We use an experiment to examine whether form of payment (cash or mobile money) affects estimates of intertemporal choice and risk taking. We find that form of payment does not affect temporal discounting and risk taking. Given that participants prefer payment via mobile money, the results suggest that there are minimal concerns with using mobile money to pay participants in experimental studies.

We often forego a larger future reward in order to obtain a smaller reward immediately, known as impatient intertemporal choice. The current study investigated the role of Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT) as a mechanism contributing to impatient intertemporal choice, following a theoretical framework proposing that cues associated with immediate gratification trigger a Pavlovian approach response, interfering with goal-directed (instrumental) inhibitory behavior. We developed a paradigm in which participants first learned to make instrumental go/no-go responses in order to win rewards and avoid punishments. Next, they learned the associations between Pavlovian cues and rewards varying in amount and delay. Finally, we tested whether these (task-irrelevant) cues exerted transfer effects by influencing instrumental actions while participants again completed the go/no-go task. Across two experiments, Pavlovian cues associated with larger (versus smaller) and immediate (versus delayed) rewards were evaluated more positively, reflecting the successful acquisition of Pavlovian cue–outcome associations. These findings replicated the previously reported classical transfer effect of reward amount on instrumental behavior, as large (versus smaller) cues increased instrumental approach. In contrast, we found no evidence for the hypothesized transfer effects for reward delay, contrary to the proposed role of PIT in impatient intertemporal choice. These results suggest that although both reward amount and delay were important in the evaluation of cues, only the amount associated with cues influenced instrumental choice. We provide concrete suggestions for future studies, addressing instrumental outcome identity, competition between cue–amount and cue–delay associations, and individual differences in response to Pavlovian cues.

In this investigation, we test whether temporal discounting is domain-specific (i.e., compared to other people, can an individual have a relatively high discount rate for one type of reward but a relatively low discount rate for another?), and we examine whether individual differences in the types of rewards one finds tempting explain domain-specificity in discount rates. Adults discounted delayed rewards they found particularly tempting (defined as the visceral attraction to and enjoyment of a reward) more steeply than did adults who did not find the rewards as tempting, contrary to what might be expected from the magnitude effect. Furthermore, we found significant group by domain interactions (e.g., chip lovers who do not like beer have relatively high discount rates for chips and relatively low discount rates for beer, whereas beer lovers who do not like chips showed the opposite pattern). These results suggest that domain-specificity in temptation partially accounts for corresponding domain-specificity in temporal discounting.

Some people find it more difficult to delay rewards than others. In three experiments, we tested a “future self-continuity” hypothesis that individual differences in the perception of one’s present self as continuous with a future self would be associated with measures of saving in the laboratory and everyday life. Higher future self-continuity (assessed by a novel index) predicted reduced discounting of future rewards in a laboratory task, more matches in adjectival descriptions of present and future selves, and greater lifetime accumulation of financial assets (even after controlling for age and education). In addition to demonstrating the reliability and validity of the future self-continuity index, these findings are consistent with the notion that increased future self-continuity might promote saving for the future.

For reasons of social influence and social logistics, people in closed networks are expected to experience time compression: The more closed a person's network, the steeper the person's discount function, and the more narrow the expected time horizon within which the person deliberates events and behavior. Consistent with the hypothesis, data on managers at the top of three organizations show network closure associated with a social life compressed into daily contact with colleagues. Further, language in closed networks is predominantly about current activities, ignoring the future. Further still, discount functions employed by executive MBA students show more severe discounting by students in more closed networks. Inattention to the future can be argued to impair achievement, however, I find no evidence across the managers of daily contact diminishing the achievement associated with network advantage. I close with comments on replication and extrapolation to language more generally, within-person variation, and select cognitive patterns (closure bias, end of history, and felt status loss).

Socioeconomic differences in behaviour are pervasive and well documented, but their causes are not yet well understood. Here, we make the case that a cluster of behaviours is associated with lower socioeconomic status (SES), which we call “the behavioural constellation of deprivation.” We propose that the relatively limited control associated with lower SES curtails the extent to which people can expect to realise deferred rewards, leading to more present-oriented behaviour in a range of domains. We illustrate this idea using the specific factor of extrinsic mortality risk, an important factor in evolutionary theoretical models. We emphasise the idea that the present-oriented behaviours of the constellation are a contextually appropriate response to structural and ecological factors rather than a pathology or a failure of willpower. We highlight some principles from evolutionary theoretical models that can deepen our understanding of how socioeconomic inequalities can become amplified and embedded. These principles are that (1) small initial disparities can lead to larger eventual inequalities, (2) feedback loops can embed early-life circumstances, (3) constraints can breed further constraints, and (4) feedback loops can operate over generations. We discuss some of the mechanisms by which SES may influence behaviour. We then review how the contextually appropriate response perspective that we have outlined fits with other findings about control and temporal discounting. Finally, we discuss the implications of this interpretation for research and policy.

The aim of this study was to examine delay discounting in girls and boys with ADHD-Combined type (ADHD-C) relative to typically developing (TD) children on two tasks that differ in the extent to which the rewards and delays were experienced by participants. Children ages 8–12 years with ADHD-C (n=65; 19 girls) and TD controls (n=55; 15 girls) completed two delay discounting tasks involving a series of choices between smaller, immediate and larger, delayed rewards. The classic delay discounting task involved choices about money at delays of 1–90 days and only some of the outcomes were actually experienced by the participants. The novel real-time discounting task involved choices about an immediately consumable reward (playing a preferred game) at delays of 25–100 s, all of which were actually experienced by participants. Participants also provided subjective ratings of how much they liked playing the game and waiting to play. Girls with ADHD-C displayed greater delay discounting compared to boys with ADHD-C and TD girls and boys on the real-time discounting task. Diagnostic group differences were not evident on the classic discounting task. In addition, children with ADHD-C reported wanting to play the game more and liking waiting to play the game less than TD children. This novel demonstration of greater delay discounting among girls with ADHD-C on a discounting task in which the rewards are immediately consumable and the delays are experienced in real-time informs our understanding of sex differences and motivational processes in children with ADHD. (JINS, 2016, 22, 12–23)

Individuals with anorexia nervosa (AN) are often characterized as possessing excessive self-control and are unusual in their ability to reduce or avoid the consumption of palatable foods. This behavior promotes potentially life-threatening weight loss and suggests disturbances in reward processing. We studied whether individuals with AN showed evidence of increased self-control by examining the tendency to delay receipt of a monetary, non-food related, reward. Underweight AN (n = 36) and healthy controls (HC, n = 28) completed a monetary intertemporal choice task measuring delay discounting factor. Individuals with AN reduced the value of a monetary reward over time significantly less than HC (F[1,61] = 5.03; p = 0.029). Secondary analyses indicated that the restricting subtype of AN, in particular, showed significantly less discounting than HC (F[1,46] = 8.3; p = 0.006). These findings indicate that some individuals with AN show less temporal discounting than HC, suggestive of enhanced self-control that is not limited to food consumption. This is in contrast to other psychiatric disorders, for example, substance abuse, which are characterized by greater discounting. Though preliminary, these findings suggest that excessive self-control may contribute to pathological processes and individuals with AN may have neuropsychological characteristics that enhance their ability to delay reward and thereby may help to maintain persistent food restriction. (JINS, 2012, 18, 1–8)