Protecting the privacy of individually-identifiable health data and promoting the public’s health often seem at odds. Privacy advocates consistently seek to limit the acquisition, use, and disclosure of identifiable health information in governmental and private sector settings. Their concerns relate to misuses or wrongful disclosures of sensitive health data that can lead to discrimination and stigmatization against individuals. Public health practitioners, on the other hand, seek regular, ongoing access to and use of identifiable health information to accomplish important public health objectives. The collection and use of identifiable health data by federal, tribal, state, and local health authorities support nearly all public health functions and goals.

Identifiable health data are the lifeblood of public health practice. When aggregated, these data help authorities monitor the incidence, patterns, and trends of injury and disease in populations. Health data are acquired by public health authorities through testing, screening, and treatment programs.

Over the past decade, a flurry of media stories devoted to sports-related concussions have drawn attention to the previously “silent epidemic” of traumatic brain injury (TBI) in athletes. From 2001 to 2009, the annual number of sports-related TBI emergency department visits in individuals age 19 and under climbed from 153,375 to 248,414, an increase of increase of 62 percent. Multiple head injuries place youth athletes at risk for serious health conditions, including cerebral swelling, brain herniation, and even death — postconcussive conditions that have collectively (and controversially) been referred to as “second impact syndrome.” Studies have shown that children and teens — and girls, in particular — are more likely to sustain a concussion and have a longer recovery time than adults. Recent research also suggests that even subconcussive hits in children and adolescents may result in longer-term health effects such as decreased cognitive functioning, increased rates of depression, memory problems, and mild cognitive impairment (a pre-Alzheimer’s condition).

Should children ever have genetic testing for adultonset conditions? For the last two decades, there have been general recommendations from professional organizations that discourage such testing. Until recently, such testing was only plausible in the context of a family history of a Mendelian condition that might prompt the parents (or an adolescent) to request testing for the adult-onset condition present within the family. In this context there has been a gradual shift in the direction of suggesting parents should have greater discretion to obtain such testing after careful consideration of risks and benefits by the family and the health care provider.

Although death by neurologic criteria (brain death) is legally recognized throughout the United States, state laws and clinical practice vary concerning three key issues: (1) the medical standards used to determine death by neurologic criteria, (2) management of family objections before determination of death by neurologic criteria, and (3) management of religious objections to declaration of death by neurologic criteria. The American Academy of Neurology and other medical stakeholder organizations involved in the determination of death by neurologic criteria have undertaken concerted action to address variation in clinical practice in order to ensure the integrity of brain death determination. To complement this effort, state policymakers must revise legislation on the use of neurologic criteria to declare death. We review the legal history and current laws regarding neurologic criteria to declare death and offer proposed revisions to the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and the rationale for these recommendations.

Finding elderly patients lying on the floor beside their beds despite the presence of elevated bedrails seems paradoxical: how can a patient fall out of bed when the bedrails are up? Surprisingly, this paradox constitutes one of the leading incidents plaguing hospitals in the United States today. It exemplifies a much larger problem created, we believe, by the uncritical adoption of measures designed to enhance patient welfare, but which may in fact undermine it. This article documents our experience with bedrails, reviews the literature, and comments on the rationale for routine adoption of bedrails for the hospitalized elderly. It concludes by advocating that a randomized, controlled study be conducted to determine whether bedrails constitute protection or a hazard to the average elderly patient.

Programs, policies, and technologies — particularly those concerned with health equity — are often designed with justice envisioned as the end goal. These policies or interventions, however, frequently fail to recognize how the beneficiaries have historically embodied the cumulative effects of marginalization, which undermines the effectiveness of the intended justice. These well-meaning attempts at justice are bounded by greater socio-historical constraints. Bounded justice suggests that it is impossible to attend to fairness, entitlement, and equity when the basic social and physical infrastructures underlying them have been eroded by racism and other historically entrenched isms. Using the case of Brazil’s National Health Policy for the Black Population, this paper proposes that bounded justice can contribute to justice discourses by serving as a concept, a proffering to a multi-disciplinary conceptual framework, and a potential analytic for those interested in the design of policy, technology, and programmatic interventions towards health equity.

This article describes overlapping links among incarceration, poor health, race, and stigma, and stigma's impact on the health of former prisoners and their families and communities. The authors include policy recommendations to reduce the impact of incarceration and stigma.

The number and the scale of transboundary public health concerns are increasing. Infectious and non-communicable diseases, international trade in tobacco, alcohol, and other dangerous products as well as the control of the safety of health services, pharmaceuticals, and food are merely a few examples of contemporary transnationalization of health concerns. The rapid development and diffusion of scientific and technological developments across national borders are creating new realms of international health concern, such as aspects of biomedical science, including human reproductive cloning, germ-line therapy, and xenotransplantation, as well as environmental health problems, including climate change, biodiversity loss, and depletion of the ozone layer. Growth in international trade and travel, in combination with population growth, has served to increase the frequency and intensity of health concerns bypassing or spilling over sovereign boundaries.

Although health has traditionally been seen an area of limited multilateral cooperation, there is growing awareness that contemporary globalization has led to the proliferation of cross border determinants of health status and is undermining the capacity of nation states to protect health through domestic action alone.

Social epidemiology has made a powerful case that health determined not just by individual-level factors such as our genetic make-up, access to medical services, or lifestyle choices, but also by social conditions, including the economy, law, and culture. Indeed, at the level of populations, evidence suggests that these “structural” factors are the predominant influences on health. Legal scholars in public health, including those in the health and human rights movement, have contended that human rights, laws, and legal practices are powerfully linked to health. Social epidemiology and health-oriented legal scholarship are complementary in their focus and their research needs. Legal scholarship has identified plausible ways in which legal and human rights factors could be influencing health, but empirical evidence has been limited.

Uncertainty regarding potential disciplinary action may give physicians pause when considering whether to accept a chronic pain patient or how to treat a patient who may require long-term or high doses of opioids. Surveys have shown that physicians fear potential disciplinary acrion for prescribing controlled substances and that physicians will, in some cases, inadequately prescribe opioids due to fear of regulatory scrutiny. Prescribing opioids for long-term pain management, particularly noncancer pain management, has been controversial; and boards have investigated and, in some cases, disciplined physicians for such prescribing. While in virtually all of these cases the disciplinary actions were successfully appealed, news of the success was not often as well-publicized as news of the disciplinary actions, leaving some physicians confused about their potential liability when prescribing opioids for pain. The confusion has perhaps increased as a result of two relatively recent cases, one where a physician was successfully disciplined by a state medical board for undertreatment of his patients’ pain, and another where the physician was successfully sued for inadequate pain treatment.

Conflicts of interest have been reduced to financial conflicts. The National Institutes of Health’s (NIH) new rules for managing conflicts of interest in medical research, the first major change to the regulations in over 15 years, address only financial ties. Although several commentators urged that the regulations also cover non-financial interests, the Department of Health and Human Services declined to do so. Similarly, the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) influential 2009 Conflict of Interest Report focuses almost exclusively on financial conflicts. Institutional policies at academic medical centers and guidance from professional bodies and medical journals also primarily emphasize financial ties. Even broadly worded rules are applied more readily to financial ties than non-financial interests, such as the regulations that restrict institutional review board (IRB) members with conflicting interests from participating in protocol reviews.

In 1968, the definition of death in the United States was expanded to include not just death by cardiopulmonary criteria, but also death by neurologic criteria. We explore the way the definition has been modified by the medical and legal communities over the past 50 years and address the medical, legal and ethical controversies associated with the definition at present, with a particular highlight on the Supreme Court of Nevada Case of Aden Hailu.

When applied in the health sector, AI-based applications raise not only ethical but legal and safety concerns, where algorithms trained on data from majority populations can generate less accurate or reliable results for minorities and other disadvantaged groups.

In January 2010 the Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO) called for an “informal consultation on the future of financing for WHO” and in her opening remarks expressed the need to make the WHO fit for purpose given the unique health challenges of the 21st century.

Margaret Chan referred to the constitutional role that WHO has to “act as the directing and co-ordinating authority on international health work” and stated clearly that global health leadership today and for the future must be earned through strategic and selective engagement. She said, “WHO can no longer aim to direct and coordinate all of the activities and policies in multiple sectors that influence public health today.” This is a clear challenge that she has put to the global health community in recognition that WHO’s role must be clarified in the face of major change.

Embryonic stem cell (ESC) research has been a source of ethical, legal, and social controversy since the first successful culturing of human ESCs in the laboratory in 1998. The controversy has slowed the pace of stem cell science and shaped many aspects of its subsequent development. This paper assesses the main issues that have bedeviled stem cell progress and identifies the ethical fault lines that are likely to continue.

The time is appropriate for such an assessment because the field is poised for a period of rapid development. President Obama has removed the Bush administration’s restrictions on federal funding. A huge influx of federal research funds is in the offing and presumably a more rapid maturing of the science will take place. Stem cell science is also moving into the clinical realm. In March 2009, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the first clinical trial with an ESC-derived therapy for spinal cord injuries, an important first step — though by no means a final or a sure one — in moving ESC research out of the laboratory into clinical medicine. Finally, recent work with induced pluripotent stem (IPS) cells suggests that non-embryonic sources of pluripotent stem cells may one day be routinely available. Such a development will lessen the temperature of the ethical debate while raising other issues.

This article details the results of a national survey conducted in 1999 of statewide laws and protocols providing for the creation and recognition of donot- resuscitate (DNR) orders effective in nonhospital settings. Applicable primarily to emergency medical services (EMS) personnel, most of these laws and protocols have been in existence for less than ten years, and there is little current comparative information on them. Such policies are commonly called out-of-hospital or prehospital DNR orders, although one state-Virginia-recently amended its DNR law to establish a durable DNR order applicable to all health care providers and all settings. I will refer to the laws and policies examined here interchangeably as out-of hospital DNR protocols or EMS-DNR protocols. The survey produced a descriptive snapshot of such laws and protocols in effect on a statewide basis as of March 1999.

Successful preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to avoid creating a child affected by a genetically-based disorder was reported in 1989. Since then PGD has been used to biopsy and analyze embryos created through in viuo fertilization (IVF) to avoid transferring to the mother’s uterus an embryo affected by a mutation or chromosomal abnormality associated with serious illness. PGD to avoid serious and early-onset illness in the child-to-be is widely accepted. PGD prevents gestation of an affected embryo and reduces the chance that the parents will be faced with a difficult decision of whether to terminate the pregnancy. More controversial have been PGD to select the sex of the child-to-be for “family balancing” (rather than to avoid a sex-linked disorder), PGD for mere susceptibility to disease and for late-onset disorders such as Alzheimer diseas, and most controversially, PGD to create a donor child who is Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA-matched with a preexisting sibling in need of stem cell transplant.