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The uniqueness of this book is its conceptualization of a corporate group as a system of interaction, comprised of nodes, links and internal governance tools. This framework can be used to understand what constitutes a group, based on affiliation-linkages. By increasing our perception of group-structuring we can assess the extent to which existing laws address all variables. If the law does not consider certain variables to be used for identifying groups, a case of shadow business may be identified. Group-transparency is a recurring topic on the regulatory agenda. In this book, three legal domains are analysed questioning whether specific amendments have led to increased group-transparency: the control-definition for consolidated accounts, shareholder-transparency in company law, and major holding disclosure in listed companies. This book identifies deficiencies of the law in obtaining its regulatory objective of group-transparency, and proposes an interpretative solution based on Systems Thinking.
This chapter points to the importance of addressing shadow business practices through a functional perception of de facto control. The book has shown that shadow business practices are a potential outcome whenever a formal definition of control is applied. I conclude by arguing that the European Union should strive to use its power as a norm creator to establish a harmonized concept of de facto control based on a Systems Thinking approach.
This chapter analyzes the extent to which company law requires disclosure of corporate control. Three approaches to disclosure regimes are covered: (i) investor disclosure and the amended Shareholder Rights Directive on the transparency of shareholders, (ii) intention disclosure, referring to the extent to which investors are to disclosure the intention of their investment that can illuminate control structures, and (iii) interaction disclosure, referring to requirements to disclose agreements between affiliated entities and network entities.
Companies’ sustainable and socially responsible footprint, especially multi-national corporations, is increasingly scrutinised by policy-makers, stakeholders and the media. However, regulatory policy to promote socially responsible and sustainable behaviour at companies remains at an emerging state as the minimally intrusive regulatory instrument of disclosure regulation seems to be the preferred policy. Disclosure regulation merely compels information to be released so that next steps can be taken by interested recipients, whether they be the market or stakeholders. This Chapter explores disclosure regulation introduced at the EU level transposed in the UK, as well as the UK’s own initiatives such as the modern slavery statement that large businesses have to publicly disclose in relation to their supply chains. It is argued that disclosure regulation does not necessarily foster deep self-reflection and fundamental changes in corporate behaviour, as corporations’ responses to compliance with disclosure regulation vary significantly.