In about last three decades, many developing countries have experienced a large decline in maternal mortality rates. Global initiatives leading to better maternal health policies may have contributed to this decline. In this paper, we investigate whether maternal health intervention also improves the fetal survival rate. For this purpose, we consider the Village Midwife Program in Indonesia, which was launched in 1989 as a part of the safe motherhood strategy. Using the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), we investigate the impact of midwives on fetal survival rate in terms of a change in the likelihood of a live birth being male. Our results show that the provision of a midwife in a community increases the probability of a live birth being male by about 3 percentage points. Greater antenatal care, skilled birth-attendance, and an improvement in nutrition among reproductive-age women—in terms of greater BMI—are the likely pathways. We do not find the results to be driven by pre-treatment trends, and they remain robust to a number of checks.

We study the impact of capital and labor taxation in an economy where couples bargain over the intrahousehold allocation under limited commitment. In this framework more wealth improves commitment and gives rise to insurance gains within the household. Our theory motivates these gains by the empirical observation that wealth, in contrast to labor income, is a commonly held resource within households. Based on this observation we study whether eliminating capital taxes from the economy, and raising labor taxes to balance the government’s budget, may generate welfare gains to married households. We illustrate that the quantitative effects from this reform are rather small. We attribute the small effects to the life cycle pattern of wealth accumulation and to the impact of labor income taxes on household risk sharing: In particular, we show that higher labor taxes may make the limited commitment friction more severe, even though they may make the distribution of labor income more equitable within the household.

In multi-population mortality modeling, autoregressive moving average (ARMA) processes are typically used to model the evolution of mortality differentials between different populations over time. While such processes capture only short-term serial dependence, it is found in our empirical work that mortality differentials often exhibit statistically significant long-term serial dependence, suggesting the necessity for using long memory processes instead. In this paper, we model mortality differentials between different populations with long memory processes, while preserving coherence in the resulting mortality forecasts. Our results indicate that if the dynamics of mortality differentials are modeled by long memory processes, mean reversion would be much slower, and forecast uncertainty over the long run would be higher. These results imply that the true level of population basis risk in index-based longevity hedges may be larger than what we would expect when ARMA processes are assumed. We also study how index-based longevity hedges should be calibrated if mortality differentials follow long memory processes. It is found that delta hedges are more robust than variance-minimizing hedges, in the sense that the former remains effective even if the true processes for mortality differentials are long memory ones.

This paper explores whether a positive unexpected exogenous (unearned) wealth shock affects household structure decisions in different Spanish regions. The Christmas draw of the Spanish National Lottery is used in a natural experiment as a proxy for exogenous random variations in provincial wealth. A static and dynamic linear panel event-study design allows for control of changing economic and demographic conditions at the province level and the dynamic effects on the analyzed decisions. The evidence is consistent with families getting divorced and having children when the province in which they live experiences an unexpected increase in wealth, but no conclusive effect on wedding plans is found.

Fertility control strategies became widespread in rural Spain through the twentieth century: a significant number of parents decided to reduce their marital fertility once the advantages of control strategies became widely known. This paper explores the impact of those practices on children through a comparative study of the heights and occupations of grandparents, parents, and children. We analyze more than 1,200 individuals from three different generations born between 1835 and 1959 in 14 rural Spanish villages, studying whether the advantages associated with fertility control were maintained over time favoring a better family status or whether they were diluted in the next generation. The largest increases in height were among children whose parents controlled their fertility by stopping having children before the mother's 36th birthday. However, it does not seem that this increase in biological well-being was accompanied by major episodes of upward social mobility.

Marriage patterns can be well understood only if researchers employ measures of marriage rates that are appropriate for the question asked. In this paper, we provide evidence that the two classes of measures typically used in the literature, the number of new marriages per population and the share of individuals currently or ever married within an age range, generally lead to misleading inference when used to study the probability someone marries during his or her life or fertile life, how it evolves, and how it differs across populations. An alternative measure, the share of individuals ever married in a given cohort by a given age, is better suited for such studies. When researchers are interested in year-on-year changes in marriage probabilities of singles, age-specific marriage hazards are more reliable than population-based measures. We conclude by discussing implications of our findings for studies of the drivers and consequences of marriage formation.

Over the past three decades, educational attainment in Mexico has grown substantially. This increase in educational attainment may affect marriage patterns through the growing supply of individuals with higher education and changing preferences over their partner's education level. We use administrative marriage and birth certificate records to quantify changes in the relative education levels for both married and unmarried couples. Our results suggest that individuals who marry outside their education category prefer to match with a partner with a similar education level. That is, college graduates prefer to match with individuals with a secondary education rather than those with a primary education. We also find that assortativeness among pairs which include college graduates has grown considerably over this time period. Our findings hold across both marriage records and birth certificate records, indicating a parallel increase in assortativeness regardless of marital status.

The configurational studies of this special issue trace complex patterns of interdependencies existing among family members and beyond households. They focus on the functional connections among spouses, children, siblings, and other relatives living in a variety of households. The main goal of this special issue is to reveal how some key decisions and exchanges occurring in family dyads, such as the marital and parent–child dyads, are embedded within a larger set of family and interpersonal exchanges that constitute configurations of their own in a variety of contexts.

Over the next 35 years, the total population of sub-Saharan Africa is projected to increase by 118%, with a greater rise of of 156% of people in the prime working ages. To cope with population growth and exploit the slowly unfolding, favorable change in age structure, countries face a triple challenge. Agricultural productivity has to improve. Prospects are good, though climate change remains a threat. Manufacturing jobs need to be created on a far larger scale than hitherto. Success is uncertain because much depends on foreign investors and the actions of competing low-wage countries in Asia. The third challenge concerns the non-agricultural informal sector, which, even under optimistic assumptions about manufacturing, will continue to provide livelihoods for a large segment of the population. Entrepreneurship needs to be encouraged so that an increasing proportion of family enterprises evolve into larger businesses. There is no blueprint to achieve this evolution and much will depend on the hard work and ingenuity of individuals.

In the coming decades, the countries of the South will be facing the aging of the population faster than the countries of the North. This will have long-term economic consequences for the South but also for the North through the changing of international capital flows. To study the latter, we build a simple two-region two-period overlapping generations (OLG) model, assuming fully integrated financial markets. This allows us to determine the analytical expression of the world interest rate dynamics at general equilibrium and the resulting capital flows accruing to each of the two regions (the North and the South). From there, we analyze how a reduction in either fertility or mortality alters the magnitude of the international capital flows. Contradictory effects are evidenced. To clear-up any ambiguity and to study the South's demographic transition, which involves a succession of shocks, we propose numerical simulations. Even if the results stress that the institutional context and technological catching-up may matter, they suggest in a rather general way that the declines in both fertility and mortality tend to reduce the relative capital needs of the Southern economies and consequently their capital inflows. This, in turn, would be beneficial to the North's productive capacity, which should then hold more capital.

While previous studies have confirmed the negative effects of son preference on the prenatal care received by girls, few have examined its effect on birth outcomes. This study contributes to the literature on son preference by examining this relationship. The degree of son preference is measured by the sex ratio at birth, and the data were obtained from the birth registry of South Korea, which has a long history of strong son preference. We find that girls are more likely to be born with low birth weight when son preference is stronger. In addition, when son preference is stronger, girls are more likely to be born outside hospitals, which implies that mothers conceiving girls make fewer prenatal visits to the hospital when their son preference is stronger.

This paper contributes to the migration literature studying the time devoted to educational activities. It uses US time-diary surveys to study the allocation of time to informal as well as formal learning and educational activities by immigrants and natives. We develop a simple theoretical framework, which highlights the different constraints/opportunity costs faced by immigrants as compared with natives. Consistently with our theoretical model, the estimates show that immigrants are more likely to engage in informal and formal education and conditional on participation, they allocate more time to these activities. We find that the main drivers are economic incentives, mostly in the early phase of working life, and that the differences between natives and immigrants persist across generations. We also find that differences between immigrants and natives are generally larger in informal education than in formal education. The investment in informal and formal learning and educational activities is likely to boost immigrants' human and social capital and contribute to their socio-economic integration.

We study whether the increased adoption of available automation technologies allows economies to avoid the negative effect of aging on per capita output. We develop a quantitative theory in which firms choose to which extent they automate in response to a declining workforce and rising old-age dependency. An important element in our model is the integration of two capital types: automation capital that acts as a substitute to human labor, and traditional capital that is a complement to labor. Empirically, our model's predictions largely match data regarding automation (robotization) density across OECD countries. Simulating the model, we find that aging-induced automation only partially compensates the negative growth effect of aging in the absence of technical progress in automation technology. One reason is that automated tasks are no perfect substitutes for non-automated tasks. A second reason is that automation raises the interest rate and thus inhibits positive behavioral reactions to aging (later retirement and investment in human capital). Moreover, increased automation generates a falling net labor share of income and rising welfare inequality. We evaluate alternative policy responses to cope with this inequality.

This paper argues that the expectation of having to provide care for aging parents in the future may be a major factor contributing to the current low fertility rate in Japan. Using data from the 1998 and 2008 National Family Research of Japan (NFRJ) surveys and a Poisson-logit hurdle model, this paper examines whether the expectation of having to look after parents in the future affects a couple's current family planning. The first-stage model of a couple's family planning decision is a logit model which examines the decision of whether or not to have any children, and then in the second stage a Poisson model is applied to explain the number of children a couple has conditional on the couple having at least one child. The empirical evidence presented suggests that there are strong generational effects, and that for the post-war cohort, an increase in the probability of having to look after a parent increases the probability of a couple being childless.

The government of Uganda introduced an education reform that eliminated school fees for primary school-age children in 1997. This paper finds that an increase in education, generated by the reform, has a positive impact on women's empowerment. Specifically, an increase in schooling, due to the reform, improves women's involvement in decision making within the household by increasing their likelihood of having a final say on issues related to their own health, about large household expenses, and regarding visits to family or relatives. Education enhances women's cognitive ability but has no impact on women's labor market opportunities and attitudes toward gender-based violence.

Labor market conditions in Greece have severely deteriorated during the crisis, affecting youths the most. Using the Greek crisis as a case-study, this paper examines the role of the family as a social safety net for its young members. Specifically, we test the relationship between youth labor outcomes and parental co-residence, whether this relationship has become stronger during the crisis, and the degree to which the relationship is causal. Our results confirm that the parental home is a refuge both for jobless youth and for those in poorly paid, insecure jobs, and this role has intensified during the crisis. We find no reverse causality between co-residence and employment status for young men, and significant reverse causality for women. This finding implies that all youths live in the parental home when they are in need themselves, but it is young women not men who live with parents when parents are in need or for cultural reasons.

This paper investigates whether the availability of breastfeeding facilities at the workplace helps to reconcile breastfeeding and work commitments, and whether it has beneficial effects for the health of the child. Using data from the UK Infant Feeding Survey, we find that the availability of breastfeeding facilities at work is associated with longer breastfeeding durations for all women and shorter maternity leave spells for higher educated women. We also find that children born to mothers whose employer offers breastfeeding facilities experience significantly fewer sickness in the first 6 months of life.

A potential solution to low fertility is the employment of foreign domestic workers (FDWs), who substitute child-rearing and housework duties, thus reducing child-rearing costs. Recent studies argue that the flow of low-skilled foreign workers into the childcare sector influences fertility choice. However, these studies mainly use the availability of FDWs in the local area as the causal inference and focus on Western countries, making it difficult to identify individual direct effects or generalize the findings to other countries. To bridge this research gap and examine the impacts, this study uses household data from the Hong Kong census. Employing ordinary least squares, the inverse probability weighted regression adjustment, and the instrumental variable approach, we find that households that employ live-in FDWs give birth to more children. Moreover, the heterogeneous analysis reveals that women's greater proportional contribution to household income has a positive impact on households' fertility response after employing the FDWs.

US women, on average, had approximately two children in both the 1930s and in the 1970s, yet the fertility distribution in the 1930s was less concentrated. This implies change in reproductive behavior, which cannot be captured by models focusing on average fertility. To explain these changes, I have developed a model that makes a distinction between sons and daughters. In this model, the female labor force participation rate is the probability of each girl becoming an employed woman. This endogenizes the empirically observed difference in the propensity for an all-girl household to have another child compared to an all-boy household, generating large fertility differentials at low participation rates. Higher participation rates raise the expected return from an additional child, as well as the expected return from existing daughters. The first effect tends to increase fertility, while the second effect, for relatively concave utility functions, tends to decrease it, so that the distribution of completed fertilities becomes more concentrated.

On average, childless women observed by the Panel Study of Income Dynamics report that they intend to have more children than they actually have. A collection of intentions that record only whether respondents intend to have another child can more accurately predict the number of children they have. Errors in the formation of intentions are not required to explain this finding. Rather, if intentions record a survey respondent's most likely predicted number of children, then the average of these intentions does not necessarily equal average actual fertility, even if intentions are formed using rational expectations.