Expectations-based reference dependence has been shown to be important across a variety of contexts in Psychology and Economics. Do expectations play a role in moral judgment? The higher our beliefs are relative to an outcome, do we punish more harshly? This paper reports a series of experiments investigating the hypothesis that expectations as reference points per se affect punishment. The experimental design varies the expectation the Punisher holds just before she learns what actually occurred. In tandem with the manipulation, expectations are shown to vary significantly and substantially. However, punishment does not respond to these exogenous changes in expectations. After 17 sessions, 295 Punishers, and six experimental setups, expectations are shown not to affect punishment in any systematic way.

This paper examines cooperation and punishment in a public goods game in Istanbul. Unlike prior within-subject designs, we use a between-subject design with separate no-punishment and punishment conditions. This approach reveals that punishment significantly increases contributions, demonstrating the detrimental effect of having prior experience without sanctions. We highlight two critical factors—heterogeneous initial contributions across groups and how subjects update their contributions based on prior contributions and received punishment. An agent-based model verifies that the interaction between these two factors leads to a strong persistence of contributions over time. Analysis of related data from comparable cities shows similar patterns, suggesting our findings likely generalize if using a between-subject design. We conclude that overlooking within-group heterogeneity biases cross-society comparisons and subsequent policy implications.

Economists conducting laboratory experiments on cooperation and peer punishment find that a non-negligible minority of punishments is directed at cooperators rather than free riders. Such punishments have been categorized as ‘perverse’ or ‘antisocial,’ using definitions that partially overlap, but not entirely so. Which approach better identifies punishment that discourages cooperation? We analyze the data from 16 sites studied by Herrmann et al. (Science 319(5868):1362–1367, 2008) and find that when subjects are uninformed about who punished them, the recipient’s contribution relative to the group average (whether it is ‘perverse’) is a better predictor of negative impact on contribution than is her contribution relative to the punisher’s (whether it is ‘antisocial’). Regression estimates nevertheless suggest that punished subjects attempt to take relative contribution of punisher into account even if only by conjecture.

Do people discriminate between men and women when they have the option to punish defectors or reward cooperators? Here, we report on four pre-registered experiments that shed some light on this question. Study 1 (N = 544) shows that people do not discriminate between genders when they have the option to punish (reward) defectors (cooperators) in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma with third-party punishment/reward. Study 2 (N = 253) extends Study 1 to a different method of punishing/rewarding: participants are asked to rate the behaviour of a defector/cooperator on a scale of 1–5 stars. In this case too, we find that people do not discriminate between genders. Study 3a (N = 331) and Study 3b (N = 310) conceptually replicate Study 2 with a slightly different gender manipulation. These latter studies show that, in situations where they do not have specific beliefs about the gender of the defector/cooperator’s partner, neither men nor women discriminate between genders.

Although expressivism has been studied in relation to criminal justice since the emergence of modern international criminal law, an expressivist perspective in norms and criminal justice research resurfaced in the past decades, inviting a new viewpoint on the dynamic interplay between norms and symbolic action in International Relations (IR). Situated as an account of punishment, expressivism has been criticised for being too abstract and lacking an immanent meaning or for its dialectic position in relation to punishment. Addressing this theoretical shortcoming, this article remediates our understanding of expressivism, establishing new knowledge of the meaning of norm expressivism in IR and clarifying the relationship between expressivism and notions of punishment in criminal justice and norm research. To this end, it hermeneutically deconstructs the rhetoric of country delegates at the United Nations in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It examines crucial examples of expressivism: disagreement pronouncements, denunciation of norm violation, postulation of guilt, and penal analogies. While criminal justice research posits expressivism as a distinct account of punishment, the novelty of this article consists in illustrating how, even in the absence of prosecution in the courtroom, expressivist rationales can have a reinforcing effect on the international legal order.

While people are surprisingly cooperative in social dilemmas, cooperation is fragile to the emergence of defection. Punishment is a key mechanism through which people sustain cooperation, but when are people willing to pay the costs to punish? Using data from existing work on punishment in public goods games conducted in industrialized countries throughout the world (Herrmann et al. in Science, 319(5868):1362–1367, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1144237), I find first that those who contribute more are consistently punished less. Second, in many study locations, there are insignificant differences in the propensity of those who contribute and defect to punish. Finally, those who contribute and defect both carry out punishment against defectors. Some defectors do punish cooperators, but less often than they punish other defectors. The determinants of punishment are largely consistent across cities.

Punishment plays a role in human cooperation, but it is costly. Prior research shows that people are more cooperative when they expect to receive negative feedback for non-cooperation, even in the absence of costly punishment, which would have interesting implications for theory and applications. However, based on theories of habituation and cue-based learning, we propose that people will learn to ignore expressions of disapproval that are not clearly associated with material costs or benefits. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a between-subjects, 40-round public goods game (i.e. much longer than most studies), where participants could respond to others’ contributions by sending numerical disapproval messages, paying to reduce others’ earnings, or neither. Consistent with previous results, we observed steadily increasing contributions in the costly punishment condition. In contrast, contributions declined after the early rounds in the expressed disapproval condition, and were eventually no higher than the basic control condition with neither costly punishment nor disapproval ratings. In other words, costless disapproval may temporarily increase cooperation, but the effects fade. We discuss the theoretical and applied implications of our findings, including the unexpectedly high levels of cooperation in a second control condition.

This study examines the recent proliferation of manslaughter charges and subsequent prosecutions brought against people who have shared, sold, or provided drugs that have led to overdose death in Canada. It presents a documentary analysis of news media coverage, court decisions, and Access-to-Information and Freedom-of-Information requests of materials from criminal legal institutions. The analysis finds that the vast majority of those who face manslaughter charges are engaged in the lowest tiers of the drug trade, are themselves people who use drugs, and are often intimately known to the deceased. Messaging by police, prosecutors and the courts mobilize the overdose crisis as rationale for these charges and prosecutions, positioning them as a form of redress to impacted communities. This phenomenon illustrates how punitive criminal legal responses to the overdose crisis have deepened alongside the retreat of criminal law in other circumstances, contradicting claims of a therapeutic turn in Canadian drug policies.

The maintenance of cross-cultural variation and arbitrary traditions in human populations is a key question in cultural evolution. Conformist transmission, the tendency to follow the majority, was previously considered central to this phenomenon. However, recent theory indicates that cognitive biases can greatly reduce its ability to maintain traditions. Therefore, we expanded prior models to investigate two other ways that cultural variation can be sustained: payoff-biased transmission and norm reinforcement. Our findings predict that both payoff-biased transmission and reinforcement can enhance conformist transmission's ability to maintain traditions. However, payoff-biased transmission can only sustain cultural variation if it is functionally related to environmental factors. In contrast, norm reinforcement readily generates and maintains arbitrary cultural variation. Furthermore, reinforcement results in path-dependent cultural dynamics, meaning that historical traditions influence current practices, even though group behaviours have changed. We conclude that environmental variation probably plays a role in functional cultural traditions, but arbitrary cultural variation is more plausibly due to the reinforcement of norm compliance.

People simultaneously entangled in multiple state systems are often subject to contradictory legal mandates that can foster distrust and incentivize system avoidance. This study focuses on those indebted to both the child support system and the criminal legal system, a situation we describe as dual debt. We ask whether and how the imposition of legal debts with punitive surveillance and collections mechanisms fosters alienation in the form of legal cynicism and estrangement, which we refer to jointly as legal anomie. Drawing from interview data in Minnesota, we find that legal anomie and system avoidance are mutually reinforcing processes, as debts in these systems triggered consequences that pushed people out of the formal labor market and heightened their distrust of legal institutions. The case of dual debt demonstrates how alienating and contradictory policy systems can foster both legal anomie and system avoidance, particularly in the context of economic and social precarity.