Transnational marriage is a controversial topic in Hmong communities in the United States, Laos, and Thailand, and has sometimes led to intra-ethnic disputes and conflicts. Initially, many of the Hmong American men who travelled overseas to marry Hmong Lao or Thai women were already married. Furthermore, the Hmong American community has frequently come to believe that economic gain is the primary motivation for Hmong Lao/Thai women to marry Hmong American men. On the other hand, some activists have referred to these marriages generally as “abusive transnational marriages.” The association of economic resources with transnational marriage, including remittances, increased bride prices, and opportunities for migration to the United States, has perpetuated negative stereotypes that frequently overshadow the personal stories of many Hmong Lao/Thai women who do not fit with the stereotypes. For these women, marrying a Hmong American man signifies not only personal gain but also economic advancement for their families. This paper reviews the intricacies related to the topic of Hmong transnational marriage between Hmong American men and their Hmong Lao and Hmong Thai brides. In doing so, we argue that it is important to consider the complexity and nuances associated with Hmong transnational marriages, as they take on various forms that go beyond standard stereotypes.

How do different regime types execute a security response during a pandemic? We interrogate the politics of monopolistic securitization which we argue to have significantly directed and influenced the COVID-19 policy strategies adopted in the ‘democratic’ United Kingdom (UK) and ‘authoritarian’ Thailand. Despite their stark political differences, we contend that the British and Thai states’ parallel resort to monopolistic securitization as an overarching pandemic approach effectively made them ‘functionally similar’ by producing security responses that differed only in magnitude and scale but not in kind. Integrating securitization and democratic standards violations frameworks, we find out that the British and Thai authorities’ monopolistic securitization of COVID-19 initially constrained the intersubjective process required to socially construct the pandemic as a primary existential threat endangering both countries. This significantly diminished their public audiences’ individual/agential and collective/institutional capacity to deliberate the immediate emergency measures they unilaterally deployed, particularly during the pandemic’s early stages. Consequently, whether it was in the UK with a supposedly robust democracy or in Thailand with at best a hybrid regime if not outright authoritarian, the security responses that emerged constituted varying types and degrees of violations within the illiberal-authoritarian spectrum. Nevertheless, as the pandemic progressed, the fundamental deliberative-iterative mechanism underpinning securitization enabled the British and Thai public audiences to gradually reclaim their role and space, allowing them to challenge the appropriateness and legitimacy of the existing emergency measures, thereby weakening the states’ monopolistic control over the process.

During the Third Indochina War (1979-1991), the ideological alignments of involved parties differed from those during the Second Indochina War, also known as the Vietnam War. Whereas the Second Indochina War pitted communists squarely against non-communists and anti-communists, the Third Indochina War was more complicated and less ideological or political, with communists often fighting against other communists due to the Sino-Soviet ideological split. The enemy of one's enemy was frequently viewed as a friend, often leading to unlikely alliances not rooted in ideological or political similarities. In this article, I argue that it is important to consider the unlikely alliances that emerged during the Third Indochina War by focusing on the particular cross-border interactions and conflicts between communists and non-communists that occurred in the Emerald Triangle, the tri-border region between Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. Focusing particularly on the Lao insurgent perspective, I consider how Lao anti-communist insurgents, the Khmer Rouge, the Communist Party of Thailand, other armed groups, and the Thai military participated in transnational collaboration in this region during the Third Indochina War. In particular, based largely on Lao-language interviews with key figures in the Lao insurgency conducted for over a decade, I examine how Lao insurgents interacted with Khmer Rouge to oppose a common enemy, communist Vietnam and their allies, the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the Lao People's Democratic Republic, and how the Thai military supported them, but only insofar as it enabled them to maintain control over security inside Thailand.

In recent years, a number of online outlets aligned with the right has emerged in Thai politics. Though it is often assumed that such actors are merely an extension of the Thai state propaganda apparatus, as the moniker “IO (short for Information Operation)” implies, closer inspection of their contents suggests a more complicated picture. Employing the morphological approach of ideological analysis, this article argues that the Thai Online Right articulates a decidedly conservative worldview, upholding a social order centred around the monarchy, and opposing particular instigators of change, similar to more traditional Thai conservatives. The concepts and ideas they deploy to bolster these core ideas, however, seem to emphasise more materialistic and personalised elements, as well as draw from more contemporaneous “Western” right-wing conspiracy theories, making their conservative expression a strange blend of the old and the new. The findings have implications to the study of conservatisms, both in the Thai context and comparatively.

This article brings film/media theory into Southeast Asian research through a revisionist queer approach. It contains two goals: addressing some recent developments about queer imag(in)ing in Thai media whilst reappraising the fundamental question of spectatorship via screen theory. Taking into account the more general issue of media specificity and the particular textual device of identity/gender-switch in several recent Thai television serials, we propose the notion of wer viewership: a mode of viewing practice that features viewer-text interaction through the perceptual-cognitive processes, and is characterised by wer/excessive aesthetics, multiple meanings, and diverse pleasures. Resonant with camp reading, wer viewership underlines how the viewer actively makes sense of the ambiguities about gender, particularly those along the extra-/diegetic interface. We use Thai soap opera Shadow of Love to illuminate the wer/excessive aesthetics rendered through its identity/gender play bordering on the extra-/diegetic divide, and the enhanced pleasures and meanings thus available to its extradiegetic active viewers. We stress, though, the expanded queer imag(in)ing in Shadow is not of total free interpretation, but is animated in relation to both the evolving discourses about gender/sexuality in Thailand, and the popularising homoerotic Boys Love (BL) media across Asia in recent years.

Space as a domain of economic and security competition between great powers has risen to become an arena of active statecraft for middle powers in the twenty-first century. It has set a high-stake stage for not only continuing struggles for catch-up industrialization of late developers but also offering opportunities to capture commercial gains of technological breakthroughs and globalization of markets. We examine these challenges for Taiwan and Thailand, surveying major trends in the emerging space industry and exploring four analytical perspectives on how government-business relations shape adaptive national industrial policies in high-technology sectors with proliferating end-users. We argue that the Asian developmental state model is evolving in response to specific challenges of a global supply chain for commercial space activities dominated by leading space firms and government regulatory actions in the United States. Significant differences in Taiwan’s and Thailand’s space and industrial policy approaches will likely create divergent technological trajectories and reinforce current constraints on improving national security. The longer-term prospect for middle spacepowers remains contingent on the space race between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.

The genus Tanqua Blanchard, 1904, infests reptiles, particularly those inhabiting aquatic environments. This study examined a population of rainbow water snakes, Enhydris enhydris (Schneider, 1799), collected from southern Thailand. Adult nematodes consistent with Tanqua were found in the stomach. Various morphometric, meristic and qualitative morphological variables, including size, ratios, distances, cephalic appearance, the number of caudal papillae and other features, serve to distinguish the specimens from other species within the genus. In particular, Tanqua anomala and Tanqua diadema, which closely resemble our Tanqua specimens, can be differentiated by key diagnostic characteristics such as a retractable head, the distance from the anterior end to the cervical sac, the relative positions of caudal papillae and excretory pore, and the length of the uterus. Molecular analysis (COI and 18s rRNA genes) confirmed its status as a species of Tanqua, genetically distinct from Tanqua tiara, and matching the genetic sequence found in larvae of Tanqua sp. from a snakehead fish species from Bangladesh. Tanqua siamensis sp. nov. is described, supported by morphological traits, microscopic illustrations and genetic information. This study reports the first evidence of a caudal papillary pair in females. This species causes significant lesions on the stomach wall of the snake host, raising possible issues for snakes held in captivity regarding food hygiene and parasite protection.

Calls for the restitution and repatriation of cultural objects continue to escalate. High-profile cases such as the Parthenon Frieze and the Benin Bronzes dominate international news cycles and provoke fierce debate; however, less attention has been paid to items that are quietly returned and to the potential positive outcomes for the institutions on both sides. This article discusses three Southeast Asian case studies to address this lacuna and urges institutions to become more proactive in their engagement with restitution and repatriation claims.

This paper examines the habitus of contemporary Thailand based on the concepts developed by Pierre Bourdieu and their operationalisation to Thai society developed by Boike Rehbein's principles, which explain how contemporary habitus is linked to social inequality and mobilisation participation. Thailand has two key social structures: precapitalist and capitalist. Both create and reproduce different types of habitus. The paper used a mixed-methods research approach to analyse social inequality and challenges in Thailand since 2019. Data collection was conducted during the years between 2021 and 2022 from 400 surveys and fifteen qualitative interviews. The paper proposes eight habitus types rooted in Thai social structures with seven characteristics for explaining contemporary Thai society. The pre-capitalist structure generates the following habitus types: subsistential, traditionalist, and powerful (phuyai). The capitalist structure generates the following types: desperate, individualist, aspirant, and content creator. Between these two structures is the conformist. All habitus types share some characteristics. Authoritarianism is the fundamental trait of the predominant habitus types in Thai society, which are interconnected with social structures, thereby reflecting the consequences of social inequality and mobilisations. The demographic most affected by social inequality is the desperate group, but a more significant habitus for mobilisation participation is that of content creator, which is considerably small now but is likely to increase. Traditionalist and conformist groups are less likely to protest and, to a lesser degree, this is true of the subsistential and powerful types. Moreover, rationales of being affected by social inequality and reacting differently are distinct characteristics of each type, and socio-economic positions interplayed with social media influences.

The existing literature on the relationship between political parties and social movements draws mainly from European cases, and has rarely captured the kinds of relationships that may exist in other parts of the world. This article addresses the gap by shedding light on the dynamics of party–movement relationships in Thailand. We examine the connections between two Thai political parties and a variety of protest movements. Our analysis demonstrates that Thailand's Move Forward Party and its predecessor the Future Forward Party can be classified as movement parties, but that they operated differently. While Future Forward was a clandestine movement party, concealing its origins in grassroots activism, Move Forward later revealed its activist roots and underwent a transformation from a clandestine to a fully fledged movement party. This change was triggered by two emerging conditions: the rise of student-led mass movements and collective demands for radical change that had been ignored by other political parties.

This article conducts an analytical review of the works of three prominent Thai comparative law professors: Professor Preedee Kasemsup, Professor Phijaisakdi Horayangkura and Professor Sanunkorn Sotthibandhu. Although influential in Thailand, their works are mostly in Thai and therefore have received little academic attention outside the kingdom. The authors argue that the works of these scholars have the potential to shine new light on comparative law theory and bring voices from the Global South to add fresh perspectives and contexts to a discipline dominated by scholars from the Global North. Moreover, this examination highlights the challenges that comparative law faces in freeing itself from this hegemony when using internally developed concepts and modes of questioning.