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Public pensions in the United States face an impending funding crisis in the wake of the financial crisis and the COVID-19 recession. Many cities and states will struggle to meet these growing obligations without major cuts in government services, reneging on pension promises, or raising taxes. This Element examines the development of the pension crisis through the lens of political economy. We analyze the knowledge and incentive problems inherent in the institutional structure, governance, and accounting of public pensions. We conclude by offering several institutional, governance, and reporting reforms to address the pension funding crisis.
This study assesses the effect of tax withholding on pre-retirement withdrawals from a tax-preferred savings account in Canada. Using a large sample of administrative tax records and exploiting inter-provincial variation in tax withholding rates over time in the identification, the withdrawal elasticity to the net-of-tax withholding rate is estimated to be approximately 0.40 for many prime-aged savers. Hence, tax withholding discourages pre-retirement savings withdrawals and serves as a de facto savings commitment device. This finding is not well-explained by rational agency, and theories of present-biased time preferences and fiscal illusion are shown to be a better explanation of such behavior.
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