This volume is intended to introduce students and general readers to the theory and practice of rhetoric. Part I offers classic statements of rhetoric in Plato (in the Gorgias), Aristotle (in the Art of Rhetoric) and other seminal thinkers—both what rhetoric is and what its potential virtues and vices, strengths and weaknesses, are. The rest of Part I is devoted to explaining Aristotle’s classic and influential account of rhetoric: its three main kinds (deliberative, epideictic, and judicial) and the three “modes of persuasion” or proofs characteristic of it (those that appeal to the speaker’s ethos or character, to the pathos or emotion of the audience, and to logos or the logic of the speech itself). Part II offers a broad range of exemplary speeches, ancient and modern, grouped thematically. There is a preference throughout for political speeches, as distinguished from essays, letters, and other forms of communication; and our collection boasts a diversity of speakers.

[3.1] The constitutional framework of legislation, federal and state, is relevant to statutory interpretation in various ways. At its most general level, the framework identifies the source of interpretative law for legislation. Further, three fundamental constitutional concepts – the separation of powers, the rule of law and parliamentary supremacy – both influence and provide a foundation for statutory interpretation law. Although these concepts are complex, and the subject of considerable discourse in constitutional law, it is important to understand their basic characteristics as a backdrop to the more detailed examination of statutory interpretation law that follows in this book.

This chapter introduces the concepts of convergence and fragmentation in international human rights law (IHRL) by providing and discussing their definitions and meanings. Building on the conclusion of the 2006 ILC Report on Fragmentation in international law and drawing on existing literature on the matter, the chapter assesses the extent of normative fragmentation and proposes a new definition of judicial fragmentation in IHRL. Moreover, this chapter also engages in a discussion of how convergence and fragmentation relate to the concepts of universality and relativism, key for any comparative discussion on human rights.

The number of transnational corporations (TNCs) – including parent companies and subsidiaries – has exploded over the last forty years. In 1970, there were approximately 7,000 TNCs in the world; today, there are more than 100,000 with over 900,000 foreign affiliates.1 TNCs are now so complex and amorphous in their structure – even compared to ten years ago – that it is difficult for even the most sophisticated legal systems to adequately hold TNCs accountable for the harms they create in countries where they operate, even as the TNCs make enormous profits at the expense of often vulnerable communities. The truth is, certain legal doctrines, often devised nearly a century ago or longer, are too outdated to sufficiently assure that TNCs are held accountable for harms they create in today’s world, where TNCs operate globally, and often have structures that transcend a single country or jurisdiction.