What are the elements uniting (or distinguishing) entities that in different jurisdictions and historical periods, have been officially called General Congresses, Constituent Parliaments, Constituent Congresses, National Constituent Assemblies, Constitutional Assemblies, Assemblies of Revision, Parallel Constituent Assembles, or Conventions, but at the same time are generically labelled by political actors and academics as ‘constituent assemblies’? In attempting to answer that question, the objective of this chapter is threefold. First, to describe the main features of the type of institution that can be accurately identified as a constituent assembly. This requires a conception that is broad enough to cover most constitution-making bodies that would be normally labelled as ‘constituent assemblies’, but specific enough as to discriminate against entities that lack certain features. I propose that, while constituent assemblies may be understood in terms of their form or function, it is the nature of their power what distinguishes them from other constitution-drafting mechanisms. My second objective is to enquire into the limits of the power of -a properly understood- constituent assembly. Third, and relatedly, to consider the effects that the attempt to constitutionally regulate such an entity has on its ‘constituent’ nature.

Chapter 1 focuses on constitution-making and constitutional reform processes. After providing a brief historical overview of the four waves of constitution-drafting in the Arab world, this chapter examines closely the post-Arab Spring constitution-making and constitutional reform processes, focusing on the following elements: The body in charge of drafting the constitution and the role played by the ruling regime (“bottom-up” vs. “top-down” processes); the degree of openness and transparency of the process; the duration of the process; the role played by political parties; the role of civil society; the role played by external actors; the influence of previous domestic constitutions and their “reactivation”; and the influence of foreign constitutional models. The chapter shows that the vast majority of these processes were characterized by major flaws and shortcomings, a fact that had a negative impact on the legitimacy and sense of ownership of these texts and, ultimately, on the transition processes as a whole. Although it should not be idealized, the process that led to the adoption of the 2014 Tunisian Constitution was to a large extent a positive exception.