Attributes and Duration

For most commentators, it goes without saying that attributes are, like God, not subject to duration, and that the problem of duration's appearance is not one that would fall within the sphere of natura naturans. Still, a curious passage found in a letter to Hudde seems to call this all too obvious conclusion into question. On the occasion of explaining the concept of imperfection, Spinoza gives an example pertaining to extension to illustrate what he means by privation. ‘For although extension, for example, may deny thought of itself, this in itself is not an imperfection in it. But if it were deprived of extension, that would show an imperfection in it, as would really be the case if it were limited. Similarly, if it lacked duration, position, etc.’ Not only does duration not carry the stigma of finitude, but it must belong to extension for the latter to attain its perfection. Extension without duration would be imperfect, which is to say that it would lack what was by nature owed to it. How should we understand this enigmatic claim? Doubly enigmatic, in fact, insofar as it invites us to locate the appearance of duration within natura naturans itself and to grant it the status of a property specific to extension, just like position and quantity. Must we conclude from this statement that the attribute of extension is by nature inclined to endure, thereby distinguishing itself from thought to which such a characteristic is not imputed in the letter?

We must first of all note that this property, of which extension cannot be deprived without becoming imperfect, is, unlike position, by no means the privilege of this attribute. Duration is, according to Letter XII, a characteristic of the existence of modes in general, including those of thought. In the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, Spinoza also specifies that ideas have ‘their own duration in the mind’, thereby confirming that extension does not have a monopoly on indeterminate duration.