In a democratic nation, local government is the government of the people, by the people and for the people at the grassroots levels. That is, the government nearest or closest to the people. It is at the level of local government that community action in respect of community development programmes is most effective; it is also the level where democratic processes and decision-making by consensus are traditionally entrenched; where rivalries and tensions are reduced to a minimum; where local resources and patriotism are easily called to the service of the community; and, very importantly, where the people are normally confident of effective control of their own government.

In November, 1996, the Fifth Meeting of the Commonwealth Ministers Responsible for Women's Affairs recommended that member countries be encouraged to achieve a target of not less than 30 per cent of women in decision-making in the political, public and private sectors by the year 2005. This is an ambitious target for, according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the proportion of women involved in politics world-wide declined from 12.1 per cent in 1985 to 11 per cent in 1995. The situation throughout Africa is especially bleak for, as the following table indicates, with the notable exceptions of Mozambique, Seychelles, South Africa, Eritrea and Uganda, most African countries fall well below the world average.

This article sets out a comparative study of the defences of compulsion and necessity in selected African nations and under the Statute of the International Criminal Court. The aim is to produce the best formulations of these defences for possible adoption by the African nations concerned.

In many states, more developed or less developed, the general populace does not seek redress through the court system, does not have access to legal interpretation of constitutional provisions, and is little affected by juridical decisions concerning human rights, To the majority in the Third World, dispute resolution through customary law may be of more relevance, and what matters most to the average person is how she or he is affected by the planning and daily practice of government and other bureaucratic institutions. This paper will review some aspects of political and economic development in Tanzania and Kenya since their attainment of independence from Britain, and will attempt to relate their experience to international agreements for the promotion of human rights.

The Constitutional Court of South Africa recently handed down a judgment on the extension of the common law definition of rape to include anal penetration of women, but not of men. The court argued that women form part of the most vulnerable group in society. This article analyses the court's judgment and argues that the court should have included anal penetration of men in the light of South African lower courts' decisions, international law and the fact that there is currently a law before parliament which pertains to the anal penetration of men. The article also argues that the court should have taken into consideration that this case involved a child, who is also from the most vulnerable group in society.

The creation for the island of St. Helena of a marriage law destined to become the model for marriage ordinances throughout the British Empire has been dealt with in an earlier issue of this Journal. Celebration upon certificate from the Registrar either before the Registrar or in a licensed place of worship by an authorised minister in accord with the “Rogers formula”, (after the draftsman of the St. Helena law) was to become the standard for marriages in the colonies. The adoption of the St. Helena model in Ceylon, with some embellishments, has also been described. Further refinements were then made in the use of the model for Hong Kong.

In November 1993, in the case of NPP v. Inspector-General of Police, Archer, CJ., in striking down Ghanaian legislation providing for the licensing of peaceful assemblies, stated rhetorically:

“… police permits are colonial relics and have no place in Ghana in the last decade of the twentieth century. …Those who introduced police permits in this country do not require police permits in their own country to hold public meetings and processions. Why should we require them?”

Over the last three years, possible justifications for the retention of laws requiring that a permit be obtained prior to holding a peaceful assembly have been examined and rejected by the courts of Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zambia as well as Ghana. In all four jurisdictions such laws were struck down as unconstitutional as being contrary to the fundamental right to freedom of assembly and, additionally, in Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zambia, the right to freedom of expression. This article assesses the interpretation by the courts of the relevant limitation clauses under the respective constitutions and raises the question of why, within the space of 12 months, courts in West, Southern and East Africa, although unaware of each other's decisions, reached the same conclusion on a law which had been present on the statute books since colonial times. It is suggested that these series of cases signify a turning point in the development of constitutional law in Commonwealth Africa with respect to civil rights.

In Ghana most land cases are determined according to Ghanaian customary law. One question, however, has since early colonial times always been decided by common-law principles: the question whether a party is estopped by previous litigation from making a claim.2 Thus a court often applies common law to determine whether an issue may be raised, and then, having given an affirmative answer, applies customary law to determine its validity. The courts have never stated any legal justification for this application of common-law rules in essentially customary-law cases. The early colonial judges, perhaps because they were British lawyers, seem to have regarded the matter as self-evident. Later judges followed the earlier decisions, and since 1960 statute law has for convenience confirmed the practice.3

In Tanganyika, Uganda, and Zanzibar all trials in the High Court take place with the aid of Assessors. The same rule applies in Kenya, except in the case of Europeans, when the trial is before a judge and jury. In trials with the aid of Assessors, as in the case of trial by jury, at the conclusion of the evidence and the addresses on behalf of the prosecution and the defence the Judge may sum up to the Assessors the evidence for the prosecution and the defence. In the relevant section in all four Criminal Procedure Codes the word preceding the words “sum up” is “may”. That is to say, there is no statutory obligation on the trial Judge to sum up the evidence, but, as said in Washington v. R. (1954), 21 E.A.C.A. 392, it is a very sound practice which is almost invariably followed by Judges in East African territories except in the very simplest cases. Furthermore, as held in R. v. Lute (1934), 1 E.A.C.A. 106, in all but the clearest cases, it is desirable that the Judge should make a note of the points put to the Assessors in such summing up, and the evidence which he has stated as supporting or otherwise each point.

Representatives of Australia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Yemen meeting in Mauritius in March, 1997, adopted this Charter whose primary aim is the “sustained growth and balanced development of the region and of the Member States”. The main provisions of the Charter are set out below:

To launch a new journal is an act of faith; it is also an act of recognition. An act of faith, because the editors and publishers of the journal will naturally ask themselves where the readership is to come from, which is to make the journal viable. An act of recognition, because the new journal officially marks, at least in the minds of its begetters, the recognition that a new area of theoretical study or practical action has now defined itself, which has hitherto been unrecognised or insufficiently provided for by the journals already in existence. As the first editor of this Journal, and the only member of the original Editorial Committee still serving the Journalin that capacity, I may be permitted to indulge in a personal reflection on the motives and background to the launching of the Journal of African Law in 1957.

The Land Use Act, 1978 is, indeed, a “giant-killer”. In the recent case of Savannah Bank of Nigeria Limited and Another v. Ammel Ajilo and Another a learned Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria seized the opportunity to indict a doyen of the Nigerian Bar for a seeming misapprehension of the revolutionary effect of the Act on the land tenurial system of the country. But we hasten to point out that the Act is not the problem child only of the Bar, for the Bench is not free from the same misapprehension for which this learned gentleman of the Bar was indicted. Indeed, there is mounting evidence from the conflicting opinions of our courts on the Act that the latter is the “Achilles' heel” also of the Bench. One glaring instance: while the Supreme Court in recognition of group holdings under customary law conceded communal title to a right of occupancy under the Act to a community in the case of Chief S.U. Ojeme and Others v. His Highness Momodu II and Others the Court of Appeal expressed the contrary view in the subsequent case of L.S.D.P.C. and Others v.

The courts in Ghana and Nigeria apply indigenous customary law in a large proportion of cases, particularly those involving family relationships or land. During the past century the courts have done much to clarify this law and adapt it to rapidly changing social conditions. One such adaptation is the subject of this article. The English doctrine of acquiescence has been imported to fill what appeared in new circumstances to be a deficiency in the customary land law. The doctrine had been used to perform functions different from those which it has performed and is performing in English land law. This article seeks to compare the different characteristics the doctrine has assumed in the three countries, and to draw some conclusions from the experience of Ghana and Nigeria.

“To the trained eye of a civilised community there is undoubtedly a considerable difference in the two designs set side by side and the one would hardly be likely to be mistaken for the other, but while broad principles laid down in English cases should be applied, the trade marks laws in this country should be administered with regard to local conditions…with a view to protecting not only a vast illiterate population little acquainted with pictorial representations but also the pioneers of trade who have earned a reputation among these illiterate folk by the quality of goods associated with some recognised mark such as a particular bird, animal, tree or other object…”2

Corporate criminal liability is a problematic concept, especially where it is based on an exceptionable principle such as vicarious liability. This is the case with the South African model. This article seeks to demonstrate that this model requires substantial modification because it compels the court to adopt the incoherent exercise of holding a corporation (which is a distinct person) liable for the intentional act (crime) of any of its agents, whether or not there is criminal intention on the corporation's part and whether or not it was aware of, or could have prevented the commission of the offence. It is submitted that it is more appropriate to hold a corporation liable only where it has been established that the course of conduct that resulted in the offence was encouraged or tolerated by persons who embody the corporation (usually sufficiently empowered managers or members of the board of directors).