What are the prospects for effective global governance? It is widely held that global governance is a public good, but what are the political factors that are likely to ensure its provision? Is the USA able or willing to able to provide it? Can international institutions, norms, or causal beliefs, in the absence of US leadership, fill in?

Although any typology of constructivism might be arbitrary, there are, broadly speaking, two distinctive constructivist approaches in security studies as well as International Relations (IR) according to their different meta-theoretical stances: conventional constructivism, on the one hand, and critical constructivism on the other. Indeed, regarding how to understand state identity which is integral to national security, there has meta-theoretically been fierce contention between conventional and critical constructivist security studies. In not ignoring but slightly toning down this contention operating at the abstract level, this article aims to present a pragmatic application of the two different (or conflicting) constructivisms to capturing a more complete picture of state identity formation in substantive empirical research of constructivist security studies. The pragmatic approach is that, without being immersed heavily in the meta-theoretical strife between the two seemingly conflicting constructivist camps, both constructivisms should be treated as different analytical frameworks for examining different (internal and external) faces of state identity formation: the external construction of state identity can be well addressed by conventional constructivism, while the internal one by critical constructivism. In this sense, the relationship between conventional and critical constructivism can be understood as not conflicting but complementary in empirical research, as both constructivisms enrich and deepen our understanding of state identity formation in different ways.

Urban Chinese today do not appear to trust foreign countries. Why are they so suspicious? Over the past quarter century, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has utilized its educational and propaganda systems to produce historical narratives of imperial China's beneficence towards its East Asian neighbors, and of an early modern ‘Century of Humiliation’ at the hands of ‘imperialist’ foreign powers. Qualitative analysis of Chinese social media today suggests that these narratives are tied to widespread popular distrust of China's ‘ungrateful’ East Asian neighbors and the ‘hegemonic’ West today. Interrogating a 2012 survey of urban Chinese, this paper explores the sources of international attitudes quantitatively. It first examines whether Chinese today do indeed distrust foreign countries. It then tests two hypotheses about the drivers of Chinese distrust towards the world today. A ‘top-down’ socialization hypothesis holds that political (e.g. party propaganda via education and the media) and/or social (e.g. peer groups, social conformity) pressures shape the international attitudes of the Chinese people. A ‘bottom-up’ psychological hypothesis, by contrast, holds that individual differences like age and gender shape Chinese attitudes. We find substantial support for the former: more years of education are associated with levels of dis/trust in foreign countries in the socially or politically appropriate ways. However, we also find that ‘bottom-up’ individual differences in subjective interest in international affairs interact with ‘top-down’ socialization processes like education and media exposure in shaping the international attitudes of urban Chinese today. The prevalence of public discourses of distrust towards foreign countries does not bode well for Chinese foreign policy in the twenty-first century.

The central theme of Japanese subnational governmental study has been center–local relations. Researchers looked into the question of whether Japanese subnational governments have sufficient autonomy to pursue their own preferences. In other words, the policymaking process of subnational governments in Japan has long been examined in relation to the national government. It is true that, under the centralized governmental system, the national government of Japan exerts a substantial influence on subnational policymaking. Students of subnational governments cannot avoid this issue. However, one cannot understand the reality of subnational policymaking only by looking at the center–local relations and the administrative institutions that define the relations. Indeed, one needs to ask what determines subnational policy outcomes, to what degree the national influence affects the determinants, and under what conditions these determinants function autonomously. The present paper directly examines the subnational policymaking process itself, not the center–local relations, and tries to understand its mechanism. The paper proposes a research framework using a statistical method that has been developed in the area of diffusion study. In the framework, national influence is integrated into an analysis of subnational policymaking as one of the factors that affect policy determinants. Using the framework, the paper analyzes the process of four regional policies, which will lead to a better understanding of subnational policymaking.

The year 1997 was critical for Thailand. A severe economic crisis hit in July calling into question years of economic growth and increasing prosperity. A few months later Thailand adopted a new Constitution that aimed at reforming the political system, and at making corruption and vote buying less prevalent. While this article shows that the economic turmoil was a prime catalyst for political change, it was not as simple as saying that public outcry over the economic crisis forced conservative parliamentarians into voting to accept the proposed constitution. While public outcry did matter, what is vitally important is that elite political leaders, the heads of the major parties, ministers, and generals, were renegotiating their alliances and ties both with one another, and with various groups in society that were pushing for change. Elite resignation to political pressure and policy shifts among the top leaders is what ultimately allows for the passage of the constitution and for Prime Minister Chavalit's departure. This article takes a closer look at Thai politics and tries to answer the following questions: Did the economic crisis lead to (meaningful) political reform and why or why not? Since the codification of the 1997 constitution has Thai politics become more democratic? It is my analysis that the consolidation of democracy was in reach in 1997 but today has slipped further from Thai citizens' grasp. The explanations, or the independent variables for both the successful reforms of the political system in 1997 and the backsliding away from democratization, are largely the same. When both internal and external pressures prod democracy along, reforms take place. When pressures are pushing in different directions democratic reforms become threatened. Internal pressures include the military, civil society, and the behavior and power of political and economic elites; and external ones are the IMF, national security concerns, and globalization in general. When conditions or variables change, and when elite priorities or preferences shift, as this article will show, we can see the results in Thai politics.

This paper, the first step of a project aiming at analysing the establishment of practices of resident participation and consultation in urban renewal in China, proposes a reflection upon these practices through a comparison with similar experiences in France. Identifying some convergences between the practices adopted in the two countries, the paper proposes to reflect upon such puzzling outcomes, provocatively questioning the classic distinction between authoritarian and democratic regimes. It suggests that our analyses and interpretations shall get rid of classical binary categorisations between regime types to embrace a comparative analysis of the policies and practices introduced in various local contexts, and reflect upon their underlying logics. In so doing, the paper engages with He and Warren's concept of ‘authoritarian deliberation’ as well as with the critiques expressed by a number of French scholars on concepts such as ‘participative democracy’ and ‘good governance’. Such a focus on the underlying logics rather than on regime types will show that the concept of ‘authoritarian deliberation’ does not only apply to authoritarian contexts. Rather, it represents a fruitful starting point to analyse and reflect upon instances of participation and deliberation in both democratic and authoritarian countries.

The changing trust that Chinese students who study in Taiwan exhibit toward the Chinese government is a critical, but rarely explored topic, which is crucial for maintaining the sovereignty of Taiwan. I conducted a panel study and adopted a political socialization approach, proposing and verifying five hypotheses based on the theories of cognitive dissonance, assimilation, social contact, and social identity. The results indicate that compared with the average score for political trust that Chinese students exhibit at the time of arrival in Taiwan, the scores obtained four months later significantly declined by 0.09. Specifically, 50% of students exhibited a decreased level of political trust, whereas 33% exhibited an increased level of trust. The regression model developed in this study explains 23.6% of the variance in the changes in the political trust of Chinese students studying in Taiwan. In addition, five hypotheses were empirically supported.

Economic development and the social changes it brings are changing people's world views among the East Asia Confucian societies. Most notable is a change from stressing hard work and achievement toward stressing enjoyment, self expression, and a fulfilling lifestyle. With this people also have become more pro-equality and tolerant toward different ideas and styles. These newly emerged views of modernized societies can be called ‘postmodern’ values. People with stronger postmodern values are more active politically, more assertive in demanding individual and political rights, and more emphatic in their preference for democratic government. The implication is that people in East Asia will demand more democracy as economic development proceeds and as they acquire these postmodern values.

This paper starts out with a theoretical argument, based on panel data, that public mood in general and societal pessimism in particular should be measured from an explicitly temporal perspective. Next, based on a survey among more than 200 Japanese students and a wide array of existing (longitudinal) data sources in three different languages and covering several decades it is shown that public mood in three quite different countries – first and foremost Japan, but also the United States and The Netherlands – is quite apprehensive. In all these three countries societal pessimism can be observed during the past quarter century. Finally, utilizing a MDSD approach a few possible tentative explanations for this observed pessimism are sought.

Two lines of argument seem to stand solidly without seeing eye to eye with each other about the current world order. Steven Pinker, the American psychologist, writes about the steady reduction in human violence in settling disputes among humankind (Pinker, 2012). John Mearsheimer, the American political scientist, writes about the structurally almost inevitable conflicts of interest between great powers in the early twenty-first century in his analysis of hegemonic competition between the United States and China (Mearsheimer, 2005). It is not necessary to note that their arguments are made looking at conflicts of interest and use of violence from very different angles and time ranges. Yet their differences are stark and clear. Pinker says that the future is bright and shining due to the non-use of violence. Mearsheimer says that the future is dark and potentially devastating due to the consequences of the high tensions surrounding the conflicts of interest. The question posed at the outset is thus: Is the current era one of peace or war?

How do contemporary publics understand happiness? What makes them experience it? Do conceptions and sources of their happiness vary across culturally different societies? This paper addresses these questions, utilizing the 2008 round of the AsiaBarometer surveys conducted in six countries scattered over four different continents. Analyses of these surveys, conducted in Japan, China, and India from the East; and the United States, Russia, and Australia from the West, reveal a number of interesting cross-cultural differences and similarities in the way the people of the East and West understand and experience happiness. Specifically, the former are much less multidimensional than the latter in their conceptions of happiness. Yet, they are alike in that their sense of relative achievement or deprivation is the most pervasive and powerful influence on happiness.

This study analyzed public opinion data for the 45 societies from the latest World Values Survey and found that Internet use promotes democratic support in democratic countries but not in authoritarian countries. In advanced democracies, democratic ideas and thoughts are freely produced and disseminated in cyberspace, and Internet users tend to absorb them. On the other hand, this online content is highly controlled by authoritarian governments in non-democratic settings, and Internet users are likely to be exposed to pro-government messages and entertainment, thereby nullifying the democratic utility of Internet use. These different social learning processes result in a global reinforcement effect of Internet use on democratic support. The results confirm that the Internet is a neutral technology and its effect depends on the political environment where it is used.

Does direct democracy enhance political efficacy? This article examines the effect of direct democracy on political efficacy. Normative theorists have suggested that direct democracy has educative effects on citizens, such as promoting political efficacy. While a number of studies have examined the corresponding hypothesis, their empirical findings are not clear-cut. This study attributes the inconsistent results to two problems of the existing studies: the employment of cross-sectional data and the heterogeneity of popular vote issues. This study closes this gap by examining the effect of direct democracy in local politics on political efficacy in a more systematic and controlled way. More concretely, it utilizes the Japanese case: In the first decade of this century, more than 400 Japanese municipalities held a popular vote for the first time because the Japanese national government promoted municipal merger. Therefore, the Japanese case provides multiple popular votes on comparable substantive topics that can be conceived as an homogeneous treatment. By applying multilevel modeling to panel survey data, this study demonstrates the causal effect that the popular vote increases the level of internal political efficacy.

Previous studies on economic convergence have been handicapped by the lack of sufficient serial data. Real GDP per capita are now available for 56 states. With some interpolation, we create series from 1870 to 1992 for Northern (developed countries) and Southern (lesser developed countries) aggregates. The data are explored by extending the leadership-long cycle perspective to deal with convergence. We find that North–South inequalities, at least those based on GDP per capita data, have been expanding. The corresponding growth rates reveal long waves, providing an important clue related to iterations of radical technological changes and their incomplete diffusion in explaining the North–South gap. We believe that convergence is unlikely any time soon without radical restructuring of global economic growth prospects.

India is a large country with 29 states as constituents in its federal structure. The large and growing population imposes great pressure on available natural resources. Disputes arising out of contested river water entitlements between states are common and often intractable. Laws conceived for settling such disputes were created for a particular socio-political environment characterized by strong Centre and relatively non-assertive states. The paper argues that this political configuration has changed dramatically and in turn has reduced the efficacy of the existing statutory mechanisms. A new paradigm for dispute resolution is required. The existing institutional mechanism and its political environment are examined and the structural changes identified. A set of reforms in the dispute resolution mechanism is proposed, which would reduce the friction between the statutory mechanism and its operational environment.

This research tests if political discussion influences policy preference. The literature greatly stresses the non-rational nature of political decision-making. Rational policy preferences require learning specific details in a competitive political environment. Yet, research shows that most people do not have the skills to understand policy. Social networking is one way to help people understand policy. Social network influence on policy preferences, however, is mostly ignored. We show that the likelihood of supporting a policy increases when one's social network supports a party that advocates that policy. We control for the political knowledge of the respondent, network size, partisanship, ideology, socioeconomic, and policy-specific determinants. Examining data from the 2000 American National Election Study and Japanese Election Study 3, we find strong results in the United States, but mixed results in Japan. Additional research we perform shows a stronger social network influence in Japan.

The importance of citizen deliberation in democracy is widely recognized today and the current digitalized and more fragmented society may benefit from discussions among people with diverse opinions in a well-organized setting. At the same time, concerns have also been raised about inequality in deliberative participation. We narrowed our focus to gender equality and examined whether introducing an evidence-driven style of deliberation can mitigate gender inequality in policy deliberation. In our repeated measure (within-subjects) experiment, university students in Japan discussed divisive policy issues during two sessions. Half of the participants started the discussion by examining factual information about the topic (evidence-driven style) and the other half started the discussion by expressing opinions about the topic (verdict-driven style). In the second session, the two groups switched styles. We found a statistically significant gender gap in participatory contribution for the verdict-driven style, but no such gap existed for the evidence-driven style. Using causal mediation analysis, we also found that, compared with the verdict-driven style, the evidence-driven style of deliberation reduces the gender gap by lowering women's tendency to agree with men. One possible explanation from the viewpoint of gendered communication is that women were more confident in evidence-driven deliberations. This psychological effect is a factor that is harder for facilitators to control and thus the evidence-driven style can be effective even with the presence of facilitators. This paper demonstrates the importance of studying how deliberations are conducted and how deliberation styles can affect the content and the consequences of policy deliberations.

What explains South Korean public opposition for refugees and does the public differentiate among groups? Although a sizable literature addresses perceptions of North Korean arrivals, few studies directly compare sentiment for this group to others. Using an original web survey with an embedded experimental design, we find clear greater support for accepting North Korean arrivals compared to both non-ethnic Korean refugees and Muslim refugees. Additional analysis finds clear majorities view Islam as incompatible with Korean values. Our results suggest the challenge of encouraging multiculturalism in the largely homogeneous country.

This study examines the extent to which there has been a rise in ideologically based politics in Japan due to the decline in factionalism in the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The study is based on two cases studies. The first is based on the notion of ‘Koizumi's children’ recruited by former Prime Minister Koizumi and his allies, who were heavily discouraged from joining a faction. The second model is based on an analysis of a junior MP groups which have played a role in the internal management of the LDP independent of established party organizational structures.