We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Online ordering will be unavailable from 17:00 GMT on Friday, April 25 until 17:00 GMT on Sunday, April 27 due to maintenance. We apologise for the inconvenience.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected]
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Considers the international law and practice around asset recovery. Starts with UNCAC Chapter 5 and its genesis, and covers what human rights bodies have said on asset recovery and return. Summarizes the national law of major asset-holding states on recovery and return, and looks at four different models for returning assets to states where they were stolen while avoiding those same assets being re-stolen. Considers some of the complications of asset return where the same networks responsible for stealing them are still in power.
In the concluding chapter, we take stock of the legal developments that are likely to shape the implementation and further development of liability rules and process in areas beyond national jurisdiction. We argue that the developments in relation to state obligations of due diligence, the widening scope of compensable damages and the potential for more inclusive rights of standing, as well as rights for states to take response measures in areas beyond national jurisdiction, provides a strengthened foundation for a more robust system of state responsibility for environmental harm in areas beyond national jurisdiction. In recognizing that the approaches to civil liability in areas beyond national jurisdiction remain underdeveloped, we examine the central challenges that remain, as well as some modest pathways towards stronger legal accountability for environmental harm in the global commons.
Many trusts are established specifically to facilitate investment activity. Many managed investment schemes and most superannuation funds, for instance, employ the legal architecture of the trust. Parties may also create specialised trust structures that are not open to the public in order to arrange their investment affairs. The trust is a convenient device to enable a collection of investor monies under the management control of a party with experience and skills in the business of investing. The need for a trustee to invest trust assets can arise in other circumstances. The most obvious of these is where the trust is expected to exist for some time and has assets that are not specifically nominated in the trust instrument as assets that must be held by the trustee. In this situation, a trustee is likely to be subject to a duty, implied from the circumstances of the trust, to invest unallocated assets. This chapter examines the rules that apply to the investment of trust funds. It takes the statutory regime as its starting point but also illustrates the interplay between the statutory and general law rules that apply in different contexts.
Natural resources trust funds have been employed in the developed world since the 1970s in order to achieve a fair allocation of revenues and promote social growth. This model has been applied recently in developing economies, however lacking transparency and democratic oversight. As a result of increased public spending and depletion of the funds' assets, instead of economic growth, Dutch disease set in when oil prices fell. The World Bank-inspired Chad trust fund is the only of its kind with some external oversight and a contractual obligation by the recipient state to use the fund's earnings for social development. The idea is commendable, but implementation has been slack and if this model is to work in the future the Bank must condition similar loans to full external oversight, otherwise the whole operation will remain a farce.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.