Over one hundred years ago, W. E. B. Du Bois (1899) documented large, pervasive, and persistent racial inequities in health. While the current demography of racial groups in the United States is radically different compared to the times when Du Bois first discussed issues of race and health, many of the significant developments in research on racial differences in health in the last century can be traced to his seminal work (Williams and Sternthal, 2010). Du Bois recognized that the limited access to economic resources and the social marginalization of some racial groups could have dire social, physical, and psychological consequences for them. Current research studies continue to document that racial groups with a long history characterized by economic exploitation and geographic marginalization—Blacks or African Americans, American Indians, and Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders—have markedly poor health outcomes compared to the dominant White population. Immigrant Asians and Hispanics tend to have better health than the U.S. average, but their health tends to worsen over time and across subsequent generations. Despite Du Bois's prescience and the advances made by contemporary researchers, there are many substantive theoretical and methodological challenges confronting scholars who study the health of diverse racial and ethnic groups. This special issue of the Du Bois Review provides a state-of-the-art overview of some of these unanswered questions and critical research directions for the study of racial inequality in health.

Increasingly, African Americans find themselves living side-by-side with immigrant newcomers from Latin America, the largest source of today’s immigrant population. Research on “Black/Brown” relations tends to a priori define groupness in ethnoracial terms and gloss over potential nuance in inter-group relations. Taking an inductive approach to understanding how African Americans interpret the boundaries that result from immigration-driven change, this paper draws on fieldwork among African Americans in East Palo Alto, California, a Black-majority-turned-Latino-majority city, to examine how African Americans construct multiple symbolic boundaries in the context of a Latino-immigrant settlement. Blacks’ rendering of these boundaries at the communal level invokes ethnoracial boundaries as a source of significant division. They see Latinos as having overwhelmed Black material and symbolic prowess. However, accounts of inter-personal interactions evince symbolic boundaries defined by language and neighborhood tenure that render ethnoracial boundaries porous. Respondents note intra-group differences among Latinos, pointing out how the ability to speak English and long-time residence in the neighborhood are important factors facilitating ties and cooperation across ethnoracial boundaries. The findings point to the importance of intra-ethnoracial-group differences for inter-ethnoracial-group attitudes and relations. Adopting ethnographic and survey research practices that treat boundaries as multiplex will better capture how growing intra-ethnoracial-group diversity shapes inter-ethnoracial-group relations.

The size and especially the growth of the Latino population in the United States are associated with anti-Latino and anti-immigrant attitudes. Findings from a recent line of experimental work suggest that Latino growth may also be associated with Whites’ anti-Black attitudes. Racial status threat could account for this association if Whites view Latino growth as a potential challenge to their status within a multi-group system that includes Blacks. Alternatively, or in addition, by engendering instability and uncertainty, Latino growth may promote ideological conservatism, which itself predicts racial attitudes. Building on prior work, this study examines the association between real, local Latino population growth––as opposed to manipulated or perceived growth––and Whites’ anti-Black resentment for a nationally representative sample of White Americans. Using data from the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, the study finds that Whites in counties where the Latino population grew more report stronger anti-Black resentment. They are also more likely to perceive a threat to Whites’ racial status and to endorse ideological conservatism. Perceived threat and conservatism each partially account for the association between Latino growth and anti-Black resentment, suggesting the effect of Latino growth on anti-Black resentment is mediated through both channels.

There is much research on race and schooling focused on punitive discipline, but little attention is paid to how teachers and administrators use minor policies to coerce students to “willingly” adopt hegemonic ideologies, particularly the ones that correspond to Whiteness. In this work, Whiteness is conceptualized as a social concept in which forms of knowledge, skills, and behavioral traits are cultivated for the sake of maintaining White supremacy as the dominant ideology in the social organization of structures and people. My work explores how teachers and administrators use school dress code policies, specifically the policies regarding hairstyles, to indoctrinate Black students into Whiteness. I argue that schools are sites intended to racialize Black students into White society. I argue that dress codes that regulate hairstyles are a form of White hegemony. I ground my work in Antonio Gramsci and John Gaventa’s theoretical views of hegemony to conceptualize how administrators and teachers invoke forms of domination and coercion to force Black students to transform their appearance for the sake of upholding White ideals of professionalism. I offer a critical race conceptual model that articulates how power is enacted upon Black students to further a White aesthetic. The conceptual model highlights how teachers and administrators assign racialized social meanings to different hairstyles and unconsciously or consciously reinforce the idea that Black hairstyles hinder Black students’ performance in the classroom and reduce their future employment opportunities. Contemporary examples of Black students’ experiences in school are cases that validate this model. I argue that dress code policies about hair that incur minor infractions are destructive to Black students’ sense of identity and reinforce Whiteness as the normative frame of civil society.

Since 1981, there has been a sea change in longstanding policies of jus soli, or birthright citizenship, reinforcing the global divide between affluent spaces of whiteness and impoverished spaces of nonwhiteness. I argue that these moves highlight the global system of citizenship as an increasingly consequential aspect of what Charles Mills terms the Racial Contract: the set of agreements, historically explicit and currently tacit, that divides the earth's peoples into full persons—Whites—and subpersons—nonwhites—such that the latter are constitutive outsiders to the political, moral, and epistemological norms that structure the White social world. Mills posits that the present phase of the Racial Contract disconnects present geographies of inequality from the violent history of the earlier phase that brought them into being, thereby moving them outside the realm of redress. I focus on formal citizenship as a central locus of such erasure, using the figuration of the undocumented mother in the controversy over U.S. birthright citizenship as a case study. I argue that the global regime of citizenship perpetuates White supremacy in two ways: first, through a Westphalian map of citizenship, and second, through gendered and raced neoliberal norms of citizenship. The alchemy between these two rationalities both entrenches and hides the violence of the Racial Contract. Building upon Mills' standpoint epistemology, I analyze arguments from both sides of a 1995 congressional hearing on birthright citizenship. I argue that the arguments opposing birthright citizenship exhibit what can be thought of as a White epistemology of citizenship, which relies upon a profound amnesia about the exclusionary and violent history of the global regime of citizenship.

Does President Obama's momentous election victory signify a new, post-racism era in America? Many observers, such as a New York Times science editor, think so. But, unfortunately, this claim is premature for a host of reasons. [1] It took “a perfect storm” of interlocking factors to elect Obama. [2] Many bigots actually voted for Obama. [3] Two logical fallacies underlie this too-optimistic view. [4] Racist attitudes and actions repeatedly occurred throughout the campaign. [5] White Southern and older voters both demonstrated that rank racism remains. [6] Increased turn-out of young and minority voters was crucial. The paper closes by considering what changes in American race relations may take place during the Obama presidency.

The United States today has the highest incarceration rate, as well as the largest number of people living under correctional control more broadly (including probation and parole), than any other country on the globe. The size of the American criminal justice system is not only internationally unparalleled, but it is also historically unprecedented. This apparatus is also deeply racialized. African Americans, Latinos, and indigenous populations (Hawaiian, Puerto Rican, Native American), are all represented in U. S. jails and prisons in numbers dramatically disproportionate to their representation in the population as a whole, and every non-White population is incarcerated at a rate far surpassing that of Whites. Notably, however, while the scale of today’s criminal justice system is unsurpassed and unprecedented, its severe racial disproportionality has always been a defining feature. Only by taking a close look at the long and deeply racialized history of the American criminal justice system, and more specifically at the regularly discriminatory application of the law as well as the consistent lack of equal justice under the law over time, can we fully understand not only why the American criminal justice system remains so unjust, but also why prison populations rose so dramatically when they did.

The more that devalued group members experience stigmatization, the worse their physical and mental health, well-being, and performance will be. However, the effects of stigmatization are often mixed, weak, and conditional. We should expect such variability in how devalued group members respond to stigmatization because resilience in the face of challenges is possible, depending on how stressful stigmatization is for people. Using the transactional model of stress (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984) as an organizing framework, I provide evidence that people will have different reactions to stigmatization depending on primary appraisals—that is, how harmful and self-relevant they appraise it to be—and on secondary appraisals—that is, whether or not they believe that they have the resources to cope with it. My review of the literature suggests that a stronger ingroup identification, stronger identification with a negatively stereotyped domain, chronic beliefs about stigmatization, and beliefs about meritocracy create vulnerabilities to stigmatization because they lead people to appraise stigmatization as more harmful and self-relevant. Furthermore, psychological optimism, a sense of control, self-esteem, as well as high socioeconomic status, a stronger identification with one's ingroup, and positive evaluations of the ingroup create resilience to discrimination because they allow people to perceive themselves as having the resources needed to cope with stigmatization. In conclusion, people will respond to the same potential stressor in different ways, depending on how self-relevant and harmful they perceive it to be and whether or not they perceive themselves as having the resources to cope. Thus, attention should be directed to developing families, communities, institutions, and societies that can provide people with the resources that they need to be resilient.

DNA ancestry testing may seem frivolous, but it points to two crucial questions: First, what is the relationship, if any, between biology and race? Second, how much and why do people prefer clear, singular racial identities over blurred, mixed racial self-understandings, or the reverse? We posit that individuals of different racial or ethnic backgrounds will have different levels of support for this new technology. In particular, despite the history of harm caused by the biologization of race, we theorize that African Americans will be receptive to the use of DNA ancestry testing because conventional genealogical searches for ancestral roots are mostly unavailable to them. This “broken chain” theory leads to two hypotheses, of disproportionately high Black interest in DNA ancestry testing—thus an implicit acceptance of a link between biology and race—and high acceptance among Blacks of multiple heritages despite a preference for evidence of roots in Africa.

To test these hypotheses, we analyze two databases of U.S. newspaper articles, one with almost 6,000 items and a second with 700. We also analyze two new public opinion surveys of nationally representative samples of adult Americans. Most of the evidence comes from the second survey, which uses vignettes to obtain views about varied results of DNA ancestry testing. We find that the media increasingly report on the links between genetic inheritance and race, and emphasize singular racial ancestry more than multiple heritages. The surveys show, consistent with our theory, that Blacks (and Hispanics, to some degree) are especially receptive to DNA ancestry testing, and are pleased with not only a finding of group singularity but also a finding of multiple points of origin. Qualitative readings of media reports illuminate some of the reasons behind these survey findings. We conclude with a brief discussion of the broader importance of DNA ancestry testing.

In the United States, Blacks overwhelmingly bear the brunt of gun violence. While Blacks are more likely to favor gun restrictions than are Whites, the influence of Black gun death on Whites’ attitudes about gun control has not been investigated. We advance a theory to explain White response to Black firearm fatalities: Black gun death is explicitly and implicitly racialized in the public discourse and imagination. The roots of the gun control debate are themselves likewise racialized, and portrayals of Black gun death has the potential to tap latent racial biases among Whites. As a consequence, exposure to routinized Black gun death either fails to move White opinion, or moves Whites to greater support for gun rights. The influence of race on White public opinion is particularly concerning in an era when health officials consider gun death a public health crisis. First, we evaluate this theory with a regression discontinuity (RDD) analysis of the effects of a highly salient gun death of a young Black boy in Chicago on Whites’ opinions about gun control. Relative to White people interviewed before the death, White people interviewed after the death record greater opposition to gun control. Second, we fielded a survey experiment, exposing respondents to the reported gun homicide of either Black or White thirteen-year-old boys. Relative to a control, respondents in the Black death condition are unmoved, whereas respondents in the White death condition report greater levels of support for gun control. Implications are discussed.

In this research, I use theories of framing and social construction to investigate how race and gender are featured in national news coverage of the school-to-prison pipeline, and how policies and practices funnel students from school to the criminal justice system. Results indicate that there are three primary narratives surrounding the school-to-prison pipeline. The first is a narrative that harsh disciplinary practices in schools are irrational and negatively impact all students. The second narrative crafts the school-to-prison pipeline as a social problem for all Black students irrespective of gender. The final narrative emphasizes the impact of exclusionary discipline on Black boys. Each of these narratives functions to erase the experiences of Black girls. Ultimately, I argue that we need to take a more intersectional approach to school discipline policies and take into account how Black women and girls are situated within popular and policy discussions.

Increasingly, scholars have argued that immigration politics are inseparable from racial politics, which implies that organizations and individuals who mobilize around racial group interests influence racial and immigration attitudes and behaviors. How does the racial-political context influence anti-immigration lawmaking? In what ways does this influence vary at different stages of lawmaking? To address these questions, we combine comprehensive datasets of racially conservative organizations and state immigrant legislation and use negative binomial regression to estimate the count of anti-immigrant bills and laws in the fifty states from 1991 to 2010. We find that the presence of racially conservative organizations encourages the introduction of exclusionary proposals, but only in contexts with a Republican-dominated government. At the approval stage, on the other hand, racially conservative organizations foster the passage of exclusionary laws, and this effect is heightened in contexts with a growing foreign-born population or where a majority of voters report anti-immigrant opinions or identify as conservative. This indicates that the institutionalization of the colorblind racial ideology (in the form of racially conservative organizations) resonates with lawmakers, but in a different manner when the stakes are higher. These findings have important implications and challenge previous research on the conditions under which advocacy organizations influence lawmaking and additional forms of group behavior.

The issue of race has followed Barack Obama since he emerged on the national political scene, continuing unabated throughout his successful 2008 presidential campaign. Although the issue of race is not always explicitly acknowledged or discussed by Obama himself, the implications of his successful candidacy for U.S. politics and the ways people in the United States think about race more generally have been of great interest to media pundits, social scientists, and laypersons alike. Race has been considered a substantial barrier to the electoral success of previous non-White political candidates; therefore Obama's success requires reconsideration of how race can be expected to influence political outcomes in the future. In addition, his biracial identity also raises questions about how his role as a prominent cultural figure will affect existing racial categories in the United States. A review of social psychological evidence highlights the importance of understanding the ambivalence that characterizes contemporary racial attitudes, as well as the ways in which definitions of race and racial categories may be changing, in order to understand the impact that Obama could have on the future of racial politics. We conclude that Obama's victory represents a large step in the direction of increasingly positive racial attitudes and more sophisticated public conceptualizations of race, but steady progress in the coming years is not guaranteed. We consider some of the opportunities and obstacles that may affect the trajectory of future gains in the struggle for racial equality in the Obama era.

Michelle Alexander argues that carceral inequality and mass incarceration together have created a “new racial caste system” in America (2010, p. 11). She contends that only a race-conscious social movement that engages both legal actors and the public can dismantle this system of racial control. Unfortunately, very little research has examined views about carceral inequality. Little is known about the attitudes of juvenile and criminal justice workers. We build on and integrate three literatures—scholarship on the framing perspective, comparative conflict theory, and group position theory and racial ideology—to develop a theoretical model of attitudes toward carceral inequality. We hypothesize that race influences the resonance of attributional frames, especially criminal injustice frames, but endorsement of these frames represents the primary factor shaping judgments about whether carceral inequality is a social problem (propriety, urgency, severity and policy frames). For several decades, framing efforts have been underway aimed at mobilizing JCJW to reduce racial disparities in the juvenile justice system. And most offenders first have contact with the state as juveniles. Accordingly, to test our theory, we analyze data on views about carceral inequality in the juvenile justice system—or disproportionate minority contact—among a nationwide sample of justice workers (N = 543). The findings show that race is strongly associated with attributional frames about carceral inequality, and is indirectly related, through attributional frames, to endorsement of propriety, urgency, severity, and policy frames about carceral inequality.

Drawing on two online studies among predominantly U.S.-born and lawful permanent resident Latinxs, we developed a self-report scale intended to capture how discrimination related to perceived legal status, as well as perceptions of racial/ethnic marginalization of Latinxs in U.S. society, are experienced among a wide swath of the Latinx population. We also explore how these processes may be associated with psychological distress in this population. In line with the immigration scholarship that has identified a spillover effect of immigration enforcement and the racialization of legal status beyond the undocumented population, our exploratory factor analysis results from Study I (N = 355 Latinxs) collected in fall of 2013 revealed four factors among our study population: Fear of Deportation, Marginalization of Latinxs in U.S. Society, Marginalization Due to Perceived Illegality, and Fear Due to Perceived Illegality. Results from a confirmatory factor analysis from a separate study conducted in spring of 2016 (Study II; N = 295 Latinxs) provided evidence in support of the structure identified in Study I. Results also revealed evidence of the association between the Stigma of Illegality and Marginalization of Latinxs (SIML) subscales and psychological distress, measured as anxiety and depression. Implications of these findings are discussed.

Few Black women are tenured faculty in academia, and the statistics are quite stunning. The Almanac of the Chronicle of Higher Education (2004–2005) shows that, in 2001, 1% of all faculty at the rank of professor were Black females—only 5% of all females at that rank. The numbers are only slightly better for the rank of associate professor, the only other rank where one is likely to be tenured. Of all faculty at the associate professor level, only 2% are Black women; among women at that rank, only 6% are Black. Of assistant professors, 3% are Black females (7.5% of all female faculty at that rank); Black females comprise 8% of female instructors (4% of all faculty at that rank); and 3% of lecturers (5% of all female lecturers).

While most Americans agree that government officials failed to act promptly to provide food, water, shelter, and other relief to the victims of Hurricane Katrina, they disagree about the racial relevance of this negligence. Nevertheless, the unavoidable images of the storm's disproportionately high number of African American victims among those unable to flee a foretold disaster brought into view the specter of racial inequality. While most theorists and commentators have used race and poverty as the primary lenses through which to view Katrina's human toll, this paper utilizes linguistic rubrics and relative immigration status to address inequities globally suffered by people of African descent. In the case of American Blacks, our emphasis is on Blacks with ancestral ties to enslaved Africans, since those who suffered most in the wake of Katrina were not merely Black, but also direct descendants of American slaves of African origin. Framing the discussion in terms of linguistic ancestry, its relationship to slavery, and instances of (c)overt social and educational apartheid born of statutory racial segregation, I develop a Historical Hardship Index as an alternative way to advance equality in the period after the end of African slave trade. The proposed Historical Hardship Index can be applied—with slight regional modifications—to anyone, anywhere, without reference to race.

This article examines the determinants and the substantive content of racial socialization strategies among African Americans. Existing studies have established that most Black parents socialize their children to race. However, studies have yet to determine whether assimilation trajectories and commitments to Black social heritage influence racial socialization outcomes. This article addresses this void within the context of a new, assimilation-based theory of adult Black identity—the investment in Blackness hypothesis. Findings from a national probability sample of African Americans suggest that there is a relationship between degree of assimilation into the mainstream and racial socialization strategies among parents. The implications of these findings are discussed, as well as suggestions for future research.

In my article, Racialization: A Defense of the Concept, I argue that ‘race’ fails as an analytic category and that we should think in terms of ‘racialization’ and ‘racialized groups’ instead. I define these concepts and defend them against a range of criticisms. In Rethinking Racialization: The Analytical Limits of Racialization, Deniz Uyan critiques my “theory of racialization”. However, I do not defend a theory of racialization; I defend the concept of racialization. I argue that racialization is a useful idea, but I do not advance a theory to explain or predict the phenomena it describes. While Uyan’s critique therefore misses its mark, it raises important questions about the explanatory scope of the racialization concept. Ironically, I may be even more skeptical of the prospects of any general theory of racialization than Uyan. I argue that while we ought to develop theories to explain particular instances of racialization, we should not develop a general theory of racialization, because it is simply too varied in its agents and their intents, the mechanisms through which it operates, and the outcomes it produces. While hope for any general theory of racialisation should be abandoned, I argue that the racialisation concept is still extremely useful. It offers a necessary alternative to race realist concepts, allowing us to point to the wide-ranging effects of belief in race without falsely implying that race itself is real. Uyan does not focus on my arguments against racial realism. However, the theoretical failures and normative risks of racial realism motivate my defense of the racialization concept. In this paper, I reiterate my arguments against racial realism and offer further defense of the concepts of ‘racialization’ and ‘racialized group’.