Over the last few years, artificial intelligence (AI) technologies have become embedded in various domains of social life, prompting legislative efforts at both national and international levels. In the European Union (EU), this drive for legislation has been reflected in various legal instruments, notably the proposed AI Act, which is expected to become a global standard through the “Brussels Effect.” This Article argues that while the AI Act will likely produce a Brussels Effect of its own, such an outcome will be accompanied by a side effect that undermines the EU’s ambition to spread legislative text and values in AI governance. Since the AI Act follows EU product safety legislation, its provisions supply limited protection to some of the values the EU policy intends to protect, such as the protection of fundamental rights. These shortcomings are compounded by the EU’s active efforts to shape alternative instruments, such as the Council of Europe’s proposed convention on AI along the lines of the AI Act. As a result, the diffusion of the AI Act as a global standard will have consequences for the EU policy agenda on AI and the conceptualization of the Brussels Effect.

Offshore financial centres have attracted considerable critical attention over the past few decades as havens for lightly taxed funds that circulate outside the regulatory oversight of major financial centres. This article addresses the emergence of an offshore market in US dollars in Singapore from the late 1960s using a range of archival sources to identify the motivations of the host, participant banks and regional rivals. The development of the Asia dollar market is particularly striking because Singapore was not the most likely venue for an Asian offshore financial centre. The main regional financial centre was Hong Kong, but the Hong Kong authorities made a deliberate choice not to host an offshore market in Hong Kong, a decision that was initially supported both by the state and by incumbent banks, although the banks later changed their view as the Singapore market grew. This case thus opens up discussion of the influence market actors exert over regulators when they are engaged in regulatory arbitrage as well as regulatory competition between states. Evidence is also presented about the efforts of the Bank for International Settlements to encourage greater transparency in offshore financial centres in the 1980s.

How can regulators keep up with sea changes in dynamic markets? This article proposes the use of competitive forces to generate innovative regulation. In markets where national, social, cultural, economic or other interests must be maintained in the face of evolving risks, heightened uncertainties and dynamic technological developments, regulators have to learn by doing.

This article proposes the novel concept of intra-regulatory competition (IRC), a powerful method for developing innovative regulatory solutions by staging a contest between different regulatory regimes imposed simultaneously on market participants in a given jurisdiction. The article describes the principles of and justifications for IRC, conditions for its effective implementation, its potential benefits and drawbacks. IRC is analysed against the backdrop of similar concepts such as randomised law, experimental law and inter-jurisdictional competition. Finally, the article argues that the regulation of media content in order to promote cultural pluralism and the regulation of computerised trading in securities and futures markets are fields that are ripe for and compatible with the application of IRC.

This article deals with the exclusion of non-profit-making entities from the right of freedom of establishment of Articles 49 and 54 TFEU. It analyses the historical reasons for this exclusion. It is argued that the exclusion from freedom of establishment is no longer justified on the basis of two elements. Firstly, the development of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice in the fields of competition law, free movement of capital and tax law makes such exclusion systematically no longer tenable. Secondly, a law and economics treatment of non-profit firms as organisations that efficiently provide services in alternative to for-profit firms weakens the reasons for the exclusion. The article proposes a uniform, European notion of non-profit entity based on a law and economics analysis of this type of firm for the purposes of Article 54 TFEU as opposed to possible different national notions. This is followed by a brief analysis of the hypothesis of regulatory competition among jurisdictions for the law regulating the corporate governance of non-profit entities.

Soon we can expect a new type of company: the European Private Company (Societas Privata Europaea – SPE) aimed at small and medium-sized enterprises in the EU. In this article, we analyse how creditors of future SPEs will be protected. In the first part, we identify on a general level how creditors can be protected. Then we turn to the tools used in the different draft versions of an SPE statute (Commission Draft, EP Draft and Presidency Compromise). As these do not cover all aspects of creditor protection, the next part examines how these gaps ought to be filled. Subsequently, we discuss whether, from a normative perspective, creditor protection in the EU should be further harmonised. Overall, we conclude that what emerges is a mixed picture between various levels of European and national rules. This may not be ideal but it may be the price worth paying in order to reach political agreement on SPE law.

After the global financial crisis, systemic risk regulation has taken centre stage. Many consider hedge funds a potential threat to financial stability. Regulating hedge funds, however, is necessarily a transnational challenge because no national government alone can effectively control the systemic risks affecting its economy. This article takes the example of hedge funds for a case study of emerging transnational regulation. After an introduction to hedge funds and the reasons for regulating them, it considers the possible elements of a transnational regulatory regime for hedge funds: transnational industry self-regulation, including such induced by the government, regulatory competition between government regulators, and harmonisation of government regulation. The main conclusions are: self-regulation cannot substitute fully for government regulation in controlling systemic risks caused by hedge funds. Equally, regulatory competition tends to undercut systemic risk regulation. Effective transnational regulation can only be accomplished through harmonisation of government regulation. Such harmonisation is likely to arise if regulation is needed to control systemic risk in global financial markets.

When Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Company (Societas Europaea – SE) became effective on 8 October 2004, it offered existing publicly traded companies, for the first time, a choice between competing company laws, namely the national law of the company's home state and the law of the supranational SE. Using an event study methodology, we analyse a unique dataset of publicly traded firms that have announced to re-incorporate under the SE Regulation.

This essay takes stock of the corporate governance reform efforts in which Italian policy makers have engaged since the beginning of the 1990s. After describing the reform process and its drivers (a concern for Italian equity markets' attractiveness in an increasingly competitive and global framework, scandals, and EC activism) the essay analyses the main reforms to single out what has worked (i.e., what has had a practical positive impact on Italian listed companies' corporate governance) and what has not. After concluding that the corporate governance legal framework has greatly improved as a result of reforms, the essay identifies a number of areas where further steps could be taken to protect investors against the risk of expropriation by corporate insiders. It is also argued, however, that the mother of all corporate governance reforms in Italy would be a change in legal and political culture; legal culture should change so as to put substance over form, function over doctrine. That would be a precondition to effective enforcement of corporate and securities laws. Political culture should change from one that deems it to be the norm for politicians to decide on the allocation of corporate control to one more respectful of property rights. Finally, two modest, bottom-up proposals to help change legal culture in the long run are put forth.

After a slow start, the European Company (Societas Europaea – SE) has become increasingly popular. Besides documenting the growth of this new company type, we examine whether firms choose to incorporate in the SE corporate form because they engage in ‘legal arbitrage’ by exploiting differences in legal rules between jurisdictions. We specify a number of hypotheses on particular legal arbitrage motives. To validate our hypotheses, we use a broad telephone survey among SE users in Germany as well as a simple country-level regression model based on a unique, hand-collected dataset on SE incorporations. We find strong evidence that firms use the SE to mitigate the effect of mandatory codetermination rules. Establishing a one-tier board structure (in jurisdictions that impose a two-tier structure on their national public companies) and taking advantage of the SE's mobility for tax purposes also seem to be driving SE formations. By contrast, our analysis fails to support the suggestion that firms use the SE to shop for the most favourable national company law to fill the gaps in the SE Regulation.

We apply the paradigm of the firm as a nexus of contracts to the debate on regulatory competition vs. unification of law as an alternative way of regulating the business corporation. This approach views the business corporation as a set of coordinated contracts among different parties. Agency problems and related agency costs are the result of this interaction. The economic analysis of corporate law, securities regulation and bankruptcy law identifies law as a means to minimise such agency costs. In this paper, we develop a model where companies are heterogeneous in their preferences about the legal regulation of contractual relationships. We then compare a regime of regulatory competition with one of single supply of regulation and we analyse their relative costs and benefits.

Cross-border forum shopping for a different insolvency law regime has become popular within the European Union in recent years. Yet legislators, courts and legal scholarship react with suspicion when debtors cross the border only to benefit from a different insolvency law system. The most prominent legal tool, the European Insolvency Regulation, is based on the assumption that forum shopping has a negative impact on the functioning of the European Internal Market. This paper questions the hostile attitude towards the phenomenon of forum shopping. It is argued that forum shopping can have beneficial effects both for the company and for its creditors, and that strong safeguards for creditors who oppose the migration are in place. Furthermore, the validity of the COMI approach of the Regulation under the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty is questioned; it is suggested that the current regime needs to be amended. The proposed new system would enable more corporate mobility within the European Union and create more legal certainty for all constituencies at the same time.

Following the ECJ's recent case law on EC freedom of establishment (the Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art cases), regulatory competition for corporate law within the European Union takes place at an early stage of the incorporation of new companies. In contrast, as regards the ‘moving out’ of companies from the country of incorporation, the ECJ once considered a tax law restriction against the transfer abroad of a company's administrative seat as compatible with EC freedom of establishment (the Daily Mail case). For years, this decision has been regarded as applicable to all restrictions imposed by countries of incorporation, even the forced liquidation of the ‘emigrating’ company. This paper addresses the question whether EC freedom of establishment really allows Member States to place any limit on the ‘emigration’ of nationally registered companies. It argues that EC freedom of establishment covers the transfer of the administrative seat as well as the transfer of the registered office and, therefore, that the country of incorporation cannot liquidate ‘emigrating’ companies. In addition, it addresses the question whether a new Directive is needed to allow the transfer of a company's registered office and identity-preserving company law changes. It argues that such a Directive is necessary to avoid legal uncertainty and to protect the interests of employees, creditors and minority shareholders, among others, who could be detrimentally affected by the ‘emigration’ of national companies.

After a short historical introduction, this paper argues that corporate mobility remains a real political issue. To clarify matters, it proposes to distinguish between a formal seat transfer, being the choice of a different legal regime, and a de facto seat transfer that would not affect the applicable company law, the host State not being entitled to apply its company law rules. A future directive should be based on this distinction, prescribing the formalities for the former and stating clearly the consequences of the latter, thereby also defining the limits within which the “general good” can be invoked.

This paper reviews the case for and against mandatory legal capital rules. It is argued that legal capital is no longer an appropriate means of safeguarding creditors' interests. This is most clearly the case as regards mandatory rules. Moreover, it is suggested that even an ‘opt in’ (or default) legal capital regime is unlikely to be a useful mechanism. However, the advent of regulatory arbitrage in European corporate law will provide a way of gathering information regarding investors' preferences in relation to such rules. Those creditor protection rules that do not further the interests of adjusting creditors will become subject to competitive pressures. Legislatures will be faced with the task of designing mandatory rules to deal with the issues raised by ‘non-adjusting’ creditors in a proportionate and effective manner, consistent with the Gebhard formula.