parenting science, child and youth development, and disasters to guide parents in varying contexts. We first discuss how parents and carers can help young people cope with the direct exposure to both sudden and gradual climate disasters and flow-on effects that exacerbate social inequalities. We then discuss how parents can help children manage the emotions that knowledge of climate change can engender, explore parents’ vital role in fostering children’s sense of agency and hope, and highlight ways that parents can support young people’s active engagement. We end by stressing that parents and others with responsibility for raising the next generations should take action at local to national levels to drive the urgent changes needed to prevent climate catastrophe.

First, how does the human cognitive system give rise to gestures? A growing body of literature suggests that gestures are based in people’s perceptual and physical experience of the world. Second, do gestures influence how people take in information from the world? Research suggests that producing gestures modifies producers’ experience of the world in specific ways. Third, does externalizing information in gestures affect cognitive processing? There is evidence that expressing spatial and motoric information in gestures has consequences for thinking, including for memory and problem solving. Fourth, how do gestures influence other people’s cognitive processing? Research indicates that gestures can highlight certain forms of information for others’ thinking, thus engaging social mechanisms that influence cognitive processing. Gestures are closely tied to action, and they reveal how producers schematize information in the objects, tasks, events, and situations that they gesture about. In brief, gestures play an integral role in cognition, both for gesture producers and for gesture recipients, because they are actions of the body that bridge the mind and the world.

This chapter collects the tips on what we as individuals can do to better manage toxic stress and to reduce the contributions of stress to acute and chronic illnesses. Because toxic stress is such a common problem and a potent contributor to our most costly conditions all around the world, but still poorly understood, we should elevate toxic stress to a top public health priority to guide our efforts to find the most effective ways to prevent and treat stress-related conditions.

Elizabeth Anscombe has called the part of the Tractatus dealing with the relation between the will and the world “obviously wrong.” To understand and assess this view, I look at what Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer, and Anscombe say about the will. She is right to reject the view of the will that she calls wrong, but it is possible that Wittgenstein intends his readers to reject it too. Recent work by Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen, Eli Friedlander, Modesto Gómez-Alonso, and Michael Kremer helps us to see this, and to understand Wittgenstein’s views on ethics as well. The will, conceived as something distinct from our actions in the world, is indeed a chimaera, as Anscombe argues. Will belongs to what we do. And it is not, as such, something that we can or should reject. If we are to reject anything in this neighbourhood, it is idle wishing that the world would change.

Abundant moments of indecision and delay shape George Eliot’s last novel Daniel Deronda (1876), which treats uncertainty as a recursive movement between interior and exterior, potentiality and activity. This chapter shows how Eliot explores action’s convoluted antecedents, drawing on intellectual trends in mid-century comparative method and physiological psychology, especially the latter’s portrait of embodied willing and pathologies of volition. These contexts frame a reading of the novel’s twin stances of practical experience and intellectual reflection: hesitation, the bewildering experience of having a “will which is and yet is not yet,” and its rational cousin, comparison, “our precious guide.” Formal fluctuations and portrayals of mental caprice would seem at cross-purposes with Eliot’s narrative control and moral coherence. Yet in discovering a “kinship” between certainty and doubt, she reinvigorates her novelistic ethics and recasts sympathy as guaranteed by “closer comparison between the knowledge which we call rational & the experience which we call emotional.” Her characters set store by irresolute stances of hesitation and comparison, and predictive affects like trust and hope.

Among the rhetorical pleas that follow most instances of public dissatisfaction is the call for more or better accountability. Accountability is a lauded notion, a “golden concept” that is considered widely as critical to the success of democratic government. Such pleas, I will argue, are misplaced. Rather than starting from the premise of accountability as an idea that no one can be against, I consider the possibility that accountability undermines the very notion it ostensibly promotes: self-government. The concept of accountability in modern political theory is tied more closely to the emergence of an impersonal administrative state than it is to the hopeful horizon of a democratic one. In practice and in theory, it is a concept of irresponsibility, a technological approach to government that provides the comforts of impersonal rationality.

We need theories that help us join the struggle for alternative futures. Cultural-historical approaches frame agency as something people do rather than something they have or sense. Building on this, I conceptualise agency in terms of the direction and reach of actions. Direction concerns movement from distinctive subject positionings towards desired endpoints. Reach concerns the extent of this movement. Direction and reach can be both outward (transforming the world) and inward (transforming the self). This acknowledges individuals’ contributions to changing their own lives and those of others without evacuating actions from the activities in which they are embedded. Motive, mediation, and motion are key to this. I illustrate these ideas in relation to existing research on young people’s environmental activism, a Latino boy in foster care, and a mother struggling to care for her infant child, as well as examples from prior research and other chapters in this volume.

I argue that Either/Or contains a proposal for philosophy of science, and in particular, about the ultimate goal of science (i.e., the ideal epistemic state). Whereas the Cartesian-Hegelian tradition conceived of the ideal state as one of detached reflection – that is, “seeing the world as it is in itself” – the characters in Part I of Either/Or reveal this ideal as leading to practical absurdity. In contrast, Kierkegaard suggests that the ideal state consists in the achievement of equilibrium between the “spectator” and “actor” aspects of the human being. Kierkegaard’s proposal thus sets the stage for Niels Bohr’s “epistemological lesson of quantum theory.”

This chapter introduces Spark, a data processing engine that mitigates some of the limitations of Hadoop MapReduce to perform data analytics efficiently. We begin with the motivation of Spark, introducing Spark RDDs as an in-memory distributed data structure that allows for faster processing while maintaining the attractive properties of Hadoop, such as fault tolerance. We then cover, hands-on, how to create and operate with RDDs, distinguishing between transformations and actions. Furthermore, we discuss how to work with key–value RDDs (which is more like MapReduce), how to use caching to perform iterative queries/operations, and how RDD lineage works to ensure fault tolerance. We provide a great range of examples with transformations such as map vs. flatMap and groupByKey vs. reduceByKey, discussing their behavior, adequacy (depending on what we want to achieve), and their performance. More advanced concepts, such as shared variables (broadcast and accumulators) or work by partitions are presented towards the end. Finally, we talk about the anatomy of a Spark application, as well as the different types of dependencies (narrow vs. wide) and the limitations on optimizing their processing.

This chapter argues that Byron is famous as a leading figure in Romantic poetry, but his own allegiance was to eighteenth-century culture. I argue that on the one hand he confirms the distinction between the two and yet he also overturns it. This is because he enters so deeply into the contradictions and character of eighteenth-century culture that he is part of their generation of something different. In this he resembles Burke’s deep relation to Whig culture and Newman’s to the Church of England, both of whom by this brought about the transformation of what they revered into something new and yet sourced in the past. I argue that is bound up with a larger historical transition between judging actions as open possibilities and accepting behaviour as an unalterable given. Byron is, as he claimed to be, an ethical poet because his attention is primarily to the former of these.