Global value chains (GVCs) function as a distributive arrangement at a global scale, generating and relocating wealth while often exacerbating inequalities across and within countries. The recent rise in GVC-related regulation must hence also be assessed in its distributive implications. Human rights due diligence, the current heart of the playbook of GVC regulation, largely refrains from challenging lead firms’ business models, pricing strategies, and sourcing practices. Given thick evidence that sourcing squeeze translates into vulnerabilities on the ground that are conducive to rights violations, this lacuna significantly limits the potential of human rights due diligence to address wrongful conduct deeply entrenched in economic inequality, such as modern slavery. This article argues that human rights due diligence is marked by a ‘distributional self-restraint’, i.e., a self-inflicted reluctance to engage with deeper underpinnings or root causes of human rights violations. This self-restraint has a pedigree in the intellectual history of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP) and of human rights more broadly, as well as in the naturalizing narrative from neo-classical economics around ‘free markets’ and price formation that have immunized prices in value chains from being seen as conducive to harm. It also manifests itself in the legislative texts and debates around the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. To overcome such limitations, this article develops the notion of a reflexive governance of pricing and sourcing practices that requires companies to assess and reflect, with stakeholders at different tiers, the impact of lead firm pricing down the chain, especially on living wages and incomes.

We consider pricing of a specialised critical illness and life insurance contract for breast cancer (BC) risk. We compare (a) an industry-based Markov model with (b) a recently developed semi-Markov model, which accounts for unobserved BC cases and progression through clinical stages of BC, and (c) an alternative Markov model derived from (b). All models are calibrated using population data in England and data from the medical literature. We show that the semi-Markov model aligns best with empirical evidence. We then consider net premiums of specialized life insurance products under various scenarios of cancer diagnosis and treatment. The results show strong dependence on the time spent with diagnosed or undiagnosed pre-metastatic BC. This proves to be significant for refining cancer survival estimates and accurately estimating related age dependence by cancer stage. In contrast, the industry-based model, by overlooking this critical factor, is more sensitive to the model assumptions, underscoring its limitations in cancer estimates.

This study aimed to compare reimbursement prices for new, innovative non-orphan drugs in Germany based on price negotiation and cost-effectiveness analysis, using the efficiency frontier (EF) approach and cost-utility analysis (CUA). For the EF, the next effective intervention and no intervention were used as comparators. Three pairwise comparisons were conducted: negotiation vs EF, CUA vs EF and negotiation vs CUA. For the comparison between negotiation and EF, relative risk reductions for a given added health benefit were assigned, and resulting price premiums were determined using an empirical estimate from the literature and a conceptual model. The difference between CUA vs EF was determined based on an aggregation rule and thresholds for CUA based on the average and marginal cost-effectiveness of the health care system. The difference between negotiation and CUA was determined through an indirect comparison. Price premiums based on negotiation are approximately 10–40 per cent higher than those based on EF using no intervention as a comparator. Furthermore, price premiums based on CUA (threshold at system-average cost-effectiveness) are approximately 25–50 per cent higher than those based on EF using no intervention as a comparator. The indirect comparison predicts that price premiums based on CUA (threshold at system-average cost-effectiveness) are approximately 10–15 per cent higher than those based on negotiation. For a threshold set at system-marginal cost-effectiveness, price premiums based on CUA are more than threefold higher than those based on negotiation. In the German health care system, CUA with a threshold set at system-average or system-marginal cost-effectiveness is predicted to yield higher reimbursement prices than price negotiations or the EF approach based on no intervention as a comparator.

This is the story of the Princeton Wine Group, a group whose membership has been relatively constant for almost 40 years. This group has enjoyed 244 blind tastings involving 1,708 different wines. A statistical analysis was performed at each tasting examining whether participants ranked the quality of wines similarly and whether the preferences of the group were correlated with several variables including professional wine ratings and the prices of the wine. The article concludes with a discussion of lessons learned from a lifetime of wine tastings.

This paper considers variable annuity (VA) contracts embedded with guaranteed minimum accumulation benefit (GMAB) riders when policyholder’s proceeds are taxed upon early surrender or maturity. These contracts promise the return of the premium paid by the policyholder, or a higher rolled-up value, at the end of the investment period. A partial differential equation valuation framework which exploits the numerical method of lines is used to determine fair fees that render the policyholder and insurer breakeven. Two taxation regimes are considered: one where capital gains are allowed to offset losses and a second where gains do not offset losses. Most insurance providers highlight the tax-deferred features of VA contracts. We show that the regime under which the insured is taxed significantly impacts prices. If losses are allowed to offset gains then this enhances the market, increasing the policyholder’s willingness to participate in the market compared to the case when losses are not allowed to offset gains. With fair fees from the policyholder’s perspective, we show that the net profit is generally positive for insurance companies offering the contract as a naked option without any hedge. We also show how investment policy, as reflected in the Sharpe ratio, impacts and interacts with policyholder persistency.

This commentary highlights the scientific history of the NIH-Moderna COVID-19 vaccine and corroborates Sarpatwari’s theme of private capture of value created by the public. The commentary also identifies missteps by the Trump and Biden Administrations and offers policy recommendations: better contracts with and incentives for pharmaceutical manufacturers and a not-for-profit “public option” for pharmaceutical development.

This article examines the issue of prices from a sociological standpoint. We show that, contrary to popular belief, price setting is always the result of social practices. We identify two main perspectives in the relevant literature. The first deals with the central notion of quality: price setting is a matter of judgement, arbitration and equipment. The second focuses on measurement practices, such as valuation and pricing, which occur before or during the transaction. These two complementary perspectives reveal a variety of processes that both determine prices and can be used to construct a typology based on two criteria: the moment of price setting, and the level of competition. Four different types of pricing mechanisms are distinguished: self-regulated, administered, composed, and bargained. We use examples to describe these different pricing types, and to show how such an approach contributes to our understanding of the economy.

Bismarckian health systems are mainly governed by social health insurers, but their role, status, and power vary across countries and over time. We compare the role of health insurers in three distinct social health insurance systems in improving health systems' efficiency. In France, insurers work together as a single payer within a highly regulated context. Although this gives insurers substantial bargaining power, collective negotiations with providers are highly political and do not provide appropriate incentives for efficiency. Both Germany and the Netherlands have introduced competition among insurers to foster efficiency. However, the rationale of insurer competition in Germany is unclear because contracts are mostly concluded at a collective level and individual insurers have little power to influence health system efficiency. In the Netherlands, insurer competition is substantially more effective, but primarily focused on price and cost containment. In all three countries, the role of insurers has been transforming slowly to respond to common challenges of assuring care quality and continuity for an ageing population. To assure sustainability, they need to ensure that care providers cooperate with the same quality and efficiency objectives, but their capacity to do so has been limited by insufficient support to enforce public information on provider quality.

This paper reviews the main pricing policies in Latin American countries, discussing their shortcomings. It also gives an overview of the most common pricing and reimbursement policies in Europe and describes in detail three well-established approaches — international price referencing, value-based pricing, including setting up of health technology assessment, and generic and biosimilar policies — building on country examples.

This paper proposes an approach to determine efficient release prices on the Bordeaux en primeur (primary) market. The model exploits information from the secondary market to estimate efficient release prices. We apply the model to a representative sample of wines from the 2021 vintage. The results show that most chateaux released their wines at prices that were too high. The median overpricing is 5.2% but exceeds 30% for some wines. This situation may be partially attributed to excessively uniform pricing caused by the tendency of chateaux with similar status to release their wines at similar price levels.

This essay is a review of and tribute to the life and contributions of Nina Shapiro, who passed away this year. Shapiro was an American Post-Keynesian economist, who was a bridge figure in radical economics, connecting Marx to Keynes, Schumpeter to Kaldor, the behavior of the firm to the dynamics of the macroeconomy, and the process of innovation to the organization of production and accumulation. She was seminal to important moments in the history of radical economics in the US, including the formation of the Hegel-inspired journal Social Concept in the 1980s and the Rutgers University’s Post-Keynesian circle in the 1980s and 1990s. Shapiro’s deeply philosophical and dialectical approach to firm behavior, innovation, and business cycles led her to theorize the “revolutionary character” of Post-Keynesian economics and to formulate a critique of the competitive neoclassical firm which, she argued, is at odds with the logic of capitalism in which firms seek to make profit and grow.

SARS-CoV-2 has unleashed an unprecedented global crisis that has caused the demand for essential goods, such as medical and sanitation products, to soar while simultaneously disrupting the very supply chains that allow individuals and institutions to obtain those essential goods. This has resulted in stark price increases and accusations of price gouging. We survey the existing philosophical literature that examines price gouging and identify the key arguments for regulators permitting such behavior and for regulators restricting such behavior. We demonstrate how the existing accounts are designed for localized emergencies rather than global persistent crises such as the coronavirus pandemic. In light of this, we highlight an understudied justification for price gouging that is much more salient during global crises: incentivizing increased production of essential goods. Furthermore, we pinpoint three conditions that help determine whether authorities should restrict price gouging during the coronavirus pandemic and similar global crises.