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2 results

  • Who is the “boss” in planning to have a baby? Fertility and household bargaining in China

  • Jie Ma, Xiaojun Yang, Yuxuan Fei
  • Journal:
    Journal of Demographic Economics , First View
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    21 March 2025, pp. 1-21

  • Although fertility is typically regarded as a unitary family decision, a meaningful degree of disagreement in fertility willingness exists within households, especially for having two or more children. As China transitioned from a one-child to multiple-child policy, understanding how such disagreement affects fertility decisions is crucial. Using household data from the 2016 China Labor-force Dynamic Survey, we analyze fertility willingness in married couples. We find that over 10% of families disagree on having two or more children. Disagreement negatively impacts plans to have more children: only the husband wanting two children significantly reduces fertility plans compared to mutual agreement, while only the wife wanting two children does not suppress the plan. This is consistent with the wife's veto power in fertility decisions. Heterogeneity analyses reveal that more equal gender role and higher bargaining power contribute to the wife's veto power, offering insights into the mechanism of intra-household fertility decisions.

  • 3 - A Relational Theory of Women’s Political Participation

  • from Part I - The Puzzle of Women’s Political Participation
  • Soledad Artiz Prillaman, Stanford University, California
  • Book:
    The Patriarchal Political Order
    Published online:
    30 November 2023
    Print publication:
    14 December 2023, pp 61-86

  • Summary

    Chapter 3 builds a theory of women’s political behavior under conditions of patriarchy and gender inequality. It argues for the defining role of the household in women’s political lives and describes the conditions that would lead to household political cooperation – joint household political decision-making – and hypothesizes its implications for individual women’s political behavior and the structure of political organization more broadly. It then develops a series of expectations about how and when women will become active political citizens, arguing for the importance of women’s autonomy from the household, their social solidarity with each other, and the potential for women’s collective action to transform their political lives.