Events in the Persian Gulf during 1990–91 brought back fears of large-scale conventional wars suddenly erupting in theaters of perpetual tension such as the Middle East. Although predictions of obsolescence of major wars among advanced industrialized countries hold for the time being, war still seems the ultima ratio for resolving conflict, at least among some states. The Persian Gulf War generated debates, especially in the United States, on the advantages of air power and short wars and the virtue of high spending for sophisticated weaponry, even during a period of relative economic decline. In January 1991, the US decision-makers abandoned their earlier adopted strategies of deterrence and coercive diplomacy against Iraq in favor of “compellence” or active use of military force.

The American deterrence strategy was aimed at preventing Iraq from undertaking further attacks on other states in the region, especially Saudi Arabia, while the compellence strategy was meant to pressure the Iraqi leadership into backing down from its annexation of Kuwait. The behavior of the challenging smaller power during both the crisis and the subsequent war raised doubts about the notion that when confronted with overwhelming force, states would modify their recalcitrant positions. To a certain extent, the Iraqi willingness to suffer incalculable damage at the hands of a multinational force headed by a super power, possessing several times superior technological prowess, military capability, and economic power, showed the limits of applying coercive diplomacy against a determined opponent.