The stylized facts of Africa's urban transition highlight the limitations of traditional economic models of urbanization. Recent research has provided evidence that demographic rather than economic processes provide a more compelling explanation for observed trends in the region. In particular, mortality decline appears to be both a necessary and sufficient condition for urbanization to occur and a key driver of urban growth more broadly. The accumulation of survey data over the past few decades and the development of new geospatial datasets that incorporate satellite imagery are facilitating new, more spatially nuanced insights into the dynamics of urban population change in the region. This offers opportunity to develop better policies for managing urban change than those adopted in the past, which placed a misguided emphasis on manipulating migration incentives with little evidence of positive benefits.

Total fertility in the Catholic countries of Southern Europe has dropped to remarkably low rates (=1.4) despite continuing low rates female labor force participation and high historic fertility. We model three ways in which religion affects the demand for children – through norms, market wages, and childrearing costs. We estimate these effects using new panel data on church attendance and clergy employment for 13 European countries from 1960 to 2000, spanning the Second Vatican Council (1962–65). Using nuns per capita as a proxy for service provision, we estimate fertility effects on the order of 300 to 400 children per nun. Moreover, nuns outperform priests as a predictor of fertility, suggesting that changes in childrearing costs dominate changes in theology and norms. Reduced church attendance also predicts fertility decline, but only for Catholics, not for Protestants. Service provision and attendance complement each other, a finding consistent with club models of religion.

This paper shows that differences in fertility across European countries mainly emerge due to fewer women having two children in low-fertility countries. It further suggests that childcare services are an important determinant for the transition to a second child to occur. The theoretical framework we propose suggests that (i) in countries where childcare coverage is low, there is a U-shaped relationship between a couple’s probability of having a second child and the woman’s potential wage, whereas (ii) in countries with easy access to childcare, this probability is positively related with the woman’s potential wage. Data from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) confirm these implications when estimating a woman’s probability of having a second child as a function of education. This implies that middle-income women are the most affected ones by the lack of access to formal and subsidized childcare.

It was a different era when Gary Becker did his groundbreaking work on the economics of fertility, during the years from the late 1950 through the early 1990s. There was great concern then about the “population explosion” due to sustained high fertility in the developing world after mortality declined following World War II. In 1968, Paul Ehrlich published “The Population Bomb” predicting disaster and mass starvation due to rapid population growth: “The battle to feed all of humanity is over. In the 1970s, the world will undergo famines – hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death. . . .” Robert McNamara, then the President of the World Bank, in 1984 said “Short of thermonuclear war itself, population growth is the gravest issue the world faces over the decades immediately ahead. If we do not act, the problem will be solved by famine, riots, insurrection and war.”

Recent papers have suggested that the Industrial Revolution in Europe ultimately derives from the labor scarce economy of northwest Europe, which some trace back to the Black Death [Voigtländer and Voth (2013a) and Allen (2011)]. This paper examines the effects of the Black Death in England. Specifically, did it merely change relative factor prices, or did it lead to lasting gains in the efficiency of the economy after 1348? Extensive wage and price data from England 1210–1800 suggest that the population losses of the Black Death were associated with a surprising increase in economic efficiency, despite the decline in the scale of the economy. But this efficiency gain disappeared when population rose again in the 16th century. There is no sign of a connection between a labor scarce economy, and a switch to faster long run economic growth through technological advance.

Knowledge of the long relationship between gender equality and economic growth is hampered by the lack of information and resources on the various dimensions of gender equality. This paper is a first attempt to assess the size of the gender gap and investigate its relationship with economic growth from a historical perspective. Exploiting a unique census-based dataset of 86 French counties in the mid-nineteenth century, I construct a historical gender gap index measuring the size of the gap between men and women in three critical areas: economic opportunities, educational attainment, and health. A county comparison allows me to identify the strengths and weaknesses of French counties in closing the gender gap. I find that France can be divided into two main areas, the North and the South. In particular, the Northern counties that have done most to narrow the gap display better economic performance. Boys' and girls' education and family structures appear to be crucial determinants of gender equality. Gender equality is positively and significantly associated with economic performance. Accounting for the multi-dimensions of gender equality is crucial for economic development.

We provide a new explanation for the narrowing and reversal of the gender education gap. We assume that parents maximize the full income of their children and that males have an additional income, independently of education. This additional income biases preferences toward sons and implies that females have relative advantage in producing income through education. When the returns to human capital are low, the bias toward sons is high, so that parents whose first newborns are females have more children. Consequently, daughters are born to larger families and hence receive less education. As returns to human capital increase, gender differences in producing income diminish, bias toward sons declines, variation in family size falls and the positive correlation between family size and the number of daughters is weakened. Ultimately, the relative advantage of females in education dominates differences in family size, triggering the reversal in the gender education gap.

In light of increasing environmental stress and its likely implications for migration patterns, we conduct a cross-country individual-level analysis of the impact of self-reported exposure to environmental stress on people's migration intentions and their destination choice. We simultaneously model intentions to migrate domestically and internationally for 90 countries worldwide in 2010. We find that self-reported exposure to environmental stress increases the probability to intend to migrate both domestically and internationally in the coming year. In absolute terms, the largest impact is obtained for domestic migration, but controlling for the fact that this is the most common form of migration anyway, environmental stress particularly raises intraregional migration intentions. Overall, the effects on migration intentions to the different destinations are strongest in low- and middle-income countries in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, while in high-income countries, and in Europe particularly, environmental stress appears to spur only domestic migration intentions.

In mid-2016, the population of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was almost 1 billion people. By 2050, the population of the region will probably reach 2.1 billion people [Population Reference Bureau (2016)]. In 2100, SSA's population could be almost 4 billion people [United Nations (2015)]. This rapid demographic increase would translate into a possible quadrupling of the current SSA population by the end of the century (unless fertility would decline sharply in the near future). Nonetheless, the region has embarked on its demographic transition, i.e., the shift from high to low crude birth rates and crude death rates, albeit this process has occurred in SSA at a slower pace than in the rest of the developing world. In particular, the decline of fertility has been slower in SSA than in the other regions of the world. The rapid population growth and the occurrence of a demographic transition in the region have generated discussions on the prospects for SSA to open a demographic window of opportunity and capture a first demographic dividend. However, two crucial dimensions, which have so far been rather neglected, need more attention. First, one will need to define with more accuracy the sub-populations of the working-age adults and their young and older dependents, therefore refining the calculation of the dependency ratio. In particular, one will need to assess the population of the young dependents as well as the population of adults who are actually working. Second, it will be also necessary to examine the conditions required to trigger a faster and significant fertility decline in the region. This is most important because the relationship between the active adults and their dependents is predicated by the fertility decline, which will bring the changes to the age structure.

This paper discusses the use of Chinese genealogies for research on economic demography. I focus both on what is known about the genealogy as a data source, and what are the open questions for future research. Chinese genealogies contain records at the individual level. With the publication of new catalogs and efforts to collect genealogies, the number of genealogies is even larger than previously thought, with most dating to the late Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1911) Dynasties. These records contain a rich source of information about the Chinese population history, over a period for which there is no alternative source of information. Yet, the source still remains largely unexploited. Although the work of transcribing the data is significant, and selection biases need to be carefully considered, preliminary analysis of the data for a sample of married men for Tongcheng County in Anhui Province suggests these data are a rich source of information for demographic and economics research.

Migration is a common means of adaptation to weather shocks. Previous research has identified heterogeneous effects according to age, sex, and wealth, but little is still known about how marriage-related institutions affect such migration. Relying on a quasi-experimental identification strategy, we analyze marriage- and work-related migration in Malawi following large droughts, separating the effects for female and male migrants according to different age groups. The analysis based on stated motives of migration reveals marginal decreases in marriage-related migration among girls, but increases in marriage-related migration within districts for women in older age groups. We also find large increases in work-related between-district migration for boys, and to a smaller extent also for girls following severe drought. The results add to the evidence of the potentially adverse effects of migration as a coping mechanism following drought when other means of insurance do not exist.

This study employs a two-way fixed effects research design to measure the mortality impact and cost-effectiveness of cancer drugs: It analyzes the correlation across 36 countries between the relative mortality from 19 types of cancer in 2015 and the relative number of drugs previously launched in that country to treat that type of cancer, controlling for relative incidence. The sample size (both in terms of number of observations and population covered) of this study is considerably larger than the sample sizes of previous studies; a new and improved method of analyzing the lag structure of the relationship between drug launches and life-years lost is used; and a larger set of measures of the burden of cancer is analyzed. The number of DALYs and life-years lost are unrelated to drug launches 0–4 years earlier. This is not surprising, since utilization of a drug tends to be quite low during the first few post-launch years. Moreover, there is likely to be a lag of several years between utilization of a drug and its impact on mortality. However, mortality is significantly inversely related to the number of drug launches at least 5 years earlier, especially to drug launches 5–9 years earlier. One additional drug for a cancer site launched during 2006–2010 is estimated to have reduced the number of 2015 DALYs due to cancer at that site by 5.8%;; one additional drug launched during 1982–2005 is estimated to have reduced the number of 2015 DALYs by about 2.6%. Lower quality (or effectiveness) of earlier vintage drugs may account for their smaller estimated effect. We estimate that drugs launched during the entire 1982–2010 period reduced the number of cancer DALYs in 2015 by about 23.0%, and that, in the absence of new drug launches during 1982–2010, there would have been 26.3 million additional DALYs in 2015. Also, the nine countries with the largest number of drug launches during 1982–2010 are estimated to have had 14% fewer cancer DALYs (controlling for incidence) in 2015 than the nine countries with the smallest number of drug launches during 1982–2010. Estimates of the cost per life-year gained in 2015 from drugs launched during 2006–2010 range between $1,635 (life-years gained at all ages) and $2,820 (life-years gained before age 65). These estimates are similar to those obtained in previous country-specific studies of Belgium, Canada, and Mexico, and are well below the estimate obtained in one study of Switzerland. Mortality in 2015 is strongly inversely related to the number of drug launches in 2006–2010. If the relationship between mortality in 2020 and the number of drug launches in 2011–2015 is similar, drug launches 5–9 years earlier will reduce mortality even more (by 9.9%) between 2015 and 2020 than they did (by 8.4%) between 2010 and 2015.

This paper first elaborates a model of intermediate selection where potential migrants must have both the resources to finance the migration cost (liquidity constraint restriction) and an income gain of migrating (economic incentives restriction). We then test the predictions of the model regarding the impact of output in the sending country and migration costs on average skill level of immigrants to the United States from 1899 to 1932, where immigration was initially unrestricted by law and then highly limited. Our panel of 39 countries includes data on occupations that immigrants had in their country of origin, providing a more accurate skill measure than previously available datasets. We find that migration costs have a negative but skill-neutral effect on quantity of immigrants and an increase in output, measured as GDP per capita, has a positive effect on quantity and a negative effect on average skill level of immigrants, suggesting that the main channel by which changes in output affected the average skill level of migrants in that time period is through the easing or tightening of the liquidity constraints and not through the economic incentives as in previous models. Also, using migrants’ occupation in the United States as a measure of skills would lead to misleading conclusions.

This study explores how the distinctive Korean age reckoning, the Confucian age culture, and the school-entry-cutoff date affect the decisions of parents on both birth and school-entry timing for their children in Korea. There is a traditional method of age calculation in Korea that all people get one year older on January 1. Korea also has a distinctive age culture influenced by Confucianism. I find a substantial amount of birth and school-entry timing selections around the Korean age-cutoff date, January 1. The estimation results show that children born in January and February delayed school entry by 18.2–21.2 percentage points more than those born in November and December and 24% of births moved from one week before January 1 to one week after when the school-entry cutoff was March 1. After the school-entry cutoff has changed to January 1, children barely delay school enrollment, while more births are moved from December to January: 42% of births are shifted within the 7-day window. These behaviors are made by two motives: (1) parents want their children to have the same Korean age with their classmates because of the Confucian age culture; (2) they also want their children to be relatively older to have academic advantages.

In this paper, I suggest a novel explanation for a hump-shaped age-consumption profile, based on human aging. The model integrates health in the utility function and utilizes recent estimates of the effects of health on the marginal utility of consumption. The parsimonious model has a closed-form solution for the age of peak consumption and the consumption level at that age relative to initial consumption. A calibration of the model with data from gerontology produces an empirically plausible hump in consumption.

Economists theorize that the inverse relationship between income and family size reflects a trade-off between child quality and quantity. Testing this hypothesis requires addressing the simultaneity of the quality and quantity decisions. The unanticipated birth of twins and sex composition of the first two children have been used as the exogenous variation in family size with mixed results. We exploit the One-Child Policy (OCP) in China, which exogenously reduced fertility, and examine how the OCP affected the education of Chinese migrants to the USA. Using the American Community Survey and a difference-in-differences strategy, we find higher levels of education for Chinese migrants born after the OCP compared with their counterparts from other East Asian countries. This finding provides additional support for the existence of a quality-quantity trade-off.

In this paper, we document the economic implications of changing demographic conditions in Africa. To construct support ratios, we use National Transfer Accounts (NTA) estimates of per capita labor income and consumption by age, as well as population estimates and projections provided by the UN Population Division for 16 African countries. First, we find that, on average, support ratios are rising in Africa. But compared with the support ratios in Asia and Latin America, the magnitude of those in Africa is lower because the percentage of effective workers in the total population is also low. Second, we find that human capital spending is high in countries with low fertility rates, which suggests a quantity–quality trade-off. NTA estimates also show that to capitalize on the demographic dividend, countries have to create economic opportunities for young adults. In addition, investment in human and physical capital is important to generate the second demographic dividend.

This paper argues that the conventional strategy of identifying a cultural effect using variation across countries of origin may be biased because the assumption that all immigrants make their choices in an identical environment in the host country is unlikely to hold true, even when controlling for individual characteristics. We discuss different mechanisms behind the bias and propose to eliminate it by exploiting only the variation within countries of origin. In our application (fertility of immigrants in Germany), the cultural effect survives this more demanding specification; however, the estimated coefficient is smaller compared to estimations that rely on cross-country variation for identification. We also show that the cultural influence is considerably smaller in the second generation of immigrants.

This paper revisits the question of how brain drain affects the optimal education policy of a developing economy. Our framework of analysis highlights the complementarity between public spending on education and students' efforts to acquire human capital in response to career opportunities at home and abroad. Given this complementarity, we find that brain drain has conflicting effects on the optimal provision of public education. A positive response is called for when the international earning differential with destination countries is large, and when the emigration rate is relatively low. In contrast with the findings in the existing literature, our numerical experiments show that these required conditions are in fact present in a large number of developing countries; they are equivalent to those under which an increase in emigration induces a net brain gain. As a further contribution, we study the interaction between the optimal immigration policy of the host country and education policy of the source country in a game-theoretic framework.

The headline demographics of sub-Saharan Africa appear to be reason for concern. Looking back, since Independence in the 1960s, the region has been the major exception to the global demographic trend of rising height: In some countries, average height has even been declining [eLife (2016)]. Looking forward, between now and 2050, the population is set to grow more rapidly than that of any other region. But the demographic transition that is typically of most concern to African governments is not about the size or stature of overall population, it is urbanization. Politicians fear the consequences of a restive urban youth: an Arab Spring repeated south of the Sahara. Many would like to slow the pace of urbanization.