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Calum Carmichael presents a new perspective on how parables unique to Luke's Gospel were composed. These parables took up moral issues that arose out of conflicts among figures such as Jacob and Esau, Joseph and his brothers, Judah and Tamar as portrayed in Genesis narratives. Providing literary and linguistic analyses, Carmichael demonstrates how Luke, like many of his contemporaries, absorbed the narrative legacy of the Hebrew Bible and used it to express ideas about Jesus. The Joseph story was of particular interest to Luke because Joseph's role during the Egyptian famine resulted in the rescue of his family, thereby giving the Israelite nation a future. Carmichael's radically different approach identifies the influence of ancestral wrongdoing on how Luke portrayed Jesus' moral teaching.
Most of the remedies discussed in this book are personal remedies (apart from the proprietary consequences of rescission). Personal remedies, as the name suggests, are directed at the person of the defendant. The defendant must comply with the court order. By contrast, proprietary remedies are directed at property to which the defendant holds title, not to the person.
Proprietary remedies are difficult to allocate on a functional basis. We have not attempted to do so, as the rationales behind the imposition of proprietary remedies vary, and the criteria for their award are uncertain and contested.
It should be noted at the outset that this chapter does not purport to provide an exhaustive account of proprietary remedies. It is presumed that the reader already has a knowledge of trust law and the principles governing the creation of trusts and equitable liens. What follows is an overview from a remedies perspective.
The availability of proprietary remedies in common law is limited. Even where the defendant has committed a proprietary tort, the common law tends to award damages as a remedy. There is no rei vindicatio, or ability of a plaintiff to demand the return of property from a defendant, at common law. Consequently, the proprietary remedies we discuss in this chapter are equitable in origin.
Anthropologists and cognitive scientists interested in ethics and morality have much to gain from a two-way dialogue that does not shy away from constructive criticism. This chapter seeks to initiate such a conversation through an overview of three lines of recent research in cognitive science: the evolution of human morality from the standpoint of evolutionary psychology; theories that look to social institutions rather than only evolved psychological dispositions for insight into the variability of human moral dispositions; and studies of how responsibility and intentionality are ascribed in cases of wrongdoing. The final section offers some personal reflections on the methodological challenges of inter-disciplinary engagement, drawing on some of the authors’ recent research on morality and change in western Amazonia. It concludes that anthropologists can use experimental methods creatively, as a way of generating new ethnographic insights; although if genuine conversation on an equal footing is to take place, then ethnography must not only inform experimental design but also be employed to redefine concepts and generate theory.
We argue that a taken-for-granted category gives way to a new category when strategic behavior becomes stigmatized. As a result, even bystander firms that have engaged in similar strategic behavior, such as lobbying, will be penalized by their association with the culpable strategic behavior. The extent of their association with the culpable behavior will determine the level of punishment they receive. However, if a trustworthy third party administers a corrective measure, the affected firms can regain their lost legitimacy. The extent of their restoration is proportional to the amount of legitimacy that was lost. We provide empirical evidence for this argument by analyzing the Jack Abramoff case, one of the most notorious corrupt lobbying cases in US history. We find that bystander firms were penalized by shareholders when the corrupt lobbying was revealed. Furthermore, the penalty was more severe for bystander firms that engaged in more lobbying activities and hired more revolving-door lobbyists. We also find that the subsequent legal remedy helped the bystander firms that were penalized the most to recover the most from their losses. We confirm the theoretical notion using the Enron case as well.
This chapter does not purport to provide an exhaustive account of proprietary remedies. It proves a brief remedial overview of how proprietary remedies work. Because proprietary remedies are enforceable against property rather than a specific person, they are advantageous to plaintiffs in the following ways:
Proprietary remedies are enforceable against third parties (except bona fide purchasers for value of the legal title without notice).
Some proprietary remedies (constructive trusts) allow plaintiffs to enjoy appreciations in value of property, or to trace into exchange products
Specific property may be able to be returned (important if property has special value to the plaintiff)
Proprietary remedies confer advantages in insolvency by conferring priority to the plaintiff or taking property out of the insolvent estate.
According to an influential view, using the criminal law against innocent actions or agents is wrong. In this paper, I consider four related arguments against this view: a debunking argument that suggests that the intuitive appeal of this view may be due to a conflation of different ideas; a counterexamples argument that points out that there are many cases in which using the criminal law against innocent actions or agents is justified; a theoretical argument, according to which the force of the reasons for and against using the criminal law is a matter of degree and it is therefore implausible to hold that the latter always defeat the former; and an analogy argument, which holds that it is implausible to maintain that harming innocents is often justified in other contexts but (almost) never in the context of the criminal law.
This paper argues that punitive, nominal, contemptuous, vindicatory, and disgorgement damages (commonly referred to as non-compensatory damages) can be collectively analysed as public interest damages because all these awards are justified by violations of public interests in addition to violations of the claimant's rights. To the extent they are awarded in the public interest, non-compensatory damages feature a distinctively public element in private law. In contrast to compensatory damages, public interest damages are justified by ‘non-correlative wrongdoing’, ie infringements of interests which are valuable to the community rather than to the claimant. This helps us to understand how public interest damages differ from traditional damages awards and why public interest damages should be treated as an exceptional remedy. In support of these claims, the paper offers an original analytic framework of reasons that justify damages awards.
Ancient Egypt, its society, law and belief system were brought into being, and sustained, by the threat and application of violence in the form of cruel and unusual punishments intended unabashedly to intimidate. The ‘Big Man’ role which informs the office of kingship from the outset of Egyptian history, maintains itself on celestial as well as terrestrial levels. The fertility of valley and delta promised untold agricultural riches to the human community if there was general cooperation; it was essential therefore to deter free thought and action by all available means of violent force. Prosperity would come through the plans of a single authority, not the collective debate of a people. Similarly, in Egypt’s sphere of influence whole-hearted subservience was required on pain of violent punishment. From the third millennium BCE Egypt had begun the process of cloning this life to produce a heaven and hell.
Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do. We argue for parity on both counts.
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