This chapter examines the twin threats of invasion and insurrection that most English tropical colonies faced because of dwindling white migration and the English reliance on bondage and forced migration to populate and build the tropical empire. It focuses on the period between 1675 and 1720, when a series of large-scale slave insurrection plots began to rock English settlements in the Atlantic. It shows how the very real threats of invasion and insurrection shaped these colonies and how the English navigated these twin threats. Ultimately, English settlers and governors in the Caribbean turned to brutal and draconian policies of slave management to maintain their colonies, while English agents in Asia and Africa were forced to rely on others to help them control the enslaved and defend their factories and settlements. Yet, by the end of the seventeenth century, the English in both the East and West Indies had begun to tentatively explore arming the enslaved, turning to their non-European bondsmen to build, populate, and even help defend the empire. Armed slaves became agents of empire.

Military comparison between Hannibal and Scipio began early, with their conversation at Ephesus, 193. First rule of generalship was: stay alive as ‘battle manager’; this had to be balanced by felt need for heroic leadership. Both learned warlike skills from relatives (Scipio grew up with three consular uncles and a consular father), but the biggest lesson was to avoid these men’s premature battle deaths. Army reforms are reviewed; Scipio’s are better attested. In logistics, both faced similar problems, but Hannibal’s isolation meant his challenges were greater. For weaponry, Hannibal had to improvise and recycle. Hannibal’s tactics were superior to Roman at the outset, but Scipio learned from his enemy. Both practised ‘Punic’ deception. Neither shone at siege or naval warfare. Hannibal’s struggle for Italian hearts and minds conflicted with his need to extract supplies. On man management, Scipio’s handling of Pleminius was a blemish. Unlike Scipio, Hannibal never faced a mutiny.

Military comparison between Hannibal and Scipio began early, with their conversation at Ephesus, 193. First rule of generalship was: stay alive as ‘battle manager’; this had to be balanced by felt need for heroic leadership. Both learned warlike skills from relatives (Scipio grew up with three consular uncles and a consular father), but the biggest lesson was to avoid these men’s premature battle deaths. Army reforms are reviewed; Scipio’s are better attested. In logistics, both faced similar problems, but Hannibal’s isolation meant his challenges were greater. For weaponry, Hannibal had to improvise and recycle. Hannibal’s tactics were superior to Roman at the outset, but Scipio learned from his enemy. Both practised ‘Punic’ deception. Neither shone at siege or naval warfare. Hannibal’s struggle for Italian hearts and minds conflicted with his need to extract supplies. On man management, Scipio’s handling of Pleminius was a blemish. Unlike Scipio, Hannibal never faced a mutiny.

Chapter 2 addresses the history of Byzantine Africa 533–46. It argues that the principal challenges to imperial rule in Africa came from within the administration, rather than external pressure from hostile ‘Moorish’ groups as has conventionally been assumed. These internal tensions were manifested most clearly in a series of mutinies and revolts within the army, leading ultimately to a coup, probably in early 546, when the Dux Numidiarum Guntharith seized authority in Carthage. That many of the leading figures in the administration seem to have come to terms with this tyrant testifies to the weaknesses within the imperial system, and the challenges which faced John at the time of his landing around six months later. This chapter briefly explores the nature of relations between frontier commanders and their ‘barbarian’ neighbours, many of whom aspired to office within the imperial system. It suggests that the ‘Moorish’ crisis John faced in 546 (which had smouldered for three or four years by that stage), was the direct consequence of internecine struggles within the imperial system, as allies increasingly acted in their own interest

The entry of the United States doomed the Central Powers in the long run but not during 1917, as the collapse of Russia deprived the Allies of their largest army at a time when the Americans could not yet make good the loss. Unable to afford a repeat of the bloody battles of 1916, the Germans resolved to stand on the defensive in the west while the U-boats (and the Bolsheviks) did their work. Meanwhile, the failure of Nivelle’s spring offensive nearly broke the French army, leaving it paralyzed by mutiny for much of the rest of the year, while British and Imperial troops attacked at Arras and Vimy Ridge in the spring, then at Passchendaele in the summer and autumn, gaining little ground at great cost. A November attack at Cambrai, ultimately indecisive, showed how tanks could be used effectively. On other fronts, Russia’s attempt to use Czech deserters against Austria-Hungary was more successful than Germany’s efforts to use Polish deserters against Russia, but not decisively so. The Allies added Greece to their ranks by overthrowing its pro-German king, but nearly lost Italy after the Central Powers achieved a decisive victory at Caporetto, and lost Romania when Russia sued for peace.

After the British swept the seas of German cruisers by early 1915, the naval war shifted to European waters, where the Allied navies adopted a strategy of “distant blockade” against Germany (on a line between Scotland and Norway) and against Austria-Hungary (across the Otranto Straits). At Dogger Bank (24 January 1915) Beatty’s battle cruiser squadron defeated its German counterpart, prompting William II to order his capital ships to remain in port for an entire year. At Jutland (31 May-1 June 1916), the war’s only fleet-scale battle, Scheer’s High Sea Fleet won a tactical victory over Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet but failed to break the blockade; afterward Scheer advocated resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, attempted during 1915 but abandoned under pressure from the United States. After unrestricted submarine warfare brought the United States into the war in April 1917, the British and Americans devised a convoy system to ensure the flow of US troops and supplies to Europe. In 1917–18 the blockaded fleets of Germany and Austria-Hungary (along with Russia, whose Baltic and Black Sea fleets were similarly idled) experienced serious mutinies. For Germany, a prewar net importer of food, the inability to trade by sea arguably was the single most important factor in its ultimate defeat.

Battles between large combat units characterized the first phase of the war from July 1847 to the end of 1848, when rebel forces attempted to conquer the area controlled by the government. The insurgents mobilized large detachments, at times amounting to several thousand combatants. Late 1848, however, saw a shift in the nature of the war. According to a contemporary observer, it transmuted into “an eternal war with no quarter,” assuming “a more bloody and fierce character.” This second phase no longer saw large battles but a “guerrilla war in which engagements were daily and everywhere but with no conclusive result.” For the divided and almost routed rebels, the new Cult of the Speaking Cross became a vital cohesive element. The proclamations of the cross offered an interpretation of their destiny and presented past defeats as sanctions for having offended God’s orders, but they also inspired hope for a better future. Beyond this, veneration of the crosses provided inhabitants of different villages and followers of different leaders with a common ideological point of identification.

Battles between large combat units characterized the first phase of the war from July 1847 to the end of 1848, when rebel forces attempted to conquer the area controlled by the government. The insurgents mobilized large detachments, at times amounting to several thousand combatants. Late 1848, however, saw a shift in the nature of the war. According to a contemporary observer, it transmuted into “an eternal war with no quarter,” assuming “a more bloody and fierce character.” This second phase no longer saw large battles but a “guerrilla war in which engagements were daily and everywhere but with no conclusive result.” For the divided and almost routed rebels, the new Cult of the Speaking Cross became a vital cohesive element. The proclamations of the cross offered an interpretation of their destiny and presented past defeats as sanctions for having offended God’s orders, but they also inspired hope for a better future. Beyond this, veneration of the crosses provided inhabitants of different villages and followers of different leaders with a common ideological point of identification.