Chapter 3 discusses the concepts of discrimination, sexism and childism. It firstly presents the concept of discrimination under international law. Secondly, it explores the notions of sexism and ‘childism’. It discusses paternalism, child liberationism and the challenge of protecting the girl child while promoting her autonomy rights. It studies theories concerning the interests of children as well as the common vulnerability approach, Arnstein and Hart’s ladder of participation, and the possibility of granting autonomy rights to girls at adolescence. Thirdly, it examines the public/private divide at the international and domestic levels and how it impacts the girl child globally. Chapter 3 thereafter explores the notions of universalism and cultural relativism, as well as the evolving meaning of culture, and their significance for the girl child. In this context, the chapter also analyzes the conceptual division between the Global South and the Global North.

This volume offers a new point of entry into enduring questions about how the law conceives of states and firms. Because states and firms are fictitious constructs rather than products of evolutionary biology, the law dictates which acts should be attributed to each entity, and by which actors. Those legal decisions construct firms and states by attributing identity and consequences to them. As the volume shows, these legal decisions are often products of path dependence or conceptual metaphors like “personhood” that have expanded beyond their original uses. Focusing on attribution allows the volume to consider together an array of questions about artificial entities that are usually divided into doctrinal siloes. These include questions about attribution of international legal responsibility to states and state-owned entities, transnational attribution of liabilities to firms, and attribution of identity rights to corporations. Taken together, the book highlights the artificiality of doctrines that construct firms and states, and therefore their susceptibility to change.

International responsibility law today is in great need of theorizing or, at least, that is the present volume’s argument. This introduction sets the stage for that argument. It unfolds in four steps: first, it clarifies the reasons that led to putting this collection of essays together and explains what it hopes to achieve; second, it introduces the main theoretical challenges addressed in the volume; third, it provides some information about how the book is organized; and, finally, it sketches out the content of its successive chapters and their articulation.