In this chapter participants reflect on the steps that senior academics and academic institutions could do to better support early career autistic academics. They also reflect candidly on the things that non-autistic colleagues and friends could do to make them feel more comfortable in both work and social settings.

The field of autism research is moving from its troubled history of research on autistic people to research with autistic people. This recognition of the need for research both with and by autistic people means there is also a need to understand the extent to which autism conferences include or exclude the voices of autistic people. In this chapter, participants reflect on their experiences in attending conferences as recipients of knowledge, active participants in the conversation, and conveyors of information. Topics discussed include sensory issues, conference organisation, social interaction and networking, in-session interaction, in-session information, inclusion, and online conferences.

While the concept of reasonable adjustments is well-established in academia, and it is enshrined in university policy that we must support the provision of these adjustments for our students, autistic employees may not always feel empowered to ask for necessary adjustments to thrive in an academic workplace. In this chapter participants reflect on the process of requesting and receiving adjustments, including those that have been denied and those that they wish they could ask for.

Chapter 2 identifies and describes several methodological considerations in participatory research with adolescents, for example the issue of power sharing. Language is explored as a tool but also a potential barrier for engagement over time. Adolescents can have different roles and levels of involvement. The research setting and the characteristics of the research team are also explored.

This chapter focuses on the barriers that LGBTIQ people continue to experience across a range of sectors, including the workplace, schools, healthcare and social care provision, and counselling and psychological services. Whilst some positive changes have occurred, this chapter highlights the ongoing (and renewed) resistance to the inclusion of LGBTIQ people. An overview of research on resistance to the inclusion of LGBTIQ people within foster care services and sports and resistance to the inclusion of certain LGBTIQ people (e.g., LGBTIQ refugees, disabled LGBTIQ people) within services is also provided. The chapter highlights the importance of both equity and liberatory practices in the removal of barriers to inclusion.

Chapter 8 is a new chapter for our textbook dedicated to the topics of diversity and inclusion. We discuss the power that can be derived from diverse group members and their experiences, but their diversity alone does not provide it. The importance of inclusion as a catalyst for leveraging the benefits of member diversity for higher productivity outcomes is discussed. We describe some of the challenges that diversity in groups can pose and factors that can exacerbate these challenges. We offer suggestions on methods groups can employ to help them overcome these challenges.

In this chapter, we discuss the relationship of individual personal thriving to fairness and worthiness by exploring the concept of epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustice refers to the rejection of people’s capacity as knowers, such that these individuals are treated as being less knowledgeable and less believable than other people, frequently on the basis of their social identities. In the first half of the chapter, we will explain how epistemic injustices take place and how they interrupt human thriving. In the second half of the chapter, we will profile the ways that psychologists and others can work to prevent epistemic injustice.

This chapter seeks keywords and concepts that will enable us to grasp the contradictory and conflictive globality of the current moment and sharpen our analysis of equally contradictory and conflictive global pasts. In a plea to move beyond equating the global with openness, connection, and integration, I address the role of closure, boundaries, and limits in global history in a wider sense. For this purpose, I explore in an experimental and deliberately open-ended fashion how thinking about global spherescan be utilised fruitfully for the current practice of history writing. The first part explores the radically inclusive yet claustrophobic vision of the globe as a closed sphere from which there is no escape. Building on earlier closed-world and one-world discourses, this thinking gained prominence after the Second World War in the face of the threat of nuclear destruction and environmental degradation. I then move to think about the globe as composed of many bounded spheres – geopolitical but also social. Here, I take central examples from the realm of communication and language and discusses the public sphere as an exclusionary rather than inclusionary figure of thought.

Chapter 1 lays out the book’s argument about the rise and sources of welfare nationalism. It explains the significance of the study in focusing on migration issues that are major sources of contemporary political and humanitarian crises and shows ‘how we got here’ – how these crises have built since the 1990s in Europe and Russia. The chapter explains the book’s key concepts: welfare nationalism, exclusion and inclusion, and populism, and sets the study within the literature on international migration and welfare. It focuses on the key role of ethnicity and the importance of political elites and mass media in influencing responses to migration and identifies contrasting cycles: Exclusionary migrations involve a “vicious cycle” of hostile public opinion toward more-or-less ethnically distant migrants that is reinforced and exploited by politicians for enhanced influence, amplified by mass media, and produces policies of exclusion. By contrast, inclusionary migrations involve a “virtuous cycle” of relatively receptive public opinion toward ethnically close migrants, high-level political support, elites’ management of nationals’ grievances, and positive treatment in mass media, producing policies of inclusion. The conclusion provides an overview of the book’s structure and a summary of each chapter.

Democracy is about collective self-rule under conditions that afford everyone political standing and consideration in matters of common concern. But in today’s globalized world, democratic states must respond to a growing number of demands for inclusion from beyond their borders, on issues ranging from migration, to trade, to human rights and the environment. Under these conditions, there is an urgent need for a principled means of determining who is entitled to inclusion, and on what basis. Defenders of the All-Affected Principle claim that inclusions should track the impacts that decisions can have on people’s lives. Defenders of the All-Subjected Principle adopt a similar strategy but use a narrower threshold for inclusion. My argument is that neither principle entirely satisfies. The problem is that both principles are too backwards looking. I offer an alternative formula for democratic inclusion that captures the underlying wrong to which complaints about undemocratic exclusion are seeking to draw our attention. One complaint is about domination: being exposed to the arbitrary and one-sided power of others. Another complaint is about usurpation: having your judgement displaced, without your consent. Using these two complaints as a guide does a much better job explaining when inclusion is justified and the appropriate institutional response.

This chapter investigates (1) whether there is a convincing justification for the All-Affected Principle, (2) whether it is best understood as substantive or procedural principle, and (3) whether it provides a useful way to approach boundary questions. Though the All-Affected Principle is often justified as realizing self-determination in political decision-making, I argue that the AAP does not do so. Instead, the ideal of self-determination, properly understood, supports individual and collective autonomy rights, and institutional arrangements that are at odds with a global democracy of the all-affected.

The All-Affected Principle is of limited help in thinking about immigration. Immigration raises important normative questions about who should have access to citizenship, what is required for the full social and economic inclusion of immigrants, what legal rights immigrants admitted by a state should have, how migrants who enter and settle without permission should be treated, what criteria should be used in selecting and excluding immigrants, what states ought to do in dealing with refugees, and whether controlling immigration is really morally justifiable at all. The All-Affected Principle is directly relevant only to the first question of who should have access to citizenship, and even in that case, it needs to be supplemented. The other questions are not primarily about who should participate in democratic decision-making but about what justice requires and about the moral constraints on democratic discretion. So, using the All-Affected Principle to think about those questions would not help, and starting from that principle in thinking about immigration might lead us to miss the key normative issues.