INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter I began my case for several anti-individualistic doctrines regarding the epistemic dimension of communication. After arguing for two doctrines that should be conceded by all sides – AI–K, pertaining to the knowledge dimension of communication, and AI–W, pertaining to the warrant dimension – I went on to argue for a decidedly more controversial anti-individualistic doctrine, regarding the dimension of justification. The anti-individualistic doctrine in question, AI–J, is an implication of the anti-reductionist (AR) approach to the conditions on justified acceptance of testimony, according to which one is justified in accepting testimony in the absence of any defeating reasons. I argued that a particular desideratum favors AR over its reductionist (RD) rivals. In particular, AR but not RD squares with the idea that justified acceptance of testimony makes for a testimonial belief that enjoys a non-negligible degree of distinctly testimonial warrant.

In this chapter I aim to address an objection, owed to Fricker 1994, which aims to show that AR is not ultimately acceptable. According to the objection, AR will regard as justified certain cases in which testimony is gullibly accepted. Since such cases are not cases of justified acceptance, AR should be rejected. Or so Fricker contends.

It is clear that a proper response to this objection will require descending from the heights of the generic and rather abstract considerations presented in chapter 5, to address considerations specific to testimonial belief-fixation.