In 1968–73, the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China played crucial military and political roles in the Vietnam War, particularly against the background of larger developments in world politics. The Sino-Soviet split, Sino-American rapprochement, and Soviet-American détente all influenced the North Vietnamese conduct of war. The split made coordination of socialist aid in the second half of the 1960s difficult, but also resulted in a Sino-Soviet competition of aid that enabled North Vietnam to launch the Tet Offensive in early 1968 in the first place. Rapprochement convinced the DRV to launch the Easter Offensive – a second Tet Offensive – in the spring of 1972. Détente eventually forced North Vietnam to rethink its strategy of trying to win a victory against the United States on the battlefield in Indochina and humiliate the superpower at the global level in the process. Despite Moscow and Beijing’s sustained loyalty throughout the conflict in the late 1960s and early 1970s, neither supported Hanoi’s overall strategy during the last years of the war. The Soviet Union preferred a negotiated solution to the conflict, while China jettisoned its world revolutionary positions in the 1970–72 period and instead counselled North Vietnam to settle for a negotiated agreement.

The two decades from 1969 marked the tightening of Israel–US strategic ties. With the Cold War becoming more and more predominant in the America view of the Arab–Israeli conflict, American presidents, from Richard Nixon to Ronald Reagan, justified the tightening strategic relations between the two nations in the role Israel would ostensibly play in the defence of the Middle East against Soviet expansion. It did not really matter that Israel would not play that role; for Israel, the idealism that was prevalent in the relations between the two nations was not solid enough, and Israeli leaders gladly recited the Cold War rhetoric in their communication with American officials. Visually, the Arab–Israel conflict played a significant role in the conduct of the relations between the two countries, from the attempts to deal with the consequences of the 1967 June War to the 1982 Lebanon War. These, though, were only a minor irritation in what became deeper and closer ties, encompassing economic and industrial ties, the deepening of cultural connections and intensification of strategic cooperation, mainly in intelligence sharing and development of technologies.

After the establishment of the state of Israel, the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations tried to apply an even-handed policy towards Israel. Both administrations acted under the assumption that favouring Israel over its Arab neighbours would alienate the latter and would push them into Soviet arms. Washington was concerned that the Soviets would gain a foothold in the Middle East, which was under sway of the West. The very strong attachment of the United States towards Israel would preclude a truly even-handed policy. Israel needed urgent economic aid during its first years of existence, and while both administrations attempted to provide such assistance as a part of universal programmes of aid, they also helped Israel significantly more than what they were gave to other nations. Militarily, both administrations managed to thwart pressures to supply arms to Israel, but in the process, the set two principles ramifications lasting for years to come. The administrations argued that Israel was militarily stronger than its neighbours, and that if it was need, it could purchase arms from other suppliers. This meant that when the two provisions were no longer valid, the administration would supply arms to Israel. The establishment of the state of Israel also thrilled Americans from various walks of life, including Evangelicals and American Jews. The press delivered to the American people a message of a new, pioneering Israeli, justifying the American support for Israel and setting conditions for its continuation.