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This article analyzes how Shinzo Abe employed various strategies to challenge Korean sovereignty over Dokdo on the international stage and to promote Japan’s territorial claims on the islets domestically. Through a series of speeches discussed at Japan’s National Diet among Abe’s cabinet ministers and members of the Diet, this article investigates how and by what policy instruments the Abe cabinet infiltrated and revitalized Japan’s territorial claims over Dokdo across the nation. Several members of the Diets and ministers discussed the Dokdo issue amid worsening Korea–Japan relations stemming from Abe’s revisionism. Content analysis revealed that Japanese lawmakers and cabinet members were very frustrated about Korea’s effective control of Dokdo as well as the Korean government’s stance on comfort women and forced labor. Quantitative analyses found increases in the average intensity of Dokdo remarks following the Abe cabinet’s hardline stance toward President Moon’s government. Regression analysis confirms that the average intensity of Dokdo remarks was intensified by cabinet approval ratings, conservative rightwing politicians, and Japan’s domestic economic conditions.
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