Postwar Poland has experienced relatively great economic instability and recurring political upheavals, at least by East European standards. Recent dramatic developments include a severe economic crisis following an extended period of spectacular growth. The collapse of the once popular leadership of Edward Gierek, the creation of the first independent trade unions under a communist regime, and the replacement of party with military rule bear witness to the severity of Poland's political disruptions. Have economic or political factors caused the economic crisis? Which are the critical factors? Escalating internal political tensions and enormous external political pressures have caused Poland's current economic collapse, preventing the successful implementation of adjustment policies. The underlying sources of these political forces–namely, worker disillusionment with communist practices and confrontational relations between the superpowers–have not eased to date; the current malaise is likely to continue for some time.

Examination of the literature on the influence of the secretary-general forcefully suggests two conclusions about that literature: It is large and growing rapidly, yet tihere is little in the way of systematic explanation of the behavior of the secretary-general. The scholarly literature is filled with statements that tell us the kindls of things we should be studying (for example, superpower rivalries and the “special right” of the secretary-general), but what they represent are alternative research concerns. They do not constitute conceptual tools for empirical analysis that would help us devise and evaluate propositions setting Ifortti relationships about human action in tihe context of international organizations. No doubt these studies have added to our descriptive knowledge of the secretary-general, and this knowledge possibly alerts us to complex processes at work in and out of the United Nations. Yet two qualifications must be noted. First, the identification of complexity should be the beginning and not the end of empirical inquiry. Second, the actual value of descriptive knowledge remains problematical when it is presented without clarifying the generalizations used as criteria to select facts. Without explicitness we have no way of validating the reliability of criteria used for sorting out “important” information. We are placed in the position of not being certain that the particular study contains all relevant information and not knowing whether the information presented is relevant.

How have market and state shaped the long-term coevolution of economic performance and social protection during the nineteenth century and post–World War II waves of globalization associated with British laissez-faire liberalism and U.S.-embedded liberalism? Under the impulse of seemingly ever-intensifying globalization, this question is emerging at the core of a novel body of political economy research that seeks to compare the two waves of globalization to draw useful lessons from the past. This research also reflects the concerns recently voiced by neoliberals and neointerventionists about the long-term stability and viability of post–World War II embedded liberalism. Satisfactory investigations of how market and state shape the long-term coevolution of economic performance and social protection in the two regimes remain lacking. Cointegration analyses of the two hegemonic powers that shaped the evolution of the two regimes—nineteenth-century Great Britain and post–World War II United States—demonstrate that the complementarity of market and state in embedded liberalism is associated with better long-term economic performance and social protection.I thank the following people for their help and support in developing this project: Katarina Juselius, Soren Johansen, Mike Artis, Ilijan Georgiev, Suzanne Perry, Ed Mansfield, Dennis Quinn, Lars-Erik Cederman, Ron Jepperson, Mark Kesselman, Luis Moreno, Martin Rhodes, Benedicta Marzinotto, Ron King, David Clinton, and the participants in the Nordic Project funded by the Danish Social Sciences Research Council. Two anonymous reviewers provided valuable suggestions. A Jean Monnet Fellowship from the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute provided financial support for the project. Any errors are my own.

A key piece of conventional wisdom among scholars of modern armed conflict is that collateral damage is often strategically costly in war. Yet most combatants already know this and take actions after mistakes—most prominently, the distribution of “condolence payments” to civilian victims—in order to mitigate these costs. Do these payments work? This question is important not only for policymakers but also for deeper theoretical debates about how civilians respond to combatant signals in war. To examine these issues, I use micro-level conflict event data on 4,046 condolence payments made by Coalition forces to civilian victims during the Iraq War from 2004 to 2008, matching it with corresponding data on collateral damage and insurgent violence. The results of this analysis reveal that post-harm compensation does significantly diminish local rates of insurgent violence, and that this is true across different types of payments (cash handouts or in-kind assistance). Ultimately, these patterns can be best explained by a rationalist mechanism in which civilians update their beliefs about violent events based on new information about combatants’ wartime intentions. The results thus provide a compelling strategic rationale for combatants to compensate their victims in war, and suggest that civilians are not blinded to new information about conflict dynamics by their preexisting biases.

Although evidence shows that territorial disputes fundamentally shape relations among states, we know surprisingly little about when territorial claims are made. We argue that revisionist states have incentives to make territorial claims when the great powers that manage the system are in crisis. We identify five main sources of systemic instability and develop measures of each of them, demonstrating that the majority of territorial claims in Europe are drawn at times when regional great powers are embroiled in crisis, for example, 1848 or 1870 during the nineteenth century. The claims that emerge at these times are not necessarily among states involved in the crises that generated turmoil (e.g., Prussia and France in 1870). We use a newly developed spatial measure of historical boundary precedents in Europe from 1650 to 1790 to demonstrate that the effect of this known spatial correlate of where claims are drawn matters only when the European system is in crisis. We further demonstrate that this claim-timing pattern is general to the global system of states. In the appendix we corroborate our explanation of our findings with a detailed case study of the territorial claims that led to the contemporary Italian state's formation.

It was generally appreciated when the United Nations was created that changes would occur in the international scene and chat over the years these would affect the functioning of the world organization. The UN was indeed constructed for the purpose of dealing with problems of change and for channeling these along peaceful lines. It was expected chat the relationships between the powers would vary, that the membership would grow, and that the issues of peace and security would not be static.

Our understanding of the roles of Secretaries-General of regional international organizations can be enhanced by the use of a four-part framework, derived from studies of the secretariats of the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the International Labor Organization. This framework emphasizes the legal-institutional authority granted the office; the material and non-material resources available to the incumbent; the effects of splits among the organization's members; and the personal qualities and beliefs of the officeholder. Use of it helps to provide an up-to-date assessment of the role of the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and an analysis of some of the reasons for the powerlessness of the position. All four of the above-mentioned factors have contributed to the continued weakness of the OAU's head.

Since 1973 the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has emerged as a working governmental cartel with formidable leverage over international economic relations and Middle Eastern politics. Over the next decade, OPEC will continue to operate as an effective cartel able to maintain real oil prices at least at or near the levels achieved in 1973–74. Expected world oil demand levels will be high enough to obviate substantial economic threats to the Organization's cohesion. Nor are potentially contentious political or ideological issues likely to be pursued by major OPEC members with sufficient vigor to jeopardize the cartel. Of cardinal importance is the fact that only Saudi Arabia is in a position to break the cartel unilaterally. Such Saudi action is highly improbable in the medium term, though after 1980 Saudi leverage will increase and raise with it the utility of oil-production rates as a diplomatic weapon.

Development policy is analyzed by liberal models in terms of bargaining transactions between interest-maximizing actors and by the dependency perspective in terms of the internalized requirements of worldwide capital accumulation. Both approaches assume the working of capitalist rationality in dependent nations. In contrast, a focus on productive relations, class alliances, and political coalitions reveals the constraints on developmental policies in nations built around the partial development of capitalist productive forces and occupying a subordinate role in the international division of labor. Analysis of the Venezuelan auto policy during the Pérez administration (1974–79) shows the relations constituting socially defined actors and the structures underlying the policy bargaining process. It posits that in Venezuela there is a growing disjuncture between the internationally conditioned requirements of capital accumulation and the locally based demands of social reproduction; that the common interest of state and bourgeoisie in maintaining the rentier basis of the economy shapes the direction and extent of industrial development; and that circulation of petrodollars has absorbed production as a phase of circulation. The struggle between state and transnational corporations over local engine manufacture, and the tension between import substitution and export promotion, concealed an underlying conflict between rent appropriation and capital accumulation.

The 1972 decision of the Norwegian people to reject admission to the European Community has raised some fresh questions about the Nordic countries and Nordic integration. Was the Norwegian decision a protest vote on mainly domestic grounds? Or was it a rejection of the whole structure, system, and ideology of the European Community—as having grown too bureaucratic, too self-centered, and too concerned about economic gains and trade and growth rates rather than about human values? Yet, if the Community was no longer an attractive alternative, what were Norway's other alternatives? The ocean-oriented, outgoing Norwegians could hardly have turned isolationists. Should we read the Norwegian referendum as a “yes” to Nordic cooperation rather than as a “no” to continental Europe? Whatever tipped the scales in Norway's 1972 referendum, the so-called Nordic alternative seems bound to become more prominent in Scandinavia, since Norway has reached a Swedish-modelled trade agreement with the European Community as a substitute for membership.

Do normative arguments change what political actors do and if so, how? Rather than using the pure force of abstract moral reasoning, states often try to move the locus of contestation to an arena where they can make practical progress—the evidence or the empirical facts in support of their argument. This paper analyzes how states try to bolster their position first by constructing an argument in which an action represents part of their argument and then by performing that action to make the argument seem more convincing. I call this mechanism rhetorical adduction. The paper challenges theories of communication that deny a causal role to the content of normative arguments and diverges from a leading view on argumentation that arguments have their effects through persuasion. Integrating strategic argumentation theory with theory from psychology about how people make choices based on compelling reasons rather than cost-benefit analysis, I also use theory from sociology on how people resolve morally complex situations through the performance of “reality tests.” I illustrate the mechanism using a case from the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 when initial resistance to recognizing the putative state of Bangladesh after India's invasion of East Pakistan was reversed as a result of an argument that Indian troop withdrawal meant that international norms were not violated.

Certain relationships among hegemony, international openness, capitalism, and state formation are stipulated by Polanyi, Kindleberger, Gilpin, Krasner, and Wallerstein. Here they are put to question through an examination of the rise and fall of the Yoruba state in the 18th and 19th centuries. In contrast to what widely held theories would predict, the Yoruba state was strengthened through greater exposure to international commerce. Second, from the point of view of African traders, the rise of British hegemony meant a decline in freedom to trade. Third, although the remnants of the Yoruba state were on the periphery of the world economy, its traders were able to penetrate international markets, even during periods of international economic crisis, with considerable success. In light of these findings, some suggestions are made for the reformulation of conventional theories;

As the Allied troops overran the German colonies the First World War British publicists began to debate whether these territories should be returned to Germany, placed under some sort of international control, or sliced up and annexed by the conquering powers. There was little support for the proposal to hand diem back to Germany. In part this was because of the widely held belief that the Germans were guilty of “atrocities” in Africa no less appalling than those committed in King Leopold's Congo Free State before it was annexed by Belgium in 1908. The real question was whether the German colonies should be annexed or “internationalized.” On the left of the political spectrum the Independent Labor Party urged international administration as a means of uprooting imperialism as a cause of war. On the right the conservative press advocated annexation pure and simple as a means of preventing war by strengthening the British Empire. The mandates system itself was a compromise between these opposing ideas. It was viewed by those on the left as a limited triumph in the cause of internationalization; and by those on the right as annexation in all but name.

How do extremist sympathizers respond to counter-radicalization efforts? Over the past decade, programs to counter violent extremism have mushroomed around the world, but little is known of their effectiveness. This study uses social media data to examine how counter-radicalization efforts shape engagement with extremist groups in the online world. Matching geolocated Twitter data on Islamic State sympathizers with granular information on counter-extremism activities in the United States, I find that, rather than deradicalizing, these efforts led Islamic State sympathizers to act strategically to avoid detection. After counter-extremism activities, the group's supporters on Twitter who were in the vicinity of these events began self-censoring expressions of support for the Islamic State, altered profile images and screen names, and encouraged followers to migrate to Telegram, an encrypted network not viewable by the public. These findings reveal previously unknown patterns in the effects of counter-extremism programs in the digital era.

During the 1970s the European Community's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), acclaimed only a decade earlier as prominent evidence of successful integration of member states, manifest major defects. Farm prices to the consumers increased continually, large surpluses of certain farm commodities accumulated, the cost of operating the CAP rose tremendously, and recurring changes of member state currencies made a shambles of the common price and market concept. Several general and specific causes of those problems can be identified. Strongly influenced by powerful national farm lobbies, the member governments have imposed their own interests, often at variance with the “common” interest, upon the Community decision-making framework. The large number of national officials participating in the CAP implementation process has tended to strengthen trends toward policy outcomes undesirable from the Community perspective. More specifically, the main cause for disrupting agricultural price and market unity has been the system of “green” currency rates and the monetary compensatory amounts (MCAs) which have provided the member governments with opportunities to reconstitute national control over farm prices. Fear of domestic political repercussions has restricted the creation of vigorous policies to counter surpluses, and structural improvement of farms, badly needed in some regions of the Community, has been slow.

Since its founding in 1946 the United Nations has experienced a remarkable expansion of membership, growing from the 51 original Members to 117 as of the twentieth session of the General Assembly. Much has been said about the membership question; but this discussion has largely ignored the fact that while the Organization's roster never has included and still does not include all states, it has come much closer to universality than is generally recognized and much closer than the roster itself would indicate.

The international political economy literature on regimes has focused on relations among the industrialized Western countries. Despite the increasing participation of East European countries in international economic organizations, the literature has neglected the subject of East–West economic relations. To redress this void in the literature, this article assesses the extent to which and the conditions under which realism, mercantilism, and regime theory help explain the Western positions toward negotiations between East European countries and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It argues that a thorough explanation requires drawing on insights from all three modes of analysis: realism provides a useful starting point and sets the context, while mercantilism and regime theory enrich the explanation in circumstances in which political issues concerning security subside and trade policy issues surface.