This chapter sets out to challenge the unity assumptions and to establish the framework for a two-strand theory of mind. It highlights a number of divisions in folk psychology – distinctions we draw between types of belief and reasoning, and tensions in our thinking about the mind and mental explanation. These divisions do not compel us to abandon the unity assumptions; they can be explained away or dismissed as superficial. But, as we shall see, a two-strand theory can account for them in a particularly attractive way. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first looks at divisions in our view of belief, the second at related divisions in our view of reasoning, and the third at some deeper tensions in our view of the mind. Since the purpose of the chapter is to gather data, it will necessarily have a somewhat disjointed character, but connections will emerge as we go on, and by the end we shall have the outline of a tentative two-strand theory of mind.

BELIEF

This part of the chapter reviews some distinctions we draw between different types of belief. There are some features common to all the types surveyed.